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31 Matrix ĀF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
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SUMMARY
This dissertation focuses on three topics. The first is the construction of a new
network model based on the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI), which is a measure
reflecting trade intensity between ports. We then use such a model to better understand
the patterns of world trade.
We also propose a new measure, called the Container Port Connectivity Index (CPCI),
to more accurately reflect the relative importance of container ports within the global
network of container shipping. Unlike any of the existing measures, this index is based on
both economics and network topology, where the strength of a port is based on the strength
of its connection to neighbors, and neighbors of those neighbors, and so on — not just
on local information such as the number of TEUs handled or direct links to other ports.
As measured by the CPCI, the most important ports are not necessarily those with the
most links, or those handling the most TEUs, but the ones with good connections to other
well-connected ports. This is a reflection of fact that the CPCI does not depend only on
the number of links but also on link quality and the connectivity of the ports to which they
connect.
This thesis also proposes a framework for evaluating market stability of a logistics hub in
a competitive environment. In particular, we build a model to predict how the community
of liners calling at a hub might develop as the result of actions by competitors. We can
use such a model to study the behavior of shipping lines, as well as the resulting trade-
flow changes, as the system gradually moves toward equilibrium. Our model predicts that
bigger lines are expected to be the first to move transshipment operations to a cheaper port,
thereby inducing the smaller ones to follow. Though our model is only preliminary and not
yet populated with actual data, it seems consistent with the observation of shipping line’s
relocation at the port of Singapore, where Maersk, the biggest operating line, was the first




1.1 Port Attractiveness and Measures of Port Importance
What makes a container port attractive as a logistics hub? From an operational point of
view, a port derives importance from three main factors. The first is the infrastructure
required to move containers, such as cranes, quays, hinterland transportation, and so on.
Another important factor is location, which includes geography, and, in particular, distance
from other ports. Finally, there is connectivity within the network of container shipping:
to what degree do shipping liners call at the port?
Practically, the annual number of TEUs handled is widely used as a traditional port
importance indicator. However, it is merely a local statistic that reflects handling and not
patterns of trade flow. To include more information about location and connectivity, others
have proposed more systematic measures of port importance that reflect something about
the position of the port in the global network of container shipping. Examples include degree
centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, or the number of origin-destination
pairs that the port serves — the Network Connectivity Index [85] and the Port Cooperative
Index [54]. Emphasizing on connectivity, nevertheless, all of these measures do not directly
reflect economics — and none exists, to the best of our knowledge.
On the other hand, from the economist’s point of view, the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has established another measure for comparing
countries’ trade competitiveness with respect to maritime logistics and transportation called
the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI), which is an aggregation of the following five
statistics: number of liner services calling, number of liner companies, number of ships,
combined container capacity of the ships (in TEUs), and capacity of the largest ship calling
[71]1. By construction, the LSCI implicitly treats each country as if it were a single location
1Despite the narrowness of focus and somewhat arbitrary method of aggregating component statistics,
the LSCI is based on hard numbers and is felt to accurately reflect trade competitiveness. Indeed, the LSCI
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and the entire rest of the world is its counterpart trading partner. Following the same idea,
we may establish an economics-based measure reflecting trade intensity between ports by
using the same calculation like that of the LSCI, except for ports rather than the countries.
Though the LSCI is meaningful to some extent, it still lacks ability to reflect port importance
from the network’s perspective.
Accordingly, in this dissertation, we propose to establish a new measure, called the Con-
tainer Port Connectivity Index (CPCI), to more accurately reflect the relative importance
of container ports taking both network structure and economic information into account.
In doing so, we first establish a new network model of container shipping called the Global
Container-Shipping Network (GCSN), which is constructed in such a way that there is a
link from port i to j, if there is direct service from port i to j. Furthermore, that link is
assigned a weight that is computed as the LSCI, reflecting direct connectivity and trade
intensity between ports. We then compute the CPCI by applying the Hyperlink-Induced
Topic Search (HITS) algorithm [46] to such a network.
In particular, the CPCI takes the proposed LSCI-like measure as link weights, reflecting
rate of container capacity moving between container ports, and assigns two types of impor-
tance scores to each port, that is, the inbound and outbound scores. Conceptually, a port
with a high inbound score has greater power to aggregate goods, and a port with a high
outbound score has greater power to distribute goods.
This measure has several advantages over the existing ones. Firstly, while the afore-
mentioned measures are based on either network topology or economic information, the
CPCI more directly reflects both. In addition, it provides separate scores for inbound and
outbound, which could consequently be used to analyze and explain the strategic position
that terminal ports serve independently. Finally, the CPCI supports what-if analysis in
such a way that survey-based indices, like the LSCI or the LPI, cannot.
has been observed to be strongly correlated with the Logistics Performance Index (LPI), a comprehensive
survey of perceptions that is reported annually by the World Bank [6].
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1.2 Market Stability of a Logistics Hub in a Competitive Environment
From a port’s perspective, in order to become a logistics hub, a port must possess at least two
important characteristics. The first is the infrastructure that allows customers, or shipping
lines, to operate at lower cost but with higher speed. The latter is its geographical location,
or centrality. A strategically located port with advanced and efficient infrastructure may
attract more liners, container flow, and so achieves the connectivity for freight consolidation
or transshipment — which, in turn, allows its customers to open new markets by calling at
such a port. Yet there are several threats that might affect the stability of such a hub.
It is worth noting that it is the customers of a port, not the port itself, that provide port
connectivity. Losing a customer inevitably reduces connectivity and so the attractiveness
of the port. This may, in turn, trigger a series of defections by others whose transshipment
opportunities have been reduced. A hub, especially the transshipment one, is more vulner-
able to this threat than the others due to its smaller demand and supply, which might not
otherwise justify port calls made by the liners.
One prominent example demonstrating this circumstance is the competition between
the ports of Singapore and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia [10]. While Tanjung Pelepas and
Singapore are located on the opposite side of the Johor Strait, next to each other, labor
cost at the port of Tanjung Pelepas is much lower. In order to secure lower operational
costs, in 2000, Maersk Sealand, the largest operating line at the port of Singapore, decided
to move its operating hub from the port of Singapore to the port of Tanjung Pelepas.
Afterward, in 2002, Evergreen, the second biggest line, also moved to the port of Tanjung
Pelepas. Under economic pressure on small lines, some have to establish connection services
to the port of Tanjung Pelepas in order to transship their containers with those who moved,
while the others have decided to follow them to the port of Tanjung Pelepas. By these
succession moves, the port of Singapore has lost millions of container flow to its competitor.
Ironically, the most important customer is also the greatest threat to the hub itself since
it could abandon the current hub and easily move to the competing ones, which increases
economic pressure on the rest to follow.
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Inspired by such an event, we establish an analytical framework to investigate and ex-
plain market stability of a logistics hub in a competition with other ports within its vicinity,
taking both ports’ and shipping lines’ decisions into consideration, where, at the state of
stability, no liner-shipping company is better off moving his business away to competing
ports. Conceptually, in our proposed scheme, port operators decide on the configurations
of their infrastructure and fees charged. And, once observed, liner-shipping companies then
decide on their operational plans that minimize their total operating costs via a model
called the Liner Shipping Cooperative Model.
Our proposed methodology differs from the existing research in three ways. Firstly,
while most of the existing models, such as [25], [26], and [27], may incorporate both explicit
and implicit costs into consideration, an implicit cost, such as waiting or congestion, is
improperly captured by a piecewise-linear function, where the containers are assessed with
different cost rates rather than one, as it should be in the steady state. In our proposed
cooperative model, we have addressed this issue by using an alternative modeling approach
assigning a single cost rate to all containers, called the piecewise-affine cost function [89].
Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to tackle this problem by means
of an optimization-based cooperative game theoretic approach. More precisely, instead of
defining relationship between interested quantities, we take advantage of the optimization
model to explain the mechanism among them.
Lastly, the structure of our proposed methodology allows us opportunity not only to
investigate the behavior of shipping lines taking port information into account but also
to provide insights into changes of container-flow patterns as the system gradually moves
toward equilibrium. This information, in turn, allows a logistics hub to comprehend and
quantify the threats posed by its competitors, which might consequently be used to devise
counter strategies or policies to safeguard its business.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapters 2 and 3, we pro-
vide comprehensive reviews of Centrality Measures and Community Structure, which would
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be used as foundation for the construction of the the Global Container-Shipping Network
(GCSN) and the Container Port Connectivity Index (CPCI) in Chapter 4. An interesting
extension of the CPCI is provided in Chapter 5, where the overall port importance score
is decomposed into components to help us better understand why a particular port has
become important — and by which factors.
The discussion of market stability of a logistics hub in a competitive environment is
provided in Chapter 6, while the detailed construction as well as the results of our proposed
framework is provided in Chapter 8. Since our model is constructed based on the concept of
cooperative game theory, where the Shapley value has played a prominent role in defining
the condition sustaining the stable community of customers at ports, readers might find
Chapter 7 to be useful as it provides a detailed discussion of the Shapley value, including
its interpretation and some interesting applications.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes our works, limitations, and future research directions —
particularly, the effects of the Panama Canal Expansion and the construction of a canal on
Kra Isthmus, the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula separating the Gulf of Thailand




In social networks, Centrality Measures are frequently used as tools to measure the potential
involvement of nodes in the networks. Although there are a great number of centrality
measures that have been established lately, they all could be arranged and grouped into
three categories, based on their dimensions of measurement, namely, (i) degree centrality,
(ii) closeness centrality, and (iii) betweenness centrality [17, 34, 35]. Some authors, such as
[17] and [45], classified eigenvector centrality as another class of centrality measures. Yet
it could be considered as a variant of degree centrality. Since eigenvector centrality and its
variants, such as the Google’s PageRank algorithm and the Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search
(HITS) algorithm, possess several important properties and play a prominent role in our
proposed ranking scheme, we will treat them separately from degree centrality. Based on the
foundations of these basic measures, many contemporary measures have been constructed,
including multidimension centrality, where the relationship among nodes are allowed to
interact with three or more entities. In order to show the viability of such tools, we also
provide several interesting applications of the centrality measures at the end of this chapter.
2.1 Terminology
Let G = (V,E) be a graph, or network, where V represents a set of nodes of size N , and E
represents a set of links or edges, which sometimes might be referred to as ties or lines in
the literature. In general, we frequently represent a network and its components by either
(i) an adjacency matrix or (ii) an incidence matrix.
• The adjacency matrix is a matrix where both of its rows and columns represent nodes.
The entry of such a matrix is one, if there exists an edge connecting nodes of the
underlying row and column, and zero otherwise.
• The incidence matrix is a matrix where each row and column represent a particular
6
node and edge, respectively. In addition, its entry is one for pairs of nodes incident
to an edge, and zero otherwise.
Another set of notations associated with connections between nodes is provided as fol-
lows.
• A walk is a sequence of nodes and adjacent edges.
• A trail is a walk with no repeated edges.
• A path is a trail with no repeated nodes.
2.2 Classical Centrality Measures
In this section, we explore the three classical centrality measures in Social Science, namely,
(i) degree centrality, (ii) closeness centrality, and (iii) betweenness centrality, which are the
foundations of the sophisticated centrality measures discussed in the following sections.
These three measures are different in terms of their control level. More specifically, degree
centrality is considered as a measure of immediate effect, since it counts only the number of
direct links connecting to its immediate neighbors, while betweenness centrality is regarded
as a measure of global control, since the centralities of other nodes depend on the position
of the interested one.
2.2.1 Degree Centrality
Degree centrality, the simplest centrality measure, measures an importance of a node based
on the number of direct links to its immediate neighbors. Mathematically, for any node i,







 1 , if there exists an edge connecting nodes i and j,0 , otherwise.
When the direction is of interest, in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality could be
defined using in-coming and out-going links instead of the adjacent ones.
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In the literature, the comparison of nodes’ degree centrality across networks could be
done by scaling such a measure into the range between 0 and 1 with the maximum theoretical
value [34]. In such a case, the theoretical maximum degree for any nodes in the network is






Since degree centrality of any node is independent of the others, it is usually referred to
as a measure of intermediate effect. Many variants of degree centrality are also studied in
the field of social science, such as (i) edge-weighted degree centrality, where the frequency of
connection between nodes is also included in the calculation, (ii) k-path centrality, where all
paths of length k or less emanating from a node are counted instead of immediate connecting
edges, (iii) geodesic k-path centrality, which is similar to k-path centrality; but, we count
only the shortest paths up to length k, starting from a node of interest, (iv) edge-disjoint k-
path centrality, which counts all paths of lengths up to k between two nodes with no shared
edges, and (v) vertex-disjoint k-path centrality, which is quite similar to edge-disjoint k-path
centrality; but, in this case, repeated nodes are prohibited.
2.2.2 Closeness Centrality
An alternative concept of centrality may be based on total shortest distance from a node to
the rest of the network, which is known as closeness centrality. Mathematically, closeness





where d(i, j) is the shortest path length from node i to j.
Notice that the measure defined in Equation (3) is indeed a farness measure, i.e. the
larger the value of CC(i), the less centrality a node possesses. In order to make a better
interpretable measure, we may redefine closeness centrality by using Equation (4) instead






Similar to that of degree centrality, for comparison purpose, the standardized closeness





It is worth mentioning that, when a network is not strongly connected, closeness cen-
trality is not well defined, i.e. there would be some nodes j ∈ V with d(i, j) = ∞. In
order to avoid such a circumstance, one can consider only the reachable nodes from node i,





Information centrality is one interesting variant of closeness centrality, where the cen-
trality of a node is defined as the difference of node’s closeness when node deactivation is
allowed [51].
2.2.3 Betweenness Centrality
The concept of betweenness centrality is based on the observation that the communication
between any pairs of nodes usually depends on a set of nodes that lies between them. Based
on this idea, a node that lies on many shortest paths might be considered as the most central
one. More formally, betweenness centrality, denoted as CB(i), is defined as Equation (7).
CB(i) =
∑
i 6=j 6=k gjk(i)
gjk
, (7)
where gjk denotes the number of shortest paths connecting nodes j and k, and gjk(i)
denotes the number of shortest paths connecting nodes j and k passing intermediate node i.
In the literature, betweenness centrality is sometimes referred to as a measure of information
control, since the most central node could be viewed as the most important information
gateway [17].
Many interesting variants of betweenness centrality include (i) group betweenness cen-
trality [47], where the influence of a set of nodes are of interest rather than that of an
individual node, (ii) co-betweenness cetrality [47], where the shortest paths counted must
pass a pair of interested nodes, (iii) flow betweenness centrality, whose calculation is based
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on the concept of maximum flow, where all information is treated like fluid continuously
pumped through the network, (iv) random-walk betweenness centrality [64], where infor-
mation is assumed to flow freely from node to node, and (v) communicability betweenness
centrality [22], which is quite similar to random-walk betweenness centrality; but, in this
case, only self-avoiding paths are considered and counted.
Although betweenness centrality provides us better insight into node importance, its
computational time is much greater than those of the previous measures, especially in large
and complex networks.
2.3 Eigenvector Centrality
The main feature that differentiates eigenvector centrality from the others is the way it
defines node centrality. In many classes of networks, centrality might be a function of the
interaction among nodes rather than the intrinsic properties of a node itself. For example,
in social network, if we are chosen by someone popular, our status should be higher than
that if being chosen by the least popular ones. Based on this idea, if we let xi be the
centrality of node i and aij be the weighted contribution that node i gives to node j, we
have xi = a1ix1 + a2ix2 + . . .+ anixn. When we write this relationship in matrix form, we
have,
ATx = x, (8)
where matrix A represents weighted contribution of all adjacent nodes.
Interestingly, solving such a set of linear equations for x is equivalent to finding the
eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue of one. However, this might be infeasible if one
is not a member of the eigenvalues of AT . In order to make such a system of equations
solvable [13], eigenvector centrality, denoted as CE , is defined as Equation (9).
λCE = A
TCE , (9)
where λ and CE are the principal eigenvalue and eigenvector corresponding to matrix
AT , respectively.
Note that, when negative relationships exist, our popularity might decrease if we are
associated with someone being disliked by the others. In such a case, eigenvector centrality
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defined in Equation (9) is still applicable, with a slight modification (see [14] for more
details).
Similar to all centrality measures, eigenvector centrality has some properties that might
be considered as its weaknesses. First of all, in directed networks, nodes with zero in-degree
possess zero centrality and any nodes being pointed by them would gain no contribution.
For example, all nodes shown in Figure 1 have zero eigenvector centrality, since nodes 1 and




Figure 1: A network with all zero eigenvector centrality [13].
As a remedy, we might add initial status, denoted as ε, which is independent of interac-
tion among nodes to all nodes [13]. This modified version of eigenvector centrality is called
alpha-centrality, which is defined as Equation (10).
αATx+ ε = λx, (10)
where x is the alpha-centrality and α is the relative importance of peers’ contribution.
It is also known that, in regular graphs, i.e. networks where all nodes have the same
degree, eigenvector centrality yields the same result as degree centrality [11, 23], which, con-
sequently, provides no meaningful information. However, this might be viewed as a property
rather than its drawback in the networks that degree of nodes drives their importance [11].
In the literature, broader class of centrality measures based on the eigen analysis is
called spectral centrality measures [75], which include the Google’s PageRank algorithm and
the Hypertext Induced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm.
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2.4 Google’s PageRank Algorithm
The PageRank algorithm is an algorithm used by Google Search Engine, where a page is
assigned an importance score, or centrality value, based on the number of its backlinks and
their importance. For example, consider an example of a network with four pages shown
in Figure 2, let xk be the importance score of page k, where xi > xj implies that page i
is more important than page j. By using the number of page’s backlinks as a measure of
page importance, pages 3 and 1 will be the most and the least important ones, respectively.
However, from the practical standpoint, the links from important pages should be much
more valuable than those of the trivial ones. Therefore, we may redefine the importance







where Lk is the set of page k’s backlinks and nj is the number of emanating links from
page j used to scale the importance score of each page j ∈ Lk.
1 2
34
Figure 2: An example network with four pages [19].
If we rewrite Equation (11) in matrix form, we then have a linear system Ax = x, where
the entry aij of matrix A is the weighted contribution that page i obtains from its backlink
page j.
In our example, by scaling the solution of Ax = x with an additional equality
∑
j xj = 1,
the importance score vector of these four pages is [0.129 0.194 0.290 0.387]T . With this
ranking scheme, it has been revealed that, indeed, page 4, not page 3, is the most important
page, while page 1 remains the least important one, which could be explained as follows:
since the importance score of a particular page i is transmitted from several source pages to
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such a page, a link from a page with higher importance score contributes more than those
of the trivial ones. In this case, page 4 could be accessed only by page 3 and page 3 could
be accessed by any pages; thus, the importance of page 4 has been increased by its backlink
page, namely, page 3.
In practice, web surfers might end up with pages with no outgoing links, such as pdf
documents or pages containing only picture files. From network perspective, this type of
page is called the dangling node. For example, in Figure 3, page 3 has no outgoing links;




Figure 3: Page 3, which is a dangling node, has no outgoing link.
With the existence of dangling nodes, importance scores of all nodes other than the
dangling ones will be zero. In order to address this issue, we may fictitiously create out-
going links from the dangling nodes to all nodes, including themselves, with some specific
probability vector, called the personalization vector V . For example, if V = 1ne, where e is
a column vector of all unity entries, we assume that once a web surfer reaches a dangling
node, the probability that she will move to any pages is 1n . In the literature, we refer to
this assumption as the idealized random web surfer assumption [98].
It was shown in [19] that, when the network consists of several unconnected subnetworks,
there was no unique importance score. But this could be fixed by maintaining network
connectedness. In doing so, matrix A is modified to matrix M as shown by Equation (12).
M = mA+ (1−m)S, (12)
where A is a modified matrix A after adding fictitious links to all dangling nodes, S is
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an n× n square matrix, where all elements are 1n , and m, known as a damping factor (see
[50] for more details), is a real number within the range of 0 to 1. In general, m is set at
0.85. Observe that such a matrix is maximally irreducible and column stochastic, i.e. each
column is added up to one, which guarantees having only one eigenvalue on its spectral circle
[49]. Interestingly, this problem is equivalent to the problem of finding limiting probability
of an ergodic markov chain.
Example 2.4.1 Consider a network of seven pages shown in Figure 4, where matrix A
is shown by Equation (13). Since page 7 is a dangling node, or an absorbing state in the
















0 0 0 14 0 0 0
0 13
1
2 0 0 0 0
0 13 0 0 0 0 0
0 13 0
1
4 0 0 0
0 0 0 14 0 1 0

(13)
By adding fictitious links connecting page 7 to all pages, including page 7 itself, the
modified matrix A could be constructed and shown by Equation (14), where the resulting
importance score vector of all pages is [0.085 0.239 0.066 0.143 0.11 0.146 0.212]T . Based
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If we replace matrix A with matrix M using expression (12) with an equiprobable per-
sonalization vector, i.e. V = 17e, and set m as 0.85, the resulting importance score vector of
all pages would be [0.135 0.170 0.130 0.143 0.133 0.139 0.151]T . Still, pages 2 and 3 remain
the most and the least important ones in the network.
It is worth noting that, based on random surfer assumption, the personalization vector
is equiprobable and it might not properly reflect the interest of web surfers’ inquiry. For
better quality of search engine, the Biased PageRank algorithm has been developed by using
the customized personalization vector for each web surfer instead [50].
2.5 The HITS Algorithm
While the Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS) algorithm [46] and the Google’s PageR-
ank algorithm fall into the same class of centrality measure, where node importance is
derived from the principal eigenvector, the HITS algorithm provides two different scores
based on two different functions of the web pages, namely, the authority and the hub scores,
as output.
In this context, a good authority page is a page with many in-coming links, while a good
hub page is a page with many out-going links (see Figure 5). The main idea of the HITS
algorithm is that any authority pages being pointed from important hub pages should be
considered as important authority pages, and vice versa.
Mathematically, we can say that the hub score of a page is a function of authority pages,






Figure 5: An illustration of hub and authority pages.









where E is the set of links and λ is the weighted constant of such functions. If we replace
(i) all yi in Equation (15) with that of Equation (16), (ii) all xi in Equation (16) with that
of Equation (15), and rewrite them in matrix form, we can calculate these two scores by
Equations (17) and (18).
λx = AT y ⇒ λ2x = ATAx, (17)
λy = Ax⇒ λ2y = AAT y, (18)
where A is an adjacency matrix. In the literature, ATA and AAT are referred to as the
authority and the hub matrices. Since ATA and AAT are both symmetric, all eigenvalues
are positive. Both the authority and the hub scores are properly defined by the principal
eigenvectors corresponding to each matrix.
2.6 Multidimension Centrality Measure
Interestingly, most of the centrality measures discussed so far emphasize only the rela-
tionship between two entities; however, in practice, additional entities might be required
to completely explain the interaction among them. For example, in a buyer-seller-broker
transaction, we need three interactions to be recognized all at once, see Figure 61.




Figure 6: A network representing a buyer-seller-broker transaction.
We may represent multidimensional relationship among entities by hyperedge and hy-
pergraph, where a hyperedge is an edge connecting more than two nodes at a time and a
graph containing hyperedges is called a hypergraph. For example, the network shown in







Figure 7: A hypergraph containing three buyer-seller-broker transactions [12].
In this setting, a hypergraph can be described by means of an incidence matrix, where
rows and columns of such a matrix represent hyperedges and nodes, respectively. For
example, the incidence matrix of the network shown in Figure 7 could be written as follows.
A =

1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1

Based on the construction of the hypergraph, each node might be involved in more than
one transaction, whose importance differs by its involving members. In this circumstance,
node importance does not depend only on the entities it is connected with but also on the
transactions it involves. Based on this fact and the concept of eigenvector centrality, we may
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apply Expressions (17) and (18) on matrix A to obtain two different importance measures;
one for node, denoted as x, and another for hyperedge, denoted as y.
With this approach, it has been revealed that the most centrality nodes of the network
shown in Figure 7 are Seller2 and Broker1, as expected, since they are involved in two out of
three transactions, and the most important transaction is the one involving Buyer2, Seller2,
and Broker1.
It is worth noting that the measurement hyperedges, i.e. fictitious hyperedges measuring
group centrality, must be treated differently — using small values to represent those edges
in the matrix — when they are added to the incidence matrix since they might reduce the
importance of data hyperedges [12].
2.7 Other Contemporary Centrality Measures
Notice that most of the standard centrality measures, like degree, closeness, and betweenness
centralities, implicitly make several assumptions about (i) the trajectory of information
flow and (ii) the method of information spread [15]. Regarding the trajectory assumption,
closeness and betweenness centralities, for example, count only the shortest paths since we
assume that the information always flows through such paths. However, in many cases, such
an assumption does not hold. For example, consider the spread of news, where the senders
have no information about the shortest paths; thus, using them as centrality measures is
definitely inappropriate. Regarding method of spread, interested information might be an
indivisible object flowing only on one path, such as the pathway of novel in the community,
or it might be simultaneously spread out from a node like an infection. Thus, one measure
might be preferable to the others, and its appropriateness mostly depends on the critical
characteristic of information flowing throughout the network.
By properly altering these assumptions and adding practical constraints based on net-
work perspectives, many contemporary centrality measures have been established. The
examples include as (i) subgraph centrality [24], which is defined as the sum of weighted
closed walk of any length k, (ii) entropy-based centrality [90], which is developed based on
path-transfer processes, like a chain letter network, where any node has an ability either
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to stop or transmit information flow to the others, and (iii) alternative path centrality [81],
where the contribution of a node in backup paths is also part of its centrality.
Interestingly, while these centrality measures emphasize connectivity, additional infor-
mation inherited on both nodes and edges is treated equally important, or even worse as
it might be neglected. For example, in social networks, all connections are assumed to
be equal in terms of influence, which might not be true in practice. Similarly, in logistics
networks, where each node and edge has different capacity, throwing away such information
and focusing only on connectivity may not reflect centrality of a node properly.
In the literature, there are only few measures incorporating network components’ infor-
mation into consideration. For example, (i) generalized classical centralities [72], where the
authors have extended the use of weighted edges into the calculation of degree, closeness,
and betweenness centralities, (ii) weighted graph centrality [63], where weighted edges are
used for the calculation of eigenvector centrality, and (iii) path value and path length mea-
sures [101], where path value is defined as a measure of bottleneck link of a path connecting
two nodes, and path length is defined as the summation of weighted links comprising a path
between two nodes.
2.8 Applications of Centrality Measures
In this section, we will provide a detailed discussion of several interesting applications of
centrality measures in a more realistic setting. We begin with the establishment of two
indices for measuring port connectivity in maritime logistics networks, called the Network
Connectivity Index (NCI) [85] and the Port Cooperation Index (PCI) [54]. The next is the
implicit use of eigenvector centrality in college football ranking [74]. And finally, we present
a contemporary concept of defining key players in social networks [16].
2.8.1 The Network Connectivity Index
In a maritime logistics network, a shipping line must decide where to host its operation,
which is usually known as hub selection problem in the literature. This decision depends
on several factors which dynamically change with regard to both ports’ and other lines’
decisions.
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In the literature, this problem is typically solved by means of empirical methods, such
as the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) or the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL). Since
these traditional methods depend mostly on surveys, subjectivity may not be avoided. In
order to reduce subjectivity, [85] proposed a new measure of port attractiveness reflecting
port connectivity based on the total number of origin-destination (O-D) pairs that such a
port served, called the Network Connectivity Index (NCI).
In that setting, given a network of ports G, we have the following.
• Ai is a set of O-D pairs served by an individual port i and n(Ai) is the total number
of such pairs which could be calculated by Equation (19).
n(Ai) = 2ninij + 2nijnij , (19)
where ni is the number of exclusive ports that could be reached by port i including
port i itself, accounting for the transshipment at port i, and nij is the number of
common ports that could be reached by both ports i and j.
• Ai ∩Aj is a set of O-D pairs served by both ports i and j and n(Ai ∩Aj) is the total
number of such pairs which could be calculated by Equation (20).
n(Ai ∩Aj) = 2nijnij (20)
• Ai ∪ Aj is a set of O-D pairs served by either port i or port j and n(Ai ∪ Aj) is the
total number of such pairs which could be calculated by Equation (21).
n(Ai ∪Aj) = 2nij(ni + nj + nij) (21)
• Ai ⊗ Aj is a set of O-D pairs jointly served by both ports i and j and n(Ai ⊗ Aj) is
the total number of such pairs which could be calculated by Equation (22).
n(Ai ⊗Aj) = 2ninj (22)
Since Ai∪Aj and Ai⊗Aj are mutually independent, we have n((Ai∪Aj)∪ (Ai⊗Aj)) =
2(ni + nij)(nj + nij) and, by definition, the network connectivity index of node i, denoted
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2(ni + nij)(nj + nij) (23)
Example 2.8.1 Consider the network shown in Figure 8, where ports i and j have served
five and four destination ports, respectively. Among these ports, ports 4 and 5 are considered









Figure 8: An example of network for the calculation of the NCI [85].
Based on the aforementioned notations, we have ni = 5 + 1− 2 = 4, nj = 4 + 1− 2 = 3,
and nij = 2. From Equation (23), total number of O-D pairs between ports i and j is
2× (4 + 2)(3 + 2) = 60.
In addition, for comparison purpose, one can scale such an index by the theoretical
maximum number of O-D pairs, which leads to Expression (24).
NCi =
∑
j 2(ni + nij)(nj + nij)∑
i
∑
j 2(ni + nij)(nj + nij)
(24)
Observe that the NCI is indeed a variant of betweenness centrality, where the shortest
path assumption is relaxed.
2.8.2 The Port Cooperation Index
To emphasize the sustainability of ports in a competitive environment, [54] developed an-
other index for measuring degree of cooperation between a pair of ports, called the Port
Cooperation Index (PCI). The PCI is derived from the observation that total number of
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O-D pairs served between any pairs of ports are either cooperative or competitive routes.
In the first case, a cooperative route is an O-D pair requiring connection from both ports;
and, in the latter case, a competitive route is an O-D pair that could be reached by either
port.
For clarity, consider two networks shown in Figure 9. While ports i and j have a perfectly







5 i 2 j
1
3
Figure 9: Networks with perfect cooperative and competitive structures [54].
If we let Ai denote a set of O-D pairs served by an individual port i with either coop-
eration or competition with port j and n(Ai) is the total number of such pairs, we could
calculate n(Ai) by Equation (25).
n(Ai) = ninj + nij(ni + nj + nij), (25)
where ni and nij are defined the same way as those of the NCI.
Notice that the first term of Expression (25) could be viewed as cooperative routes,
and the latter one may be regarded as the competitive routes. The degree of cooperation
between any pairs of ports could be defined as the ratio between total number of O-D pairs
that both ports have jointly served and total number of O-D pairs served either by port i or




(ni + nij)(nj + nij)
(26)
Similarly, degree of competition between a pair of ports i and j, called the Port Compet-
itive Index (PCI), is the ratio between total number of O-D pairs independently achieved
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without deploying direct connection between them and total number of O-D pairs served
either by port i or port j.
PCI(ij) =
nij(ni + nj + nij)
(ni + nij)(nj + nij)
(27)
2.8.3 College Football Ranking
In [74], a variant of eigenvector centrality was introduced and used to primarily reduce the
subjectivity of the existing college football ranking scheme — which was mostly based on
polls and the opinions of experts. Based on the fact that (i) the number of matches played
are much fewer than the number of existing teams (indeed, the games are mostly played in
conference system where a conference consists of a number of teams in the same region) and
(ii) the strength of schedule, i.e. some teams might have to play with some tough teams
compulsorily since they are in the same conference, should be considered in the ranking
scheme, ranking them all in one list would require a more formal unbiased scheme which
could be established through the concept of direct and indirect wins.
In this context, indirect win is defined based on logical implication. For example, if
team A has beaten team B, and team B has beaten team C, this intuitively implies that
team A has indirectly beaten team C with the length of two (see Figure 10). As this length
keeps increasing, indirect wins might not properly reflect the true strength of a team. And,
therefore, indirect win should be weighted with some values, where the longer the length,
the less the weight is assigned.
A B
C
Figure 10: An example of indirect win of length two, which is shown by bold arrow [74].
Based on the aforementioned, given an adjacency matrix A, where aij denotes the num-
ber of times team i has beaten team j, direct and indirect wins of length two of team i
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could be calculated by Equations (28) and (29), respectively.








By applying weighting factor α to all lengths of indirect win, team i’s win score, denoted







































where kini is the in degree of team i.
In [74], the rank of a team is defined and ordered by the difference between win and loss
scores, denoted as si, where si = wi − li. In matrix form, win and loss scores of all teams
could be rewritten as Equations (32) and (33).
w = kout + αA · w
= (I − αA)−1 · kout (32)
l = kin + αAT · w
= (I − αAT )−1 · kin (33)
It has been shown in [74] that this measure is well defined as long as the value of α is
smaller than the principal eigenvalue of matrix A.
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2.8.4 Key Players in Social Networks
In [16], two new problems associated with key player identification in social networks were
introduced, (i) the Key Player Problem/Negative (KPP-Neg) and (ii) the Key Player Prob-
lem/Positive (KPP-Pos). In the KPP-Neg, key players are the ones whose absence would
reduce the cohesiveness of the network. The examples of the KPP-Neg are as follows.
• In public health, we might want to immunize or quarantine a set of people in order
to prevent the epidemic.
• In military, we might want to arrest a set of terrorists in order to interrupt its network.
In contrast, key players of the KPP-Pos are the ones whose presence would maximize
the connectedness of the network. Some examples of such a problem are provided below.
• In public health, we might need to select a set of people to act as seeds to diffuse the
practices that would promote better health in society.
• In military, we might want to select a set of double agents in order to spread misin-
formation to the terrorist network.
Standard centrality measures might not appropriately identify key players in both prob-
lems since (i) the objectives of the problems are different and (ii) centrality of one node
depends on the centrality of the others. For clarity, in the KPP-Neg, deleting a node with
high centrality might not reduce the cohesiveness comparing to that of the trivial ones
(see Figure 11). Similarly, in the KPP-Pos, adding one more highly central node might
not increase the connectedness of the network since the added node might have the same
neighbors as those of the existing ones (see Figure 12).
In both cases, the redundancy principle might explain the reason of such consequences.
More precisely, the redundancy of the KPP-Neg is associated with the bridges linking the
same third parties, while the redundancy of the KPP-Pos is associated with adjacency and











Figure 11: Although node 1 is the most centrality node, deleting such a node does not





Figure 12: The addition of node B in the network does not provide any benefit in terms of
network connectedness [16].
For example, an appropriate measure for the KPP-Neg might be the number of fragments
after node deletion; however, this proposed measure does not account for the size of each
fragment. In order to incorporate fragmental size into consideration, the number of pairs of
nodes that are disconnected from each other might be a better representation reflecting key










where rij equals one if we can reach j from node i, and zero otherwise.
Notice that the computation time of Equation (34) is quite expensive, especially in large
and complex networks, since all pairs of nodes must be evaluated for connectedness. For-
tunately, since a node in one fragment cannot communicate with nodes in other fragments,
we might alternatively compute such a measure by using the size of each fragment, denoted
by sk, where k is the fragment index, instead of the number of pairwise reachable nodes.
F = 1−
∑










where aij equals one if nodes i and j are adjacent to each other, and zero otherwise.
However, the redundancy with respect to the adjacency has not yet been captured by such
an expression. To include such information, a more complicated cohesion measure might









is a non-specific aggregation function like maximization or minimization. For
example, in terms of maximization aspect, Ck measures the maximum nodes outside k that
the members of k are adjacent to.
2.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive review of centrality measures beginning with
the three classical centrality measures, namely, degree, closeness, and betweenness. While
interesting, these measures rely too much on several strict assumptions about information
flow, making them less appropriate in practice. To make them more informative, many
variants of them are extensively revised by removing those restrictions and/or incorporating
relevant network topology as part of the computation.
We complete the discussion of centrality measures by providing several applications of
such measures in a more realistic setting, including (i) the establishment of port connectivity
indices, (ii) the development of a new ranking scheme for college football teams, and (iii)
the formulation of new measures reflecting centrality of nodes in different settings.
Based on the concept of centrality measures, in Chapter 4, we introduce a new measure
of port importance, named as the Container Port Connectivity Index (CPCI), which is
computed by the HITS algorithm, where the resulting scores are referred to as the inbound
and outbound scores.
We also show that (in Chapter 5) the CPCI could be implemented in a disaggregation
fashion, where the overall port importance score is decomposed into components. With
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this decomposition scheme, we could make a detailed analysis on how a port has become
important — and by which factors.
Besides centrality measures, another fundamental characteristic of networks which is
extensively studied in social science is community structure, where the network is divided
into groups of nodes with dense and strong connections among themselves but sparser and
weaker connections to the others. For smooth transition, we will next discuss community




Besides centrality measures, Community Structure might be regarded as another fundamen-
tal characteristic of a network. While there is no well-defined definition for a community,
in our study, we choose a generally accepted term, where a community within a network
is a group of nodes with dense and strong connections among themselves but sparser and
weaker connections to the others. It is well known that community detection problem is
NP-complete [18] and there exist many algorithms to solve such a problem. One prominent
class of algorithms that we will discuss in this Chapter is the Spectrum-Based Algorithms,
which use eigenvectors as guidelines for dividing a network into communities such that the
modularity value is maximized. It is worth noting that this class of algorithms is mainly
used in a non-overlapping setting, where each node is a member of only one community. For
the overlapping case, where a node might be a member of multiple communities, a commu-
nity adjusting algorithm is introduced. Conceptually, a hard partition of non-overlapping
community structure is transformed into a soft partition of the overlapping one guided by a
local measure of improvement, called community strength [96]. We also discuss a systematic
way of comparing community structures over time, based on the similarity value [102].
3.1 Introduction
Community structure has played an important role in network analysis. It helps us un-
derstand interaction among nodes; in many cases, it provides us valuable insights into
intrinsic characteristics of the underlying network, which consequently allows us to explain
the mechanism of the system, as well as expected behavior of its members. For example,
by revealing the communities of customers of an online retailer network, we can enhance
operational efficiency by directing the right services to the right groups of customers.
In the literature, communities might be referred to as clusters and there are numerous
methodologies to identify communities within a network. The traditional ones are Graph
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Partitioning and Hierarchical Clustering Methods. In the first method, a network is parti-
tioned into a specific number of groups such that the total number of edges running between
groups is minimal. Since the optimal number of groups is usually unknown and it differs
from one to another network, finding the best partition may seem computationally pro-
hibitive, especially in large and complex networks. In the latter method, the clusters of
nodes are iteratively constructed based on some predefined criteria, using either agglomer-
ative or divisive algorithms. For example, the Girvan-Newman Algorithm (GN) [37] used
edge betweenness as a criterion for constructing a cluster — where edge betweenness of a
link was defined as the total number of the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes running
through such a link. If there were more than two shortest paths, each path was counted so
that the summation was unity. Since links with high edge betweenness are the ones act-
ing like gateways, where the flow of information between communities must pass through,
deleting such links would reveal community structure of the network. In [37], they shown
that the GN algorithm gave better results compared to those of the standard hierarchical
methods on several benchmarking networks.
Unfortunately, in weighted network, where the weight of an edge is defined as the re-
ciprocal of its length, the GN algorithm performs badly, since it tends to remove edges
that connect nearby nodes together; i.e. the flow is expected to flow via the shortest paths
and nodes that are closely connected usually attract more edge betweenness [63]. In order
to improve the performance of the GN algorithm in weighted network, [63] proposed an
extension of such an algorithm by replacing weighted edges with multi-edges. With this
modification, the shortest paths would remain unchanged, but they would be counted less
and less if they possess higher weight.
Another class of community detection methodologies extensively studied in Social Sci-
ence is the Modularity Maximization Method, where the modularity value is the mathemat-
ical reflection of community’s definition.
Definition 3.1.1 A community within a network is a collection of vertices in which the
connections among themselves are dense, but they are sparser across communities.
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More specifically, the modularity value is defined as the difference between actual and
expected edges within a community. Clearly, the higher the modularity value, the stronger
the community structure is, and, the optimal community structure is the one that maximizes
such a value.
Mathematically, the modularity function for undirected unweighted networks [65] could













• Aij is the actual number of edges connecting nodes i and j, which is either 1 or 0,
when A is an adjacency matrix,
• ki and kj are degrees of nodes i and j, respectively,
• m is the half of total number of edges within the network, i.e. 2m =
∑
ij Aij ,
• δ(ci, cj) = 1, if nodes i and j are in the same community, and 0 otherwise.





















i kij are out-degrees of node i and in-degrees of node j,
respectively,






















• wij denotes the weight of an edge connecting nodes i and j,
• wouti =
∑











Based on the fact that the modularity maximization problem is NP-complete, even
in undirected unweighted networks [18], numerous heuristics have been proposed in order
to tackle this problem, including Spectrum-Based Methods, where eigenvectors are used as
guidelines for dividing a network into communities.
3.2 Spectrum-Based Methods
In this section, a detailed discussion of two interesting spectral clustering algorithms,
namely, the Leading Eigenvector Method and the Multi-Eigenvector Method, is provided.
In the first method, only the principal eigenvector is used for the partitioning, while, in
the latter method, we use as many eigenvectors as possible, up to the number of positive
eigenvalues plus one, for the clustering.
3.2.1 The Leading Eigenvector Method
The leading eigenvector method is an iterative method, where a network is partitioned into
two subgraphs, or communities, using only the principal eigenvector. For better under-
standing, we will first discuss the development of this method in a simpler case and then
extend its results to the more general cases.
Given an undirected unweighted network of size N and its associated modularity func-
tion defined by Equation (38), we redefine δ(ci, cj) by replacing it with two belonging




(sisj + 1), (41)
where
sk =
 1 , if k belongs to community 1,−1 , if k belongs to community 2.
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If both nodes i and j are in the same community, δ(ci, cj) = 1, and δ(ci, cj) = 0
otherwise. Additionally, let s be a column vector consisting of all s′is, then the modularity



























where B is a real symmetric matrix, called the modularity matrix, whose element Bij is
defined as Bij = Aij − kikj2m . Since the row sum of the modularity matrix is always zero, its
spectral radii must contain zero. If we let s =
∑N
i aiui and ai = u
T
i s, where ui is the i
th























































where λi is the i
th eigenvalue of the modularity matrix. Based on Equation (43), if λi is
ordered in a non-increasing order, i.e. λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λN , we can maximize Q by pairing
a2i in the same order as that of λi.
As we use only the principal eigenvector in this method, the value of Q will depend only
on the value of a21. And since ai = u
T
i s, where si is either 1 or -1, a
2
1 is maximized only
when the positive s′is are matched with the positive elements of the principal eigenvector,
and vice versa. More precisely, in order to maximize the modularity value Q, si must be
assigned a value based on the sign of its associated element of the principle eigenvector as
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shown in Equation (44).
si =
 1 , if u
(1)
i > 0,




i is the i
(th) element of the principal eigenvector.
Algorithm 1 shows the summary of the leading eigenvector method where a network is
partitioned into two subgraphs, or communities, based on the sign of the principal eigen-
vector’s elements.
Algorithm 1 The Leading Eigenvector Method: The partition of a network into 2 com-
munities
1: Input: A network of size N , where N > 1
2: Compute the principal eigenpair (λ1,u1) of the modularity matrix B, where Bij =
Aij − kikj2m .
3: if λ1 is positive then
4: Assign the value of si based on the sign of its associated element of the principal
eigenvector, that is, si = 1 if such an element is positive, and si = −1 otherwise.
5: if sTBs is positive then
6: return Two communities
7: else
8: return Original network
9: end if
10: else
11: return Original network
12: end if
Observation 3.2.1 Since zero eigenvalue is always a member of the modularity matrix’s
spectrum radii, when Algorithm 1 terminates, either the original network or the two parti-
tioned subgraphs must be returned as output.
For further partitioning, we cannot iteratively apply Algorithm 1 to the resulting sub-
graphs since we will unintentionally neglect the connecting edges between communities.
Instead, we have to modify the algorithm so that connecting edges between subgraphs
are part of the modularity value’s calculation in further divisions. This could be done by
computing the incremental value of Q, denoted as ∆Q, from subgraph partitioning.
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where δij = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise, and,
B
(g)




Algorithm 2 provides the summary of subgraph partitioning. Similar to Algorithm 1,
Algorithm 2 takes any subgraph g as input, and returns two subcommunities that maximally
increase the incremental modularity value, or the original subgraph, if no improvement on
Q has been found.
Algorithm 2 The Leading Eigenvector Method: Subgraph Partitioning
1: Input: A subgraph of Ng, where Ng > 1
2: Establish matrix B(g) and compute the principal eigenpair (λ1,u1) of B
(g).
3: if λ1 is positive then
4: Assign the value of si based on the sign of its associated element of the principal
eigenvector, that is, si = 1 if such an element is positive, and si = −1 otherwise.
5: if sTB(g)s is positive then
6: return Two subcommunities
7: else
8: return Original subgraph
9: end if
10: else
11: return Original subgraph
12: end if
Observation 3.2.2 Since the row sum of B(g) is zero for all rows, zero eigenvalue is always
a member of its spectrum radii. When Algorithm 2 terminates, either the original subgraph
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or the two partitioned subgraphs are returned, and, in the latter case, the modularity value
is definitely improved.
Observation 3.2.3 Since the number of communities is bounded by the size of the net-
work. Eventually, when Algorithm 2 terminates, community structure of a network would
be revealed, together with its associated modularity value Q.
As a heuristic, the leading eigenvector method might err and misplace nodes in wrong
community, especially in large and complex networks — since the magnitude of the principal
eigenvector is preserved and distributed to all members of the network. In order to alleviate
this effect, a simple fine-tuning process (see Algorithm 3) might be implemented at the end
of each partitioning. The concept of a fine-tuning process is to swap node’s community, one
at a time, until no improvement has been found [66].
Algorithm 3 A Fine-Tuning Process (First Search)
1: Input: A network of size N , where N > 1, and vector s
2: For the first member of the list, swap its community and evaluate new modularity value
(or new incremental modularity value).
3: if the new modularity value (or the new incremental modularity value) increases then
4: Swap node community and back to line 2.
5: else
6: Move to the next member of the list and repeat the evaluation of node swapping
until no improvement has been found.
7: end if
8: return An updated list of community members
When the network is directed, matrix A might be asymmetrical, as well as the mod-
ularity matrix B. In such a case, there is no guarantee that B is diagonalizable; thus,
Algorithms 1 and 2 might fail to reveal community structure of the network. In [67], an
extension of the leading eigenvector method on directed networks was established. Con-
ceptually, the modularity matrix B, as well as B(g), is modified so that it has become




sT (B + BT )s, (47)
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sT (B(g) + B(g)T )s, (48)
where δij = 1, if i = j, and 0 otherwise, and,
B
(g)







For directed weighted networks, the modularity value and its incremental value from
the partitioning are defined almost the same as Equations (47) and (48), but with W =∑
i
∑




j replaced by wij , w
out
i , and w
in
j , respectively.
In sum, Algorithm 4 shows the summary of the leading eigenvector method with fine-
tuning process for directed weighted networks.
3.2.2 The Multi-Eigenvector Method
[65] provided an example where the leading eigenvector method might fail to detect the
optimal number of communities due to its nature that repeatedly partitions a network or
subgraph into a fixed number of communities at a time. The author also argued that, by
using only the principal eigenvector, the information inherited by other eigenvectors was
underutilized. In order to overcome these shortcomings, the Multi-Eigenvector Method was
introduced and tested [65].
In that setting, let S be a matrix, whose dimension is N×c, where c is the total number
of communities. In addition, each column of S contains only 0 or 1, where,
Sij =
 1 , if node i belongs to community j,0 , otherwise.
Since each row sum of S is unity and all columns of S are mutually orthogonal, we must




















Algorithm 4 The Leading Eigenvector Method With Fine-Tuning (First Search)
1: Input: A network of size N , where N > 1
2: Compute the principal eigenpair (λ1,u1) of the modified modularity matrix (B + B
T ),





3: if λ1 is positive then
4: Assign the value of si based on the sign of u1.
5: if sT (B + BT )s is positive then
6: return Vector s, which provides a guidance for the fine-tuning process
7:
8: Call a fine-tuning algorithm.
9:
10: return A list of temporary communities and their associated members
11: else
12: return Original network
13: end if
14: end if
15: return Original network
16:
17: while the list of temporary communities is not empty do
18: Input: A subgraph in the temporary community list of size Ng, where Ng > 1.









21: if λ1 is positive then
22: Assign the value of si based on the sign of u1.
23: if sT (B(g) + B(g)T )s is positive then
24: return Vector s, which provides a guidance for the fine-tuning process
25:
26: Call a fine-tuning algorithm.
27:
28: return A list of two new temporary communities
29: Delete input community from the temporary list.
30: Add two new temporary communities to the temporary list.
31: else
32: Mark input community as permanent and delete input community.
33: end if
34: else




39: return A list of permanent communities and their associated members, with the final-
ized modularity value
38
Since B is a real symmetric matrix, we must have B = UDUT , where U = (U1|U1| . . . |UN )
is the eigenvector matrix of B and D is the diagonal matrix, where Dii = λi. In terms
of calculation, 12m is a constant and it has no effect on the partitioning algorithm, we can








Based on Equation (52), if we want to maximize the modularity value, we have to
choose eigenvectors associated with the positive eigenvalues such that the contributions to
the modularity value are positive. If S is not constrained by binary constraint, and there
are c communities in total, there exist c− 1 independent and mutually orthogonal columns,
since one of them is being fixed for the unity row sum constraint. In other words, the
number of communities c is the number of positive eigenvalues plus one.
Observation 3.2.4 Since the elements of S are binary, finding vectors si as many as sug-
gested might not be possible, but we know that the upper bound on the number of communities
is the number of positive eigenvalues plus one.
Even though the multi-eigenvector method exercises multiple eigenvectors to extract
all communities at once, we usually have no a priori knowledge about the value of c. In
addition, it requires longer computational time compared to that of the leading eigenvector
method. Based on these reasons, the leading eigenvector method is usually implemented in
the study of community structure.
Other than those two previously discussed methods, interested readers could find a
detailed discussion of other spectrum-based methods for clustering in [62]; and, lastly, a
comprehensive review of community detection study could be found in [31].
3.3 Overlapping Community Structure
Notice that, in both the leading eigenvector and the multi-eigenvector methods, we do not
allow a node to be assigned in more than one community. However, in many applications, a
particular node might have closed relationships with members in other communities, which
39
possibly makes it be a member of them. In such a case, Overlapping Community Structure
might be a better representation.
3.3.1 Overlapping Community Identification Algorithms
In the literature, overlapping community identification receives quite less attention com-
pared to that of the non-overlapping case; and, most of the algorithms devised for overlap-
ping community identification are based on clique and its variants.
In Clique Prelocation Method [73], the total numbers of cliques associated with nodes
are counted and used to identify overlapping community structure. However, extracting
all cliques, especially in large and complex networks, usually requires costly computational
time. Instead of using pure clique-based methods, many researchers have alternatively
extended the results of the modularity maximization method, from non-overlapping to the
overlapping setting, by defining new modularity functions and devising algorithms that
maximize such values.
Since there is no clear definition for the wellness of overlapping community, many forms
of the modularity functions have been proposed. In [68], they defined the modularity






















• βl(i,j),c is the belonging coefficient of link (i, j) in community c,
• βoutl(i,j),c is the expected belonging coefficient of any link l(i, j) pointed from nodes in
community c,
• βinl(i,j),c is the expected belonging coefficient of any link l(i, j) pointing to nodes in
community c.
[82] argued that the explanation of the belonging coefficient defined in [68] was not clear
and it was quite difficult to apply such a framework on large and complex networks. Instead,
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they defined an alternative formulation of the modularity function in a much simpler form,

















where δic and δjc are belonging coefficients reflecting the degree that nodes i and j










• V (c) is the set of all nodes belonging to community c,
• Ocij denotes total number of maximal cliques containing link (i, j) in community c,
• Oij denotes total number of maximal cliques containing link (i, j) in the entire network,








In addition, these belonging coefficients must satisfy the following normalization prop-
erties.
1. 0 ≤ δvc ≤ 1, for all v ∈ V and c ∈ C.
2.
∑
c∈C δvc = 1, for all v ∈ V
With the aforementioned definitions, [82] revealed an overlapping community structure
by first constructing the maximal clique network associated with the network of interest,
and then applying a community detection algorithm on such a network. They shown that
the maximization of Qo on the original network was equivalent to the maximization of the
modularity function defined on its associated maximal clique network. This approach is
expected to work well in undirected networks, but, unfortunately, not for the directed ones
as directed clique is not well defined.
Recently, [32] pointed out that the modularity optimization might fail to detect commu-
nities whose sizes were smaller than a specific scale, which is known as the resolution limit.
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In order to avoid the resolution limit, [83] established a two-step algorithm to identifying
overlapping community structure. In the first step, they first marked all leaders in the
network, where a leader was defined as a node having more influence on its neighbors. All
nodes other than the leaders were assigned membership coefficients associated with each
leader in the second step. While this approach is a resolution-limit-free algorithm, we still
need some well-defined measures to evaluate its performance, which, unfortunately, do not
exist.
3.3.2 Community Adjusting Algorithms
One interesting class of overlapping community detection algorithms that we will discuss
next is the Community Adjusting Algorithm, where we adjust a hard partition of non-
overlapping structure to a soft partition of overlapping one based on some predefined criteria
of improvement that still maximizes the modularity value.
Examples include the algorithms proposed by [96] and [99], where the modularity func-
















where Oi and Oj are the numbers of communities that nodes i and j belong to.
In order to identify overlapping community structure, they moved the border nodes
around based on some local measures of improvement instead of computing the increasing
value of Qo to help decrease the computational time. While the algorithms proposed by
[96] and [99] shared the same concept, we will discuss only the algorithm proposed by [96],
since it is easier in terms of implementation.
Let U be a partition matrix of N rows and c columns, where N and c are total numbers
of nodes and communities. In the non-overlapping case, U(i, k) takes only a binary value,
that is, U(i, k) = 1 if node i is a member of community k, and zero otherwise; but, in the
overlapping case, we have 0 ≤ U(i, k) ≤ 1, where U(i, k) reflects the membership of node i
in community k.
Notice that not all nodes could be members of multiple communities, but, generally,
the border ones, i.e. nodes having connections with other communities. Based on this
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observation, we can enhance the algorithmic performance by focusing only on this kind of
nodes. Formally, we define border nodes of community c by Equation (57).
Bc = {{j}|(i, j) ∈ E, {i} ∈ c, {j} /∈ c} (57)
If we move a border node into different communities, we must ensure that the modularity
value increases, or, at least, some well-defined local measures reflecting community improve-
ment do. In their setting, [96] used community strength as a local measure of community









• S(c) denotes the strength of community c,
• lini denotes total internal degrees of node i within community c,
• li denotes total degrees of node i,
• r is a tuning parameter of the overlapping extent, i.e. the lower the value of r, the
greater the extent of overlapping structure. As suggested by [96], r is typically set
around 0.8 - 1.0.
Since a community is strong in the sense that its members are all well connected within,
the contribution of a node to the community strength is sufficient to define its membership
in such a community. Mathematically, the strength of community c with respect to the
presence of node i might be evaluated by Equation (59).
F (c, i) = S(c ∪ {i})− S(c \ {i}), (59)
where S(c∪ {i}) and S(c \ {i}) are the strength of community c with and without node
i, respectively. If F (c, i) is positive, node i should belong to community c; however, in order
to avoid unstable soft partitions, a specific threshold for the normalized F (c, i) might be
set, i.e. node i is a member of community c if the normalized value of F (c, i) is greater than
the threshold t.
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Algorithm 5 summarizes the aforementioned community adjusting algorithm based on
community strength criterion.
Algorithm 5 The Community Adjusting Algorithm
1: Input: Partition Matrix Uin of size N by c, where N and c > 0.
2: For each community c, find border nodes Bc.
3: while the border node set is not empty do
4: For each of the border nodes i in Bc, for all c ∈ C,
5: if i is in community k then
6: Ĉk = Ck \ {i}
7: else
8: Ĉk = Ck ∪ {i}.
9: end if
10: Calculate F (Ĉk, i).
11: if F (Ĉk, i) > 0 then
12: Û(i, k) = F (Ĉk, i).
13: end if
14: end while
15: Normalize membership vector Û and store it back to Û .
16: Set a threshold t and construct the finalized partition matrix, Uout, where Uout(i, k) = 1
if and only if Û(i, k) > t.
17: return Overlapping community structure Uout, with the modularity value
In the literature, such as [65] and [92], we can define another class of centrality measures
based on the modularity value, called community centrality, where a node that mostly
contributes to the modularity value is considered as the most important one. Intuitively,
high community centrality node is a node acting like the center of its neighborhood.
3.4 Community Structure Comparison
In the literature, there exist numerous methodologies to identify community structure in
a network, such as mixed integer programming [100], tabu search [55], simulated annealing
[53], and the spectrum-based methods previously discussed. While these methods provide
varieties of community structures with different modularity values, the best community
structure could be determined by the one giving the maximum modularity value. However,
by relying on such a value, we would not know whether these community structures are
alike, or unlike, to what extent.
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In order to quantify the difference between community structures, [102] proposed in-
tuitive measures of similarity and dissimilarity by counting co-appearing elements between
two different community structures, called the similarity value S.
Based on [102], similarity measure s and dissimilarity measure d of sets A and B are






(|A ∩B′|) ∪ (|A′ ∩B|)
|A ∪B|
(61)
Since |A ∪B| = |A ∩B|+ (|A ∩B′| ∪ |A′ ∩B|), it is enough to consider one of them as
a measure of similarity for comparison. For convenience, we will use the similarity measure
s for the development of the similarity value.
In the context of community detection, given two set of community structures {A1, A2, . . . , AK}
and {B1, B2, . . . , BM} over the same set of nodes in the network, where |K| does not nec-





, for all i ∈ K and j ∈M (62)
The similarity value (S) between two community structures is then defined as the sum-






where k = |K| and m = |M |. Notice that it might require a re-ordering for index sets i
and j since community matching between these two sets must have been done. In order to
maximize similarity value defined by Equation (63), we have to solve a matching problem,
which is done by a so-called Greedy Algorithm in the original and their following research
papers ([28], [29], and [102]). However, this problem is indeed an assignment problem, which
could be solved efficiently by simple optimization techniques, such as simplex method. Thus,
instead of using greedy algorithm, we solve this problem as if it were an assignment problem.
Algorithm 6 summarizes the calculation of the similarity value (S), which is consequently
used in our research for comparison purpose.
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Algorithm 6 The Calculation of Similarity Value
1: Input: Two sets of community structures {A1, A2, . . . , AK} and {B1, B2, . . . , BM} over
the same set of nodes in the network, where |K| does not necessarily equal to |M |.
2: For each pair of communities (i, j), calculate sij = sij =
|Ai∩Bj |
|Ai∪Bj | .
3: Solve an assignment problem, by maximizing total pairwise similarity values.
4: return similarity value (S) and re-ordering index sets
Observation 3.4.1 Since k does not necessarily equal to m, it might be the case that some
communities in one set have no counterparts in the other, though their pairwise similarity
values between these two set are positive.
Observation 3.4.2 Theoretically, the similarity value defined by Equation (63) lies in the
range of 0 to 1, where the maximum value of one is attained only when two community
structures are the same.
3.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we provide a detailed discussion of a community structure identification
algorithms called the spectrum-based methods — where eigenvectors are used as guidelines
for partitioning a network into communities. In the leading eigenvector method, only the
principal eigenvector is used to maximize the modularity value — a generally accepted
measure of community structure wellness, while in the multi-eigenvector method, we use as
many eigenvectors as possible to identify community structure.
In many cases, nodes might have connections with many communities, which, in turn,
makes them as part of several communities. Unfortunately, both the leading and the multi-
eigenvector methods are incapable of revealing this kind of structure. In such cases, we
may apply a community adjusting algorithm to the network, where a hard partition of non-
overlapping community structure is adjusted into a soft partition of the overlapping one by
moving border nodes around without hurting the modularity value.
At the end of this chapter, we also provide a discussion of similarity value which could
be used to quantify the structural difference between community structures.
In Chapter 4, we will reveal the community structure inherited within the Global
Container-Shipping Network (GCSN) by means of the leading eigenvector method, where
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a community is referred to as trading community. Based on the resulting community struc-
ture, we are able to uncover several interesting facts about the GCSN, such as the patterns
of world trade and the strategic roles of terminal ports within a community.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONTAINER PORT CONNECTIVITY INDEX
In this Chapter, we establish a new measure of port importance, called the Container
Port Connectivity Index (CPCI), to rank global container ports in the Global Container-
Shipping Network (GCSN). The CPCI is derived based on the Hyperlink-Induced Topic
Search (HITS) algorithm, which is primarily used for web page ranking. This measure
has several advantages over the existing measures, such as the Liner Shipping Connectivity
Index (LSCI), the Logistics Performance Index (LPI), and the three traditional centrality
measures in social science. Firstly, while the aforementioned measures are based either on
network topology or economic information, the CPCI is capable of satisfactorily integrating
both. In addition, it provides separate scores for inbound and outbound, which could
be consequently used to analyze the strategic position that terminal ports serve. We also
conduct an experiment on the GCSN about how well these container ports connect and form
communities using the Maximization Modularity Method. Our study reveals that trading
communities are less related with geography, but interrelated with trade connections.
4.1 Measures of Port Attractiveness
What makes a container port attractive as a logistics hub? From an operational point of
view, a port derives importance from three main factors. The first is the infrastructure
required to move containers, such as cranes, quays, hinterland transportation, and so on.
Another important factor is location, which includes geography, and, in particular, distance
from other ports. Finally, there is connectivity within the network of container shipping:
to what degree do shipping liners call at the port?
A traditional measure of port importance is the annual number of TEUs handled. How-
ever, this number is merely a local statistic that reflects handling and not patterns of
trade flow. Others have proposed more systematic measures of port importance that reflect
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something about the position of the port in the network of global container shipping. Ex-
amples include degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, or the number
of origin-destination pairs the port serves (The Network Connectivity Index, NCI [85], and
the Port Cooperative Index, PCI [54]). While all these measures emphasize connectivity,
they do not directly reflect economics.
In terms of economics, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) has established an interesting measure for comparing countries’ trade competitiveness
with respect to maritime logistics and transportation called the Liner Shipping Connectiv-
ity Index (LSCI). The LSCI is an aggregation of the following five statistics: (i) number of
liner services calling, (ii) number of liner companies, (iii) number of ships, (iv) combined
capacity of ships in TEUs, and (v) the largest capacity of ships calling [71], computed by a
simple normalization scheme. More specifically, for each component, each country’s value is
normalized by the maximum value of its kind, and the LSCI is then defined by the normal-
ized value of country’s average over these five statistics multiplied by 100. Since the LSCI
focuses on the accessibility of a country to global trade, economists have found it useful as
a joint measure of trade facilitation and maritime connectivity. The LSCI is also found to
be strongly correlated with the Logistics Performance Index (LPI), which is another index
relying on a comprehensive survey of perceptions reported annually by the World Bank ([6]
and [71]).
While meaningful to some extent, the LSCI is of limited use, especially in a more detailed
analysis, as it treats each country as if it were a single location and the entire rest of the
world is its counterpart trading partner. In other words, the world container network is
reduced to a two-node network, as in Figure 13.
To utilize this idea at a more granular level, we develop a new trade intensity between
ports, using the same calculation like that of the LSCI, except for ports rather than the
countries. With the LSCI-like measure defined as link weights reflecting direct connectivity
between ports, we can establish a network model of container shipping called the Global
Container-Shipping Network (GCSN), as in Figure 14, in which there is a link from port i
to j if there is direct service from port i to j and the weight of such a link indicates rate of
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USA Rest of the world
The LSCI for USA
Figure 13: The visualization of the LSCI from network perspective, when we consider the
computation of such an index for the United States.
capacity movement between them.
Advantageously, we can use the GCSN to better understand the patterns of world trade,
i.e. trading communities, and the relative importance of various ports therein, based on a
new measure of port importance called the Container Port Connectivity Index (CPCI).
Figure 14: The Global Container-Shipping Network (GCSN), which is constructed based
on the LSCI-like measure. In this network, nodes represent ports, links represent rates of
container movement between ports, or trade intensity, where the darker the link, the higher
the LSCI-like measure.
4.2 The Global Container-Shipping Network
Prior to the establishment of a new index for measuring port importance, we would like to
clarify detailed construction of the GCSN and discuss its properties compared with another
network of container shipping studied by [44]. While their study concerns the structure of
general cargo-shipping network and its subnetworks of containers, tankers, and dry bulk,
based on traces of each cargo vessels, ours will focus only on the movement of container
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vessels.
In both networks, each node represents a unique container port, but the meaning of a
link differs due to different data sources and research objectives. More specifically, in [44],
a directed link from port i to j indicates the existence of ships traveling from port i to j at
any time during 2007, as reported by www.sea-web.com; but, in our network, such a link
indicates the existence of mainline, or a scheduled container service traveling from port i
to j, as reported by www.compairdata.com on 25 September 2011. In other words, our
network is a snapshot of container vessel movements on 25 September 2011, while that of
[44] is a time-exposure network aggregating all ship movements for a year. Although, the
network studied in [44] may include more ephemeral services, such as variants of seasonal
services that typically do not co-exist, it does make sense for the bio-invasion problem in
which the authors were interested. In contrast, our network suits the objective of studying
the nature of container movements, which is more operational.
Based on the aforementioned, we refer to the subnetwork of container vessel movements
described by [44] and the snapshot of the scheduled services presented in this work as the
Time-Aggregated Container Network (TAC network) and the Scheduled Container Network
(SC network) respectively. While the TAC network and the SC network are similar in
general, they differ in serval ways.
Firstly, while both networks have almost the same number of ports, that is, 378 in the
TAC network versus 409 in the SC network, the number of links in the TAC network is
significantly greater, or about 6,059 links. As a consequence, the mean degree of a port in
the TAC network is undoubtedly much greater than that of the SC network, reported as
32.4, where the diameter1 of the TAC network is reported to be 8 links.
The SC network is rather sparser, with only 2,312 links; it is nevertheless strongly
connected2, with mean degree of 11.3 and diameter of 11 links3. Interestingly, with almost
4,000 fewer links, the diameter of the SC network is just three links above that of the TAC
1The longest length of the shortest path between any two ports.
2For any two ports u and v, u is reachable by some directed path from v, and vice versa.
3From Maizuru (Japan) to Fortaleza (Brazil) passing ports of Niigata (Japan), Tomakomai (Japan),
Hachinohe (Japan), Busan (South Korea), Savannah (United States), Kingston (Jamaica), Port of Spain
(Trinidad and Tobago), Degrad des Cannes (French Guiana), and Belem (Brazil).
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network. This difference is likely and it could be explained by the construction of the TAC
network. As a time-exposure network, those additional links may come from both seasonal
and unplanned service routes of local small feeder lines and short-sea services, which are
not expected to significantly reduce network diameter. Because our dataset includes transit
times, we can also report the diameter of the SC network measured by travel at sea (ignoring
time spent at ports) as 56 days 4.
The mean shortest path in the TAC network is reported as 2.76 links, while in the SC
network we can compute it as 4.02 links, with a median of 4 links. Similarly, we can find the
time-shortest path of the SC network as 18.6 days, with the median of 19 days. The global
clustering coefficient, i.e. the average of local clustering coefficient of all ports, which is a
measure of how connected are the immediate neighbors in the network, is also calculated
for both networks and reported as 0.52 and 0.40, respectively.
The last but most important difference between these two networks is the definition of
link weight. In the TAC network, the weight of a link is simply the sum of gross tonnage of
all ships traversing that link in 2007; but, in the SC network, the weight of a link is trade
intensity between ports computed by the pairwise-port LSCI previously described. Table 1
lists the twenty links of greatest weight computed by the LSCI-like measure. Interestingly,
links among East Asian ports constitute all but one. Notably, Shanghai figures in six of
these links, three times as an origin and three times as a destination.
In conclusion, Table 2 gives the summary of the standard topological statistics of each
network. Observably, these statistics provide only facts about the networks but not detailed
information or insights into geography or economics.
4.3 The Container Port Connectivity Index
Based on the dimension of measurement, all of port attractiveness measures could be classi-
fied as either Network-Based or Economics-Based Measure. The measures in the first group
include all three traditional social science measures, together with the NCI and the PCI,
4To ship from Honiara, Solomon Islands to Sortland, Norway requires 56 days and traverses 9 links. Any
container must pass, en route, through Shanghai, Busan (South Korea), Cristobal (Panama), Manzanillo
(Panama), New York, Halifax, Argentia (Newfoundland), and Reykjavik.
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Table 1: The twenty links of greatest weight, as determined by the LSCI-like computation.




Hong Kong Yantian, Shenzhen 0.834
Port Klang Singapore 0.635
Busan Shanghai 0.605
Singapore Hong Kong 0.556
Yantian, Shenzhen Hong Kong 0.528
Shanghai Busan 0.523
Hong Kong Shekou, Shenzhen 0.515
Singapore Port Klang 0.519
Qingdao Shanghai 0.505
Ningbo Hong Kong 0.477
Shanghai Hong Kong 0.462
Kaohsiung Hong Kong 0.459
Rotterdam Hamburg 0.454
Yantian, Shenzhen Tanjung Pelepas 0.438
Chiwan, Shenzhen Hong Kong 0.423
Shekou, Shenzhen Hong Kong 0.421
Qingdao Ningbo 0.410
Qingdao Busan 0.408
Table 2: Summary of the comparison statistics of two network models (degree = total
number of links, CC = clustering coefficient, Dia. = diameter measured in links, SP =
shortest path measured in links).
Network Ports Links Link weight Avg degree CC Dia. Avg SP
TAC network 378 6,059 Gross tonnage 32.4 0.52 8 2.76
SC network 409 2,312 LSCI-like 11.3 0.40 11 4.02
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which require only information regarding network topology, but not the economics, for the
computation. In contrast, the measures in the latter group, including the LSCI and the
LPI, are based on economics, but not the network structure. While none of the existing
measures is capable of reflecting port importance taking both into account, we are able to
establish one, which we called the Container Port Connectivity Index (CPCI).
The computation of the CPCI is based on the Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS)
algorithm [46], which is an eigenvector-based method primarily used for web page ranking5.
Similar to the HITS algorithm, where a web page is assigned two types of scores, namely,
the hub and authority scores, reflecting its importance as hub and authority page, the CPCI
assigns two types of importance scores to each container port, referred to as the inbound
and outbound scores.
In the context of container shipping, a port with high inbound score has greater power
to aggregate goods; and, a port with high outbound score has greater power to distribute
goods. In addition, a port receives a higher inbound score if many services call from many
other ports with high outbound scores, or it is located not too far downstream from them,
while a port receives a higher outbound scores if many services depart to many other ports
with high inbound scores. For example, St. Vincete, a container port in Cape Verde, receives
a relatively high inbound score due to direct service originated from Algeciras, a regional
hub with a relatively high outbound score. Although, such a service continues on to Praia,
another container port of the Cape Verde islands, it has comparatively lower inbound score
since it is located further away from Algeciras.
As measured by the CPCI, Figure 15 visualizes the importance of 409 container ports
in the GCSN in terms of inbound.
Our proposed measure of port importance has several advantages over the existing ones.
5See Chapter 2 for more details. It is worth noting that while the concept of both the HITS and the
Google’s PageRank algorithms is the same, where importance scores are derived based on the principal
eigenvector, the underlying assumption in each algorithm is quite different. In the PageRank algorithm, we
assume that, at a particular page, the user could move freely to any other pages with a specific probability
vector, known as the random-surfer assumption. In terms of network, this vector may be regarded as link
weight vector connecting a web page to the rest. As a consequence, the user at each web page is treated
equally important. This assumption does not hold in the GCSN where trade intensity between ports are of
different importance.
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Figure 15: The visualization of the CPCI in the GCSN containing 409 ports. Ports rep-
resented by larger disks are scored proportionally higher according to the new measure of
port connectivity described in terms of inbound.
Firstly, it is capable of satisfactorily integrating both network structure and economics; and,
it is the only one, to the best of our knowledge. In addition, it provides separate scores for
inbound and outbound, which could be consequently used to analyze the strategic position
that terminal ports serve. It also allows us flexibility to study the relative importance
of ports in alternative network settings. More specifically, we can use other interested
characteristics of the network as input, and still obtain two well-defined ranked lists of
ports preserving all intrinsic properties like those of the CPCI. For example, we may redefine
link weights of the GCSN by using trade flow instead of capacity to properly reflect trade
intensity between ports.
Later, in Chapter 5, we show that we can extract more detailed information regarding
port importance by a simple disaggregation scheme, where the overall port importance score
is decomposed into several components — each reflecting its contribution to the overall port
importance score. This information, in turn, allows the port authority to comprehend and
compare its strategic port importance with competitors’ in great detail.
4.3.1 Ranking Ports by the Container Port Connectivity Index
As measured by the CPCI, the most important ports may not necessarily be the ones
with the most links. For example, Cartagena receives services from 20 different ports, and
Yantian receives only from 18; however, Yantain ranks much higher as scored by the CPCI
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with regard to inbound in the GCSN (0.286 versus 0.0036). This is a reflection of fact that
the CPCI does not depend only on the number of links but also on link quality and the
scores of the ports to which they connect.
Similarly, the most important ports may not necessarily be the busiest ones. Tables 3
and 4 show the CPCI of the twenty ports that scored highest with respect to our measure
of inbound and outbound connectivity, together with ranking by TEUs handled in 2010 for
comparison. The ports of East Asia dominate with respect to either measure. Even though
Shanghai handled more TEUs, Hong Kong ranks higher by the CPCI, presumably because
it is better connected within the GCSN6.
On the other hand, our ranking appears to neglect the high-volume European ports
such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg, as well as the busy Mideast port of Dubai, but
this is because they are more isolated from other big ports. In contrast, the big East Asian
ports are well-connected with the rest of the world — and with each other, which further
increases their scores based on our algorithm.
Figure 16 plots scores of all 409 ports. Several stand out for the significant differences
between inbound and outbound scores, and these differences illustrate how the the CPCI
can make structural distinctions about the position of a port in the network. For example,
Yokohama has a higher outbound than inbound score because it receives from smaller ports
but ships to major Asian ports such as Shanghai, Ningbo, Yantian, Xiamen, Kiaosiung, and
Busan.
A more elaborate example is provided by Los Angeles and Long Beach, which have
inbound scores that are relatively high in comparison to outbound scores. This reflects the
fact that these are the two main ports of entry for products manufactured in East Asia.
To reduce in-transit inventory, powerful retailers in North America insist that their freight
be the last loaded out of Asia and the first unloaded in North America, and so there are
many direct links from big Asian ports into Los Angeles and Long Beach. Services that
have traversed the Pacific Ocean to call at Los Angeles or Long Beach then typically call
6The ranking by volume combines several of the Shenzhen ports, including Yantian, Chiwan, Shekou,and
Da Chan Bay, into one, ranked fourth in volume.
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Table 3: All but two of the twenty highest-scoring ports by the CPCI (inbound) are in Asia.
(Volume rankings are based on the number of TEUs transported through the ports in 2010
[20].)
Rank Port Inbound Outbound Country By volume
1 Hong Kong 0.4080 0.4035 China 3
2 Shanghai 0.3726 0.3475 China 1
3 Ningbo 0.3040 0.3419 China 6
4 Yantian 0.2861 0.2646 China
5 Busan 0.2515 0.2415 South Korea 5
6 Singapore 0.2456 0.3420 Singapore 2
7 Kaohsiung 0.2054 0.2009 Taiwan 12
8 Chiwan 0.1973 0.1905 China
9 Xiamen 0.1933 0.1841 China 19
10 Shekou 0.1859 0.1614 China
11 Port Klang 0.1748 0.1935 Malaysia 13
12 Qingdao 0.1725 0.1593 China 8
13 Nansha 0.1369 0.1109 China
14 Tanjung Pelepas 0.1289 0.1134 Malaysia 16
15 Gwangyang 0.1289 0.1182 South Korea
16 Los Angeles CA 0.0927 0.0286 USA 17
17 Long Beach CA 0.0917 0.0187 USA 18
18 Xingang/Tianjin 0.0890 0.0802 China 11
19 Da Chan Bay 0.0829 0.0809 China
20 Laem Chabang 0.0818 0.0633 Thailand 22
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Table 4: All but one of the twenty highest-scoring ports by the CPCI (outbound) are in
Asia.
Rank Port Inbound Outbound Country By volume
1 Hong Kong 0.4080 0.4035 China 3
2 Shanghai 0.3726 0.3475 China 1
3 Singapore 0.2456 0.3420 Singapore 2
4 Ningbo 0.3040 0.3419 China 6
5 Yantian 0.2861 0.2646 China
6 Busan 0.2515 0.2415 South Korea 5
7 Kaohsiung 0.2054 0.2009 Taiwan 12
8 Port Klang 0.1748 0.1935 Malaysia 13
9 Chiwan 0.1973 0.1905 China
10 Xiamen 0.1933 0.1841 China 19
11 Shekou 0.1859 0.1614 China
12 Qingdao 0.1725 0.1593 China 8
13 Gwangyang 0.1289 0.1182 South Korea
14 Yokohama 0.0619 0.1147 Japan 36
15 Tanjung Pelepas 0.1289 0.1134 Malaysia 16
16 Nansha 0.1369 0.1109 China
17 Oakland 0.0132 0.0883 USA
18 Da Chan Bay 0.0829 0.0809 China
19 Xingang/Tianjin 0.0890 0.0802 China 11
20 Cai Mep 0.0517 0.0750 Viet Nam 28
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at Oakland before returning to the large ports of Asia. Consequently, Oakland has a high
outbound score in comparison to its inbound score. This is a general pattern that may be
observed along many service loops; ports that are immediately downstream from important
ports tend to have higher inbound scores, while ports toward the end of the loop tend to
have higher outbound scores.


























Figure 16: As computed by the CPCI, those container ports for which inbound and out-
bound scores fall in the lower right are inbound-dominant and those in the upper left are
outbound-dominant.
4.3.2 North American Ports
Table 5 shows that, among the ports of North America, the west coast ports, led by Los
Angeles and Long Beach, dominate by the measure of inbound connectivity, reflecting the
many services that come directly from the great manufacturing centers of East Asia. More-
over, many of the west coast ports score much higher with respect to inbound connectivity
than to outbound.
New York is the only port on the east coast to score highly with respect to inbound
scores. But Table 6 shows that east coast ports such as Savannah are more competitive
with respect to outbound scores. It will be interesting to see how these rankings change
after the widening of the Panama Canal is completed in 2014.
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Table 5: All but one of the top ten North American ports measured by the CPCI (inbound)
are on the west coast.
Rank Port Inbound Outbound
1 Los Angeles CA 0.0927 0.0286
2 Long Beach CA 0.0917 0.0187
3 New York NY/NJ 0.0586 0.0070
4 Lazaro Cardenas, MEX 0.0349 0.0108
5 Manzanillo, MEX 0.0325 0.0406
6 Tacoma WA 0.0305 0.0084
7 Prince Rupert BC 0.0285 0.0048
8 Vancouver BC 0.0260 0.0249
9 Seattle WA 0.0231 0.0207
10 Oakland CA 0.0132 0.0883
Table 6: Four of the top ten North American ports ranked by the CPCI (outbound) are on
the east coast.
Rank Port Inbound Outbound
1 Oakland CA 0.0132 0.0883
2 Manzanillo, MEX 0.0325 0.0406
3 Savannah GA 0.0122 0.0289
4 Los Angeles CA 0.0927 0.0286
5 Vancouver BC 0.0260 0.0249
6 Seattle WA 0.0231 0.0207
7 Long Beach CA 0.0917 0.0187
8 Boston MA 0.0007 0.0150
9 Wilmington NC 0.0008 0.0133
10 Miami FL 0.0030 0.0125
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4.3.3 Panamá as a Transshipment Hub
The ports of Panama lead their region in terms of connectivity: Balboa has scores of 0.0291
and 0.0208 for inbound and outbound respectively; Manzanillo has scores of 0.0184 and
0.0213; and Cristobal has scores of 0.0182 and 0.0082.
The Panama Canal Authority currently operates a transcontinental railroad that makes
it possible to move containers between the Panamanian ports on the Pacific and Atlantic
sides. Currently, it takes at least three hours to move containers from one port stack
to another (one hour to load the train; one hour of travel time; one hour to unload the
train); and because of the delay between trains, eight hours is more typical. If the transit
time could be reliably reduced, the ports at each end of the Canal might be considered as
one, in which case the inbound and outbound scores of the aggregated port would become
0.0455 and 0.0313 making it be one of the highest scoring outside East Asia (specifically,
thirty-sixth in inbound and forty-second in outbound). Furthermore, its connectivity would
dominate that of the regional competitors such as Kingston, Jamaica (0.0037 and 0.006)
and Freeport, Bahamas (0.0026 and 0.0044).
4.3.4 Comparison With Other Measures
Fundamentally, we may evaluate the centrality of a vertex within a network by degree
centrality, which, in our context, tells from how many other ports a port receives direct
shipments (in-degree) or to how many others it sends direct shipments (out-degree). Tables 7
and 8 report the twenty most central ports measured by in-degree and out-degree centrality,
together with the CPCI ranking. While interesting, these measures neglect economic issues,
such as the volume of trade along each link and interrelationship among ports within the
network. Literally, it merely records the fact of trade, but not the importance of ports in
the GCSN.
Another fundamental means of evaluating port centrality is by distance: is a port close
to other ports? Shorter travel times mean less operating cost for the shipping company and
less in-transit inventory for the shipper or consignee. In such a case, closeness centrality,
the reciprocal of the sum of shortest distances from a vertex to all other vertices, may be
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Table 7: The twenty most central ports measured by in-degree centrality, together with the
CPCI ranking.
Port Country In-Degree Outbound Inbound
Singapore Singapore 56 3 6
Hong Kong China 44 1 1
Port Klang Malaysia 41 8 11
Busan South Korea 39 6 5
Shanghai China 35 2 2
Kaohsiung Taiwan 35 7 7
Algeciras Spain 30 32 44
Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 30 15 14
New York NY/NJ United States 28 113 28
Rotterdam Netherlands 27 24 24
Jeddah Saudi Arabia 25 26 31
Tokyo Japan 24 22 23
Ningbo China 23 4 3
Antwerp Belgium 23 37 42
Keelung Taiwan 22 23 27
Dubai, Jebel Ali United Arab Emirates 22 28 30
Qingdao China 22 12 12
Cartagena Colombia 20 146 127
Tanger Morocco 20 84 51
Yokohama Japan 20 14 25
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Table 8: The twenty most central ports measured by out-degree centrality, together with
the CPCI ranking.
Port Country Out-Degree Outbound Inbound
Singapore Singapore 53 3 6
Shanghai China 41 2 2
Hong Kong China 40 1 1
Port Klang Malaysia 40 8 11
Busan South Korea 40 6 5
Kaohsiung Taiwan 33 7 7
Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 33 15 14
Valencia Spain 27 71 74
Jeddah Saudi Arabia 24 26 31
Yantian China 24 5 4
Algeciras Spain 23 32 44
Ningbo China 23 4 3
Antwerp Belgium 23 37 42
Le Havre France 23 41 48
Cartagena Colombia 22 146 127
Oakland CA United States 22 17 80
Tanger Morocco 21 84 51
Kobe Japan 21 21 22
Tokyo Japan 20 22 23
Dubai, Jebel Ali United Arab Emirates 20 28 30
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considered as an appealing measure. Table 9 shows the twenty most central ports measured
by closeness. Interestingly, most container ports have approximately the same closeness
centrality. Although closeness centrality may be interesting as it includes time as part
of centrality, it neglects the fact that container flow does not always follows the shortest
distance. In addition, it treats all the links from either big or small ports with equal weight,
which seems questionable in practice.
Table 9: The twenty most central ports measured by closeness centrality, together with the
CPCI ranking.
Port Country Closeness (10−4) Outbound Inbound
Singapore Singapore 9.2937 3 6
Port Klang Malaysia 9.1996 8 11
Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 8.9606 15 14
Hong Kong China 8.8968 1 1
Kaohsiung Taiwan 8.7566 7 7
Le Havre France 8.7566 41 48
Yantian China 8.7184 5 4
Savannah GA United States 8.7184 46 85
Rotterdam Netherlands 8.6356 24 24
Manzanillo Panama 8.5543 56 71
Valencia Spain 8.5034 71 74
Algeciras Spain 8.4317 32 44
Port Said Egypt 8.3963 29 35
Antwerp Belgium 8.3542 37 42
Busan South Korea 8.3333 6 5
Chiwan China 8.2305 9 8
Shanghai China 8.2237 2 2
Bremerhaven Germany 8.2102 43 76
Jeddah Saudi Arabia 8.0906 26 31
Ningbo China 8.0645 4 3
The last benchmarking centrality measure for container ports is betweenness, i.e. the
number of shortest paths within the network on which the vertex lies, as reported in Table
10. We find that the twenty ports of greatest betweenness centrality in the SC network is
quite different from those of the TAC network, as shown in Table 11.
A systematic difference seems to be that some among the twenty ports of highest be-
tweenness in the TAC network are ranked much lower in the SC network. Consider, for
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example, the following ports, where the first ranking is that within the TAC network and
the second is that within the SC network: Jebel Ali 5 (20), Barcelona 8 (49), Bremerhaven
9 (26), Hamburg 10 (58), Tacoma 11 (313), Malaga 12 (162), Antwerp 13 (34), Piraeus 17
(160), Felixstowe 19 (40), Colombo 20 (63). We speculate that these ports had seasonal
services, which would have added artificially to their betweenness by suggesting paths that
did not actually exist.
Table 10: The twenty most central ports measured by betweenness centrality, together with
the CPCI ranking.
Port Country Betweenness (10−2) Outbound Inbound
Singapore Singapore 13.4482 3 6
Algeciras Spain 9.0277 32 44
Busan South Korea 8.9076 6 5
Shanghai China 8.5991 2 2
Hong Kong China 6.5738 1 1
Cartagena Colombia 6.3407 146 127
Port Klang Malaysia 6.2749 8 11
Balboa Panama 5.6483 60 55
Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 5.4653 15 14
New York NY/NJ United States 5.4225 113 28
Valencia Spain 5.0959 71 74
Port Said Egypt 4.8993 29 35
Kingston Jamaica 4.8179 129 124
Savannah GA United States 4.8110 46 85
Manzanillo Panama 4.3594 56 71
Santos Brazil 4.2839 61 52
Le Havre France 4.0957 41 48
Rotterdam Netherlands 3.9718 24 24
Tanger Morocco 3.8974 84 51
Dubai, Jebel Ali United Arab Emirates 3.7566 28 30
In comparison with the LSCI defined for countries, we can only compare the rankings
from our indices with those of countries having a single dominant port. In doing so, we
identified 64 container ports that were, within our data source, unique within their country,
and then compared rankings by the 2011 LSCI and the inbound and outbound versions of
the CPCI. The results appear in Table 12 and are generally consonant: those ranked among
the top ten by LSCI are among the top twenty by the CPCI, either inbound or outbound.
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Table 11: The twenty most central ports measured by betweenness centrality of the SC
network comparing with those of [44].
Port Country SC Network TAC Network
Singapore Singapore 1 4
Algeciras Spain 2 6
Busan South Korea 3 18
Shanghai China 4 1
Hong Kong China 5
Cartagena Colombia 6 3
Port Klang Malaysia 7
Balboa Panama 8 3
Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 9
New York NY/NJ United States 10
Valencia Spain 11
Port Said Egypt 12 14
Kingston Jamaica 13
Savannah GA United States 14
Manzanillo Panama 15 3
Santos Brazil 16 15
Le Havre France 17 7
Rotterdam Netherlands 18 16
Tanger Morocco 19
Dubai, Jebel Ali United Arab Emirates 20 5
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The differences in ranking between Gothenburg and Gdansk again illustrate how our
suggested index captures the global structure of the network. Gdansk ranks relatively high
in inbound strength because it receives shipments directly from Hamburg but ships only
to the lesser port of Aarhus, which accounts for its relatively lower ranking in outbound
strength. On the other hand, Gothenburg receives freight only from Aarhus, but it ships to
the more significant port of Bremerhaven, from which it derives a higher outbound score.
Table 12: Ranks among those countries represented by a single port, the LSCI, and the
CPCI, are in general agreement.
Port by LSCI by The CPCI (inbound) by CPCI (outbound)
Singapore 1 1 1
Rotterdam 2 2 2
Colombo 3 3 3
Malta 4 6 11
Beirut 5 4 10
Piraeus 6 7 6
Buenos Aires 7 18 26
Karachi 8 8 5
Gothenburg 9 35 20
Gdansk 10 15 57
4.4 Properties of the CPCI
Evidently, the CPCI has been proven to be a useful tool in a new ranking scheme as it
allows us to draw a systematic inference about the importance of a port, as well as the
patterns of trade flow within the network. In this section, we will provide some interesting
properties of the CPCI which might be useful for further inferences.
4.4.1 Degree, Distance, and Connectedness
One interesting property of the CPCI is that, among degree, distance, and connectedness,
port connectedness is the most crucial factor driving the CPCI — this is the reason why we
name such an index as the connectivity one. In order to explore how degree, distance, and
connectedness could affect the CPCI, as well as other classical centrality measures, let us
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consider the network shown in Figure 17, where the links shown are bidirectional with equal
weights. Port Sm is the center of the star graph whose degree is m, and each path of Sm
comprises a line graph of l links connected with a complete graph K of size n. In addition,
we define port c, a member of the complete graph that is connected with the line graph, as
the connection port which serves as a gateway from the outside world to a well-connected
and dense subgraph.
Sm Ll Kn
degree m length l size n
Figure 17: A theoretical network of ports comprising of three different graphs, that is, a
star graph of degree m, m line graphs of l links, and m complete graphs of size k. Since the
underlying network is symmetric and all m paths connected with port Sm have the same
structure, each path will be scored equally position-wise.
By construction, the center port is initially set as the most central one in terms of
degree. In addition, as it is located at the center of the whole network, both its betweenness
and closeness would also be the highest. For simplicity, we denote the configuration of
the underlying network by the triplets (Sm, Ll,Kn), and define an importance ratio as
the relative importance of the connection port c to that of the center port Sm — more
specifically, the higher the ratios, the more important the connection port.
Any changes in the CPCI ratio, betweennness ratio, and closeness ratio, are observed
when the parameters m, l, and n, have been altered. Interesting observations are as follows.
i. When the length l is fixed, as the complete graph grows larger, i.e. n has been in-
creased, the CPCI of the connection port quickly dominates that of the center port,
especially when the length l is also increased (Figures 18 – 20).
Betweenness and closeness ratios also increase as the complete graph grows larger,
which is expected, since the connection port is just one link away from a new member
of the complete graph, but it is l links away from the center port. However, these
ratios decrease as the length l increases, since it would make each path farther away
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from the others (Figures 21 – 26).
ii. Similarly, we can infer that, when the complete graph is considerably large, the greater
the length of the line graph, the smaller the CPCI of the center port.
iii. Given that the degree of the center port is the same as the size of the complete graph,
the center port tends to significantly lose its importance to the connection port as the
degree of the center port and the size of the complete graph grow at the same level
(Figure 27). In contrast, both betweenness and closeness ratios keep decreasing as the
network grows larger (Figures 28 and 29).
iv. It requires a considerable number of degree for the center port to regain its rank back,
while it requires only a very few number increasing in either the length of the line
graph or the size of the complete graph to outrank the center port.
Based on the aforementioned results, we can conclude that port connectedness, or port
connectivity, is the one that drives the CPCI, not the degree. This distinct property of the
CPCI clearly distinguishes itself from other measures and, unquestionably, is the reason
why we name such a measure as the Container Port Connectivity Index.

















Figure 18: Relationship between the CPCI ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 2(n− 1).
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Figure 19: Relationship between the CPCI ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 3(n− 1).

















Figure 20: Relationship between the CPCI ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 4(n− 1).
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Figure 21: Relationship between betweenness ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 2(n− 1).





















Figure 22: Relationship between betweenness ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 3(n− 1).
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Figure 23: Relationship between betweenness ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 4(n− 1).



















Figure 24: Relationship between closeness ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 2(n− 1).
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Figure 25: Relationship between closeness ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 3(n− 1).


















Figure 26: Relationship between closeness ratio and the size of the complete graph when
the degree of star graph is 4(n− 1).
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Figure 27: Relationship between CPCI ratio and the size of the complete graph, or the
degree of the star graph.























Figure 28: Relationship between betweenness ratio and the size of the complete graph, or
the degree of the star graph.
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Figure 29: Relationship between closeness ratio and the size of the complete graph, or the
degree of the star graph.
4.4.2 Link Modification
Another interesting property of the CPCI concerns the change of the CPCI as links have
been modified. Typically, when a particular link has been added or removed, the CPCI is
expected to change, not only those of the ports directly connected with such a link but also
those of the rest, since the CPCI depends on the global structure of the network.
For example, consider a network shown in Figure 30, where link (3, 8) is the one to be
removed. V1 and V2 show the connectivity scores of all ports, i.e. before and after the







Figure 30: An example network for evaluating the effect of the removal of link (3, 8), where
all links are bidirectional with unity link weight.
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V1 = [0.2819 0.3732 0.4492 0.2819 0.4492 0.2819 0.2819 0.3732]
V2 = [0.3181 0.4197 0.4051 0.3324 0.4715 0.2790 0.2647 0.2790]
As each of these vectors is a unit vector, we can systematically define and compare the
effect of link modification by the difference between the squared value of these two vectors.
Table 13 shows the result of such a procedure.
Table 13: The observed differences of the squared value of the two different CPCI vectors,
given that link (3, 8) is the one to be removed from the network shown in Figure 30.




4 − V 21
1 0.1012 0.0795 0.0217
2 0.1762 0.1393 0.0368
3 0.1641 0.2017 -0.0376
4 0.1105 0.0795 0.0310
5 0.2223 0.2017 0.0205
6 0.0779 0.0795 -0.0016
7 0.0701 0.0795 -0.0094
8 0.0779 0.1393 -0.0614
Sum 1 1
From Table 13, with the removal of link (3, 8), port 5 has become the most central port
in the network as connections between the rightmost and the leftmost ports have found
themselves convenient by passing port 5, while port 8 significantly loses its importance due
to direct connectivity loss with port 3.
Based on the aforementioned comparison, one may evaluate and identify the most im-
portant link to any interested port by a sequential link removal evaluation. Interestingly,
we have found that some indirect links may have greater effect than that of the direct ones.
For example, consider the network shown in Figure 31, where, in this example, we are
identifying the most influential link associated with port 13.
As ports 14 and 15 are well-connected, these two ports are unsurprisingly important
ports in the network with the importance scores of 0.324 and 0.533, respectively.










Figure 31: An example network for identifying the most influential link to port 13.
can evaluate the effect of these link removals to the importance score of port 13 as reported
below.
Port (9,13) (12,13) (13,14)
13 -0.0164 -0.0144 -0.0306
Since port 14 may be regarded as a hub port, by removing link (13,14), the connectivity
of port 13 is significantly reduced — port 13 would be located at greater distance from the
rest of the network. In contrast, deleting link (12,13) has less effect on port 13 since port
12 itself is far less important compared to that of port 14. In addition, port 13 could still
be reached from well-connected ports like port 9 or 14.
However, we have found that some indirect links might pose greater threats to port 13
than the direct ones. More specifically, the removal of link (14,15), which clearly reduces
connectivity of port 13 as flow is required to travel a longer distance between the left and
right of the network. Based on our computation, indirect link (14,15) has been found as
the most influential link to port 13 with the removal effect of -0.0316.
Let us consider another example shown in Figure 32, where we are identifying whether
the most important link to port 15 is direct or indirect. For better visualization, we will use
the network shown in Figure 32b to represent the original network shown in Figure 32a. In
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addition, the darker link is the one that is identified as the most influential link to port 15.
1 2 3 4
567
8 9
10 11 10 13 14 15
(a)





Figure 32: A network of 15 ports used to identify the most influential link to port 15 (the
darker link), where Figure 32b represents Figure 32a by replacing groups of nodes as A and
B.
Figure 33 shows the changes of the most influential link to port 15 as the position of B
changes. Interestingly, the most influential link tends to be the one that is crucial for the
flow moving from port 15 to a more important port 1. This result reflects that fact that
the CPCI depends on global structure of the network, and not on the local connectivity to
its immediate neighbors.
4.5 Trading Communities
Beside the CPCI which ranks the container ports around the world based on their inbound
and outbound connectivity, one might be interested in how the GCSN is arranged and
resolved into communities based on trade patterns, which is herein referred to as Trading
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Figure 33: The changes of the most influential link (darker link) to port 15 as the position
of B changes.
Community.
4.5.1 Identifying Trading Communities
The concept of trading community in this context is similar to that of community structure
in social science’s network analysis. More specifically, a community within a network is a
collection of vertices with dense and strong connections among themselves but sparser and
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weaker connections to other vertices. Although there exist several community detection
algorithms in the literature7, we will rely on the Modularity Maximization Method [66]. In
this method, the modularity Q is defined as the difference between actual and expected
links within a community. Clearly, the modularity value is high when there is more total

















where Aij has value wij if there is a link of weight wij from vertex (port) i to vertex (port)
j, m =
∑
ij Aij , δij is the Kronecker delta symbol, and ci is the label of the community to
which vertex (port) i is assigned.
To identify communities in a network one must search over all partitions {ci} of the
vertices to find one that maximizes the modularity Q. We used the same heuristic search
method as [44] devised by [66]8, which is known to work well, under which the GCSN is
resolved into eight communities based on links weighted by the LSCI; (i) Asia-Pacific and
Trans-Pacific, (ii) Trans-Atlantic, (iii) South Asia and Mideast, (iv) West and South Africa,
(v) Southeastern United States, Caribbean, and Pacific South America, (vi) Southeastern
Latin America, (vii) New Zealand, and (viii) Southern Europe, as shown in Figure 34.
Interestingly, the communities we identify differ greatly from those of [44], where there are
about 12 communities in their container subnetwork9. In addition, the first five largest
communities are:
• Middle East, South and East Asia, and South Africa,
• Eastern United States, Caribbean, and Northern Latin America,
• Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Western Europe,
• Northern Europe,
7Interested readers could find a detailed discussion of community structure and community detection
algorithms in Chapter 3.
8See Algorithm 4 in Chapter 3 for more details.
9In their study, the community detection algorithm was applied on directed unweighted network, where
information about economic information, such as trade flow or freight capacity, is neglected.
80
• Trans-Pacific.
As supported by [29] that link weight may help improve community detection contrast,
our computation clearly recognized important global patterns, including trans-Pacific trade
(Figure 34a), as well as trans-Atlantic (Figure 34b), and intra-American trade (Figure 34e).
Other interesting observations are as follows.
• Figure 34a: This community is the most strongly-defined in the sense that it includes
the ports that contribute most to the total modularity.
It may seem surprising that this Pacific-spanning community also includes the Caribbean
port of Colon, Panama (all the other Panamanian ports are, as would be expected,
in the Caribbean community of Figure 34e). But this makes sense because services
from Asia to the US East Coast find it convenient to tranship at Colon for subsequent
disbursement throughout the Caribbean.
• Figure 34b: Rotterdam and Hamburg are the core ports of this community.
• Figure 34c: The Mideast trading community includes East Africa above the ports of
Tanzania and the Comoros and Seychelles Islands.
• Figure 34d: The East African ports below Tanzania, including the large ports of South
Africa, are better connected to the West African trading community than to others.
Tanjung Pelepas is the easternmost member, reflecting its role as point of distribution
of manufactured goods to Africa. The few European members are connected primarily
through the ports of Tanger or Algeciras.
• Figure 34e: The Caribbean community includes two outliers inviting comment. Wilm-
ington, Delaware, in the US, has strong ties to Central America because of its spe-
cialization in the handling of tropical fruits and fruit juices. On the west coast, San
Diego is more strongly connected to Latin America than to East Asia because the
Asian services prefer to call at Los Angeles or Long Beach for their larger regional
market and superior hinterland storage and transportation infrastructure.
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• Figure 34f: Port-of-Spain (Trinidad) is the northernmost member. Services travel
from it into this community.
• Figure 34g: This community is an artifact of geography, in this case, the fact that New
Zealand is far from trading partners. This community consists of the New Zealand
regional ports of Lyttelton, Napier, Port Chalmers, and Wellington, which have very
few direct international connections. They are better connected amongst themselves
than to the rest of the world. The international connections to New Zealand call
mainly at Auckland and Tauranga which are members of the Asia-Pac and trans-
Pacific trading community.
• Figure 34h: This is another community determined by the geography of the Mediter-
ranean Sea. These ports are locally connected but all significant connections to the
outside world are mainly through a few ports near the exit to the Atlantic Ocean.
The ports that contribute most to the modularity score are overwhelmingly Asian and
especially Chinese, with the top ten being Shanghai, Ningbo, Hong Kong, Busan, Rot-
terdam, Yantian, Hamburg, Port Klang (Malaysia), and Qingdao. The ports that con-
tribute most within the Trans-Atlantic community are Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Savan-
nah; within the South Asia/Mideast community: Port Klang, Jeddah, and Dubai; within
the West/South Africa: Tanjung Pelepas, Cape Town, and Durban; and within the south-
eastern US, Caribbean, and Pacific South American community: Callao (Peru), Manzanillo
(Panama), and Balboa (Panama).
It is worth noting that Singapore is not among the ten largest contributors to the
modularity. It is a member of the powerful Asia-Pac and trans-Pacific community, but it
does not have dense local connections as do the big China ports. Instead, it serves more
as a transshipment hub, with services to and from other ports that may not be directly
connected themselves. In fact, the clustering coefficient of Singapore, which measures how
connected to each other as its immediate neighbors, is very low among all container ports.
Lastly, when we allow ports to be assigned in multiple trading communities10, we have
10This is known as an overlapping trading community structure, see Algorithm 5 in Chapter 3 for more
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(a) Asia-Pac and trans-Pacific (b) Trans-Atlantic
(c) South Asia and Mideast (d) West and south Africa
(e) Southeastern United States, Caribbean, and Pa-
cific South America
(f) Southeastern Latin America
(g) New Zealand (h) Southern Europe
Figure 34: Trading communities identified by maximizing total LSCI weight of links within
groups (rather than between groups), with reported modularity value of 0.5085.
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found that there are about 32 ports that could be assigned in alternative communities
without hurting the modularity value, as reported in Table 14. Most of the ports are
generally small, located at the border of their original trading communities, having weak
connections within both their original trading communities and the alternative ones.
4.5.2 Comparing Trading Communities Across Networks
It is evident from the studies of [9] and [91] that trading communities evolve over time as
trade patterns change, mostly from the shift of demand and supply all around the globe.
In [91], it was found that the community structure of the World Trade Web (WTW),
consisting of 178 nations, has been changed greatly from a dispersed island structure to a
more centric one reflecting an increase in intercontinental services across the globe. [9] also
found several interesting observations in a study of the evolution of community structure
in the Multi-Layer World Trade Web as follows.
• The community structure of commodity specific networks usually differs from that
of the aggregated one over the period of study. More specifically, the number of
communities obtained from the aggregated network keeps increasing, but this is not a
typical trend for most of commodity specific networks — which is quite stable. This
implies that the structural change within specific commodity networks is less volatile.
• By using the Normalized Mutual Information Measure (NMI) as a measure of similar-
ity comparison, they have found that geographical distance is more related with the
formation of community, which is surprisingly irrelevant with trade.
In this study, by using the Similarity Value11 as a measure for community structure
comparison, we can identify the evolution of trading communities in the GCSN over time, as
well as the structural difference between the GCSN and its counterpart networks. However,
as our data set is quite limited and does not include trade information during economic
downturns, we can only compare the community structure of the GCSN with those of
details.
11See Algorithm 6 in Chapter 3 for more details.
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Table 14: A list of ports that could be assigned in multiple trading communities without
hurting the modularity value.
Port Country Original Alternative
Gibraltar Spain 2 5
Pointe-a-Pitre Guadeloupe 4 5
San Pedro, Ivory Coast Ivory Coast 4 2
Jacksonville FL United States 2 5
Pasir Gudang, Johor Malaysia 1 3
Izmit Turkey 4 3
St Johns, Antigua Antigua and Barbuda 2 5
Montoir France 4 2
Freetown Sierra Leone 4 2
Bintulu, Sarawak Malaysia 1 4
Vitoria Brazil 7 5
Degrad des Cannes French Guiana 2 7
Lobito Angola 2 4
Monrovia Liberia 2 4
Longoni, Comoros 3 4
Izmir Turkey 3 6
Havana Cuba 2 6
Bridgetown Barbados 2 5
Malabo Equatorial Guinea 2 6
Melilla Spain/N Af 2 5
Agadir Morocco 2 6
Salerno Italy 6 2
Cagliari Italy 2 3
Tanger Morocco 4 2
Miami FL United States 5 2
Casablanca Morocco 2 6
Motril Spain 2 5
Marina di Carrara Italy 3 6
Colon Panama 1 2
Alicante Spain 2 6
Malaga Spain 4 2
Taranto Italy 3 6
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its adjacency counterpart network, and the continent-based network, where each port is
assigned a community based on its geographic location over seven continents.
The result has been reported in Table 15, where we found that the community structure
detected in the GCSN was less related with geographic location, but more with trade
connection, which is quite different from the observation of [9].
Table 15: The results obtained from the comparison study of three different community
structures detected from three different networks, namely, the GCSN, the adjacency coun-
terpart network, and the continent-based network.





The Container Port Connectivity Index (CPCI) is a descriptive index summarizing how each
port is connected to others within the larger network. Importantly, the CPCI expresses more
than local connectivity to immediate neighbors but also neighbors-of-neighbors, and so on,
with all links weighted by the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI). Furthermore, the
CPCI allows inbound and outbound strengths to be studied independently, and this gives a
more detailed look at the economic roles played by each port. Finally, the CPCI supports
what-if analysis in a way that survey-based indices, like the Logistics Performance Index
(LPI), cannot.
Any index of logistics performance is an attempt to summarize a complex environment.
The LSCI may be criticized for the rather arbitrary way that data is agglomerated, and
the LPI criticized for its reliance on perception rather than measurement. The CPCI has
weaknesses as well. In particular, because it uses an LSCI-like computation, it inherits any
criticism of that. In addition, while the CPCI scores are based on connectivity, they are
not based on geography, and so do not explicitly account for travel time between ports.
It should be remarked that neither our network model nor that of [44] captures anything
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about transshipment. Even though there may be direct links from port A to port B and
from port B to port C, to transport a container from A to C may require transshipment.
In this case ports A and C are further apart in both time and cost than they might appear
in these models. Nevertheless, the CPCI has many useful properties. In particular, it is
based on link weights that are computed just like the LSCI; and because the LSCI has been
vetted by economists as capturing intensities of trade, our index inherits that descriptive
power and exercises it at a more granular level.
It is worth noting that link weights could be plausibly generated in other ways than the
LSCI-type computation suggested herein. The LSCI represents shipping capacity but ideally
one would like to assign weights to the links in some way that reflects the actual number
of TEUs transported, rather than TEU capacity. Unfortunately, data at this level of detail
is not generally available. Yet the mechanism we use to generate the CPCI supports any
relevant alternative of link weight assignment, depending on the focal point of the research.
For example, we may assign link weight as the reciprocal of the typical travel time so that
the strength of a port would be determined by how close its neighbors are, which could be
used in a study that focused on speed of freight flow rather than volume.
We expect the CPCI to be useful in some of the same ways as the LSCI. This may include
explaining how the container-shipping network changes over time or using the link weights
and port scores as explanatory variables for economic phenomena. We believe these finer-
grained statistics will be easier to understand and to explain because they directly reflect
immediate decisions of primary actors such as shipping companies.
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CHAPTER V
AN EXTENSION OF THE CONTAINER PORT CONNECTIVITY
INDEX
In Chapter 4, we provided a detailed discussion of a new ranking scheme that ranks container
ports based on a new index of port importance called the Container Port Connectivity Index
(CPCI). In that setting, the CPCI takes the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) as
input and returns two separate scores, namely the inbound and outbound scores, for port
ranking. In this chapter, we will show an interesting modification of such an index by
exercising alternative input, that is, the container flow. In doing so, we simply assume that
a port derives its importance based on the container flow it handles. In practice, a port, with
little demand or supply, could become a strategic hub due to a great number of transshipped
containers, such as the port of Singapore. By using the CPCI as a tool in a disaggregation
fashion, where the importance score of a port is decomposed into components, each reflects
its contribution to the overall port importance score, we can explore how each type of flow
affects port importance and why a particular port has become important. This would allow
the port authority to realize its strategic port importance compared to those of competitors.
Following the same idea, we can also establish route and leg importance scores by help
of hyperedges, reflecting multidimensional relationship between ports, routes, legs, and
container flow circulating within the network.
5.1 A Simple Disaggregation Scheme
In the Global Container-Shipping Network (GCSN), we use the Container Port Connectivity
Index (CPCI) to quantify port attractiveness in terms of inbound and outbound connectivity
based on rate of capacity movement between ports, or trade intensity. While the CPCI tells
us which port is important based on the connections with other ports, it does not explain
why such connections affect port importance in detail. In order to answer this question
properly, we propose an extension of the CPCI in a disaggregation fashion, where the
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overall port importance score is computed and decomposed into components, each reflects
its contribution to the overall port importance score.
Instead of using capacity, we alternatively use container flow to define link weights. In
doing so, we simply assume that a port derives its importance based on the container flow
it handles. For better understanding, we will show this procedure in a two-phase fashion.
In the first phase, we construct an optimization model to help shipping lines decide the
optimal channel of container flow through ports. Such a solution is then arranged into a
proper matrix form used subsequently for the computation of port importance scores, in
the second phase.
Depending on the metric spaces used, the construction of both the optimization model
and the container-flow matrix may vary. In order to show such a difference, two different
metric spaces, namely the link and the route metric spaces, will be discussed. In the link
space model, there is a link from port i to j if there exist services from port i to j, while,
in the route space model, port j is connected from port i if there exist routes containing
leg (i, j).
Since we do not track the number of containers carried in each route but rather the
number of containers traversing each link in the link space model, we may simply categorize
the container flow into three groups, that is, (i) direct shipment, which is defined as the
total number of pick-up and drop-off containers reflecting demand and supply at ports, (ii)
indirect shipment, defined as the total number of containers passing through ports which
are not their destinations, i.e. the transshipment hubs or other intermediary ports in service
loops, and (iii) empty container shipment preserving container balancedness. By applying
the HITS algorithm to proper matrix arrangements, the overall port importance score and
its components could be revealed. We can then use these resulting scores to answer why a
particular port has become important
In the route space model, the importance of a particular port might depend not only on
the flow it handles but also on the importance of routes and legs to which it belongs. For
example, a port which is a member of important routes should be treated differently from
those of the trivial ones. In such a case, we need to modify the flow matrix such that the
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relationship between ports, routes, and legs is included. With proper modifications, we can
also establish route and leg importance scores in addition to port importance score by help
of hyperedges and their associated incidence matrix representation.
In order to visualize such concepts, the detailed discussion of both link and route space
models is provided, followed by an example illustrating how we construct both the opti-
mization model and the flow matrix in each case.
5.2 The Link Space Model
In this section, we show how to extend the CPCI using container flow to define link weights
instead of capacity in a disaggregation fashion under the link metric space. For simplicity,
we will restrict ourselves with three types of container flow, that is, (i) direct shipment, (ii)
indirect shipment, and (iii) empty container shipment. In Phase 1, we establish a simple
optimization model to find the optimal flow of containers satisfying sets of practical con-
straints, including demand, supply, and capacity constraints. Once solved, we then use the
solution of such a model to construct a flow matrix used subsequently for the computation
of port importance score and its components, in the second phase. The computation of the
importance scores in this extension is the same as that of the CPCI, except for different
matrix representations.
5.2.1 The First Phase
Given a set of ports V and a set of directed links E comprising a network G, together with
all demand and supply of containerized goods from ports to ports, the main objective of
this phase is to find the optimal flow of containers that minimizes liner shipping operational
costs, constrained by sets of practical restrictions. For simplicity, we will focus on a simple
model where all demand must be satisfied and there must be sufficient empty containers to
load goods at all ports. In addition, there exist link capacities, which the total number of
containers moved on any links, both full and empty ones, must not exceed. In this setting,
the containers passing by intermediary ports, i.e. ports which are not their destinations,
are counted as indirect shipment. It is worth noting that, in the link space model, we do
not take account for the transshipment of containers. More specifically, while the containers
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might be carried by their original vessels or transshipped to the others, we treat them as
the same.
Sets
• C denotes a set of all commodities, where each commodity is defined as an origin-
destination pair of containers represented by a tuple of two ports, i.e. (k, l).
• E denotes a set of directed links.
• V denotes a set of ports.
Parameters
• tij denotes time, or cost, of moving a container from port i to j.
• uij denotes capacity of link (i, j).
• Skl denotes total supply amount of commodity (k, l) measured in containers.
• Dkl denotes total demand amount of commodity (k, l) measured in containers.
Decision Variables
• xklij denotes full containers of commodity (k, l) moved on link (i, j).
• yij denotes total number of empty containers moved on link (i, j), where yii represents
empty containers available at port i.
At the moment, we assume that port importance score depends mostly on the container
flow from ports to ports. Since such flow is mainly controlled by shipping lines, thus, our













In the case where profits of fulfilled demand are known, we may instead redefine the
objective function to profit maximization.
91
Constraints




kl, for all (k, l) ∈ C (65)




kl, for all (k, l) ∈ C (66)
• Capacity constraint on each link (i, j).
∑
(k,l)∈C
xklij + yij ≤ uij , for all (i, j) ∈ E (67)








ykj , for all k ∈ V (68)










yil, for all l ∈ V (69)
• Indirect-shipment balancing constraints, i.e. if port j is not the destination of com-






xklji , for all (k, l) ∈ C, and for all j, l ∈ V where j 6= l (70)
• Other technological constraints imposed on the network, i.e. traffic control constraint
at each port.
• Non negativity and integrity constraints for all decision variables.
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5.2.2 The Second Phase
In this phase, the overall port importance score is computed based on the resulting container
flow from Phase 1, using the HITS algorithm. Recall that, from the establishment of the
CPCI, a port is assigned two types of importance scores, namely the inbound and outbound
scores, which are computed by Equations (15) and (16). Similar to the LSCI-based CPCI,
in this setting, we still get those two scores, with additional capability of quantifying the
contribution of each flow type to each of those connectivity scores. This piece of information
could consequently be used to explain why some ports, with little demand or supply like
the port of Singapore, is considered as the world logistics hub, while there are many more
ports with relatively high demand or supply that have been ranked much lower.
Regarding its computation, assume that we have the optimal flow of containers in matrix
form, denoted as F , which is the composition of (i) direct shipment from the ports of origin
to the ports of destination without passing by any intermediary ports (D), (ii) indirect
shipment from the ports of origin passing by a series of intermediary ports before reaching
its final destination (I), and (iii) empty container shipment between ports (E). Since the
overall port importance score is structurally contributed by these three components, one
can calculate the inbound (x) and outbound scores (y) of all ports by Equations (71) and
(72).
λx = (D + I + E)T y =⇒ λ2x = (D + I + E)T (D + I + E)x, (71)
λy = (D + I + E)x =⇒ λ2y = (D + I + E)(D + I + E)T y. (72)
Notice that once the overall inbound and outbound scores have been calculated, we
could substitute these values into Equations (71) and (72) to obtain the contribution of
each flow type. With this approach, the port authority would be able to comprehend
and benchmark its importance in terms of (i) direct freight forwarding/receiving ability,
(ii) strategic intermediary, and (iii) empty repositioning ground, with competitors, which
would be crucial for the planning of its future course of operations.
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5.2.3 An Example of the Link Space Model
Let us consider a small example consisting of four ports and seven commodities shown in
Figure 35, where its associated demand and supply information is provided in Table 16. For
simplicity, we assume that all links have the same transportation cost per container and
capacity of one and 10, respectively.
1 2
34
Figure 35: An example of four fully connected ports with transportation cost of one unit
per container, and each link has capacity of 10 containers.
Based on the three traditional centrality measures, all ports are equivalently important
since they all have the same number of degrees, and the same shortest path length connecting
with each other. However, with flow information, ports 1 and 2 are expected to be the most
important ports, since they are expected to handle more containers than the rest. Some
might also suggest that port 3 would be the least important one, since it only requires goods
from port 1 and produces nothing to supply the rest; however, this might not always be the
case. In practice, terminal ports like port 3 might be a lot more important than it seems,
due to its transshipment or empty repositioning function, which would only be revealed
once the first phase has been solved.
Table 16: Demand and supply information of all commodities
From/To 1 2 3 4
1 15 10
2 5 5 5
3
4 5 5
According to the aforementioned information, the optimal flow of container and its
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associated disaggregation obtained from phase 1 is shown in Equation (73). The left hand
side of Equation (73) is the aggregated flow, which is decomposed into three flow types,
that is, (i) direct shipment, (ii) indirect shipment, and (iii) empty repositioning shipment,
on the right hand side.
0 10 10 5
10 0 5 5
10 0 0 5




0 10 10 0
5 0 5 5
0 0 0 0




0 0 0 5
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
10 0 0 5
0 0 0 0

(73)
If we apply the HITS algorithm to the direct decomposition above, we can compute
inbound and outbound scores of all four ports as shown in Tables 17 and 18. In terms of
outbound connectivity, from Table 18, port 1 is the most important hub, which is mostly
contributed by its direct shipment component. Although, port 3 is the least important hub
port, as expected, interestingly, its outbound score is comparable to that of port 4 which has
more activities due to a considerable amount of empty repositioning containers. Regarding
consolidation, or inbound connectivity, from Table 17, port 1 is also the most important,
not port 2, which requires more incoming containerized goods compared to port 1. The
reason behind this controversy is the empty repositioning activity at port 1. Since demand
at port 1 is less than its supply, it must draw empty containers from other ports nearby to
satisfy the availability of empty containers. This is evident from Equation (73) and Table
17, where the main contribution of port 1’s inbound score comes from empty reposition;
while the inbound score of port 2 is derived solely from its direct shipment.
Table 17: The inbound scores of all ports.
1 2 3 4
Inbound scores 0.5911 0.5374 0.4509 0.3981
Direct shipment 0.2459 0.5374 0.4509 0.1351
Indirect shipment 0 0 0 0.1579
Empty repositioning 0.3452 0 0 0.1051
In practice, container ports are of different sizes and capacities. Without a scaling
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Table 18: The outbound scores of all ports.
1 2 3 4
Outbound scores 0.6124 0.5238 0.4075 0.4296
Direct shipment 0.5097 0.3714 0 0.4296
Indirect shipment 0.1027 0 0 0
Empty repositioning 0 0.1524 0.4075 0
scheme, it might be cumbersome to apply the HITS algorithm to the decomposition of
flow matrix directly — this might cause a precision problem in the calculation of port
importance score since the sum of port importance squared is preserved at unity. However,
not all scaling schemes are appropriate in this setting. For example, consider the unity row
sum scaling scheme mimicking the Google’s Pagerank algorithm as shown in Equation (74),
i.e. the sum of each row equals one.
F =⇒

0 0.5 0.5 0
0.33 0 0.33 0.33
0 0 0 0




0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0.67 0 0 0.33
0 0 0 0

(74)
If we apply the HITS algorithm to Equation (74), we can compute inbound and outbound
scores of all ports as reported in Tables 19 and 20. With this scaling scheme, port 2 has
now become the most important hub instead of port 1. Even worse, ports 1 and 3 are now
equally important, which is preposterous. This contradiction is caused by neglecting flow
magnitude, where all outgoing containers from each port are treated as equally important.
A better scaling scheme would be one that scales all values at the same rate, such as the
LSCI-like measure.
Table 19: The inbound scores of all ports when container flow is scaled by row sum.
1 2 3 4
Inbound scores 0.8079 0.2166 0.2733 0.4751
Direct shipment 0.1976 0.2166 0.2733 0.1506
Indirect shipment 0 0 0 0.2453
Empty repositioning 0.6102 0 0 0.0791
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Table 20: The outbound scores of all ports when container flow is scaled by row sum.
1 2 3 4
Outbound scores 0.4203 0.7743 0.4068 0.2415
Direct shipment 0.1430 0.3028 0 0.2415
Indirect shipment 0.2773 0 0 0
Empty repositioning 0 0.4716 0.4068 0
5.3 The Route Space Model
In the previous section, we have demonstrated the extension of the CPCI using container
flow as link weights to compute the overall port importance score and its components under
the link metric space. Observe that, in that setting, we neglect all information about
vessel routes, which allows containers to be moved freely between ports. In this section,
we will show how to incorporate route information into the computation of the importance
scores using hyperedges to reflect multidimensional relationship between ports, routes, and
legs, as well as the container flow circulating within the network. With more embedded
information, we can extract not only the inbound and outbound scores but also the route
and leg importance scores.
5.3.1 The First Phase
As opposed to the link metric space, in the route metric space, we need to modify the model
to capture more detailed information about the container flow on each leg of all routes. In
order to do so, we need one more set R representing the set of all routes, and we need to
redefine the decision variables as follows.
• xklij,r denotes the number of full containers of commodity (k, l) moved on leg (i, j) of
route r.
• zi denotes the number of empty containers available at port i.
• yij,r denotes the number of empty containers moved on leg (i, j) of route r.
The objective function of the route space model is quite similar to that of the previous
one, as shown in (75), except the inclusion of route index in the decision variables. At the
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• Supply amount of the commodity (k, l) must be originated at port k and transported






kl, for all (k, l) ∈ C (76)






kl, for all (k, l) ∈ C (77)
• Capacity constraint on leg (i, j) of route r.
∑
(k,l)∈C
xklij,r + yij,r ≤ uij,r, for all (i, j) ∈ E, and for all r ∈ R (78)










ykj,r, for all k ∈ V (79)













yil,r, for all l ∈ V (80)
• Constraints regarding transshipment and indirect shipment at ports, i.e. if port j is
not the destination of commodity (k, l) transported on the leg (i, j) of route r, those










xklji,r, for all (k, l) ∈ C, and for all j, l ∈ V where j 6= l (81)
• Other technological constraints imposed on the network, i.e. traffic control constraint
at each port.
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• Non negativity and integrity constraints for all decision variables.
Before proceeding to Phase 2, observe that the solution to the modified phase-one prob-
lem is route-based optimal flow, which is impossible to represent by a flow-through matrix,
since the relationship between ports, routes, and their comprising legs, together with their
associated flow, could not be fitted in. In order to capture such information, we instead
use a hypergraph, i.e. a network consisting of hyperedges, and its associated incidence
matrix, for network representation. With the presence of hyperedges, multidimensional
relationships concerning more than two entities, such as a buyer-seller-broker transaction
described in Chapter 2, could be described and properly defined in matrix form. Since the
resulting incidence matrix contains more information, we can extract two more interesting
importance scores, namely the route and leg importance scores, as the output1.
In order to visualize this concept, let us consider the same example shown in Figure 35;
but, in this case, we restrict the containers to be moved only on 8 available routes shown
in Table 21.











With the aforementioned information, the solution to the modified phase-one problem is
shown in Table 22. For simplicity, we do not further classify container flow by commodity;
but this could be done when importance scores are suspected to be commodity dependent.
1Recall that the computation of these scores is similar to that of the multidimension centrality described
in Chapter 2.
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Table 22: The solution to the modified phase-one problem.
Route Number Direction Leg Full Container Empty Container
1 1-2-1 (1,2) 10 0
(2,1) 5 5
2 1-3-1 (1,3) 10 0
(3,1) 0 5
3 1-4-1 (1,4) 0 0
(4,1) 5 0
4 2-3-2 (2,3) 5 0
(3,2) 0 0
5 2-4-2 (2,4) 5 0
(4,2) 5 0
6 3-4-3 (3,4) 0 0
(4,3) 0 0
7 2-1-4-2 (2,1) 0 5
(1,4) 5 0
(4,2) 5 0
8 2-3-4-2 (2,3) 0 0
(3,4) 0 0
(4,2) 0 0
5.3.2 The Second Phase
The most crucial modification for this second phase is the construction of an incidence
matrix, where port-route-flow relationship must be captured. For better understanding, we
will show a step-by-step development of this modification starting from the most general
case, where all information takes only binary value reflecting membership, to the most
sophisticated one, where we blend both binary and canonical information together.
Firstly, let us consider a modification where all information takes only binary value,
i.e. either 0 or 1, indicating whether there exists member-wise relationship between two
interested entities. In particular, this incidence matrix captures all affiliated relationship
between ports, routes, and legs, as shown in Equation (82), where rows of A represent
legs and columns of A represent ports (N) and routes (R). In other words, matrix A is a
concatenation of columns representing ports followed by the columns representing routes.
For simplicity, let Ak(i, j) be the element of A corresponding to the row of edge (i, j) in
column k. If k ∈ N , let Ak(i, j) = Nk(i, j), and Ak(i, j) = Rk(i, j) otherwise. For any edge
connecting ports i and j, we have Ni(i, j) = Nj(i, j) = 1. Similarly, for any route r ∈ R, if
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(i, j) ∈ r, then we have Rr(i, j) = 1, and Rr(i, j) = 0 otherwise.
A =

| | | | | | ... |
N1 N2 N3 N4 R1 R1 ... R8
| | | | | | ... |
 (82)
For purposes of construction, we assume that (i) leg importance score is a function
of ports and routes, and (ii) both port and route importance scores are functions of legs.
However, since we do not incorporate flow information into such a matrix, the resulting
importance scores will be primarily derived based on membership, which might mislead
their true importance. In addition, when some routes are not being used, i.e. routes 6 and
8, their route importance scores should be zero; however, with this setting, they will remain
in the positive side due to the existence of route-leg relationship. In order to alleviate
these effects, we need to modify matrix A in such a way that both membership and flow
information are well blended.
The easiest way to modify matrix A is to use container flow instead of binary parameter
Rr(i, j). Based on this modification, we can decompose such flow into full and empty














where N̄i is the i
th weighted submatrix preserving row sum unity, and RC , RE are full
and empty container submatrices.
With this disaggregation scheme, we would obtain port, route, and leg importance
scores, where, (i) leg importance score is a function of connected ports and the container
flow it handles from various routes, (ii) port importance score is a function of legs having
ports of interest as members, and (iii) route importance score is a function of container flow
moving on their comprising legs.
In the aforementioned modification, the assumption that port and route importance
scores are functions of only legs may seem incorrect since both port and route importance
scores should also depend on the flow of containers. Thence, we might further modify







where (i) the first |V | rows and the rest |E| rows of Ā represent ports and legs in the
network, (ii) the first |V | columns and the rest |R| columns of Ā represent ports and all
available routes, (iii) F1 denotes container flow submatrix among ports, which is the same
as the flow-through matrix used in the link space calculation, (iv) F2 denotes a submatrix of
container flow moved on each leg of all routes, (v) C1 denotes leg-route membership matrix,
and (vi) C2 denotes port-leg connectivity matrix. Similar to the previous modification, we








where Fix denotes the i
th weighted submatrix of container flow type x and C̄i is the i
th
weighted membership submatrix. With this modification, both membership and flow infor-
mation is properly captured and we could obtain all importance scores and the contribution
from each flow type as designed.
5.3.3 An Example of the Route Space Model
In this section, we will illustrate the aforementioned concepts of the importance score com-
putation that take multidimensional information into account. We begin the discussion
with the simplest model, where only affiliated information among ports, routes, and their
comprising legs is considered. Based on Table 22 and Equation (82), we can construct
the incidence matrix A as shown in Table 23, where Table 24 summarizes the resulting
port, route, and leg importance scores derived from such a matrix. Since importance scores
depend solely on port-leg and route-leg memberships, ports with high degree and legs ap-
pearing in many routes are expected to have relatively high scores. In addition, the longer
the routes, the higher the route importance scores, regardless of the container flow circu-
lating on such routes, for example, routes 6 and 8 containing more legs than the rest are
expected to have high importance scores, though there are no containers carrying within.
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In order to make the result more informative, we replace binary relationship between
legs and routes with actual container flow. Based on Equation (83), matrix A′ could be
constructed as shown in Table 25, where Tables 26 and 27 show its decomposition based on
the type of container flow. After applying the HITS algorithm to matrix A′, port, route,
and leg importance scores are extracted, as reported in Tables 28 and 29. Unsurprisingly,
since most activities have occurred at ports 1 and 2, we would expect high port importance
scores on these two ports. Additionally, legs connecting these two ports, i.e (1, 2) and (2, 1),
are also expected to have higher scores than the rest since higher ranked ports are connected
by these legs. Consequently, route 1 has become the most important. On the contrary, since
routes 6 and 8 have no flow, their route importance scores are undoubtedly zero. It is worth
noting that, in this decomposition, N̄1 and N̄2 are set to be the same. This implies that
the importance of full and empty containers handled is equally important, i.e. each type of
flow will have the same score.
In the last modification, where port importance score is a function of both legs and
flow, we can construct matrix Ā based on Equation (84), as shown in Table 30. With
this construction, we expect to obtain better results since both membership and flow are
being utilized; however, there are several issues needing clarification. Firstly, observe that
since membership is part of importance score calculation, there would be no entity with
zero importance score. For example, while routes 6 and 8 have zero importance score
in the previous alteration, in this alteration these two routes would receive some positive
importance scores contributed by route-leg relationship (see Table 33). Similarly, from Table
34, ports 1 and 4 have not generated any empty containers; however, their empty container
scores are not zero due to the same relational effect. Lastly, legs (3, 2), (3, 4) and (4, 3) as
parts of the unused routes have fairly high importance scores due to the contribution of
route-leg relationship. For better interpretation, empty routes should be discarded before
proceeding to the calculation of importance scores, though in practice, empty routes are
quite rare.
After removing empty routes and their associated legs, the updated matrix Ā and its
decompositions are shown in Tables 35 – 37, while the updated importance scores are
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reported in Tables 38 and 39. This result is much clearer since all relational effects previously
discussed have been removed.
One interesting feature about the extension of the CPCI in the route space model is that
the constructed matrix is not required to be a symmetric matrix for the derivation of all
importance scores, since the multiplication between the constructed incidence matrix and
its transpose is always symmetric. And, therefore, all importance scores are well-defined,
and always exist.
5.4 Conclusions
Other than the LSCI-like measure defined as link weights, we show that the CPCI can take
alternative input, such as container flow, for the computation of port importance score. We
also show that, with proper modification, we can extract detailed information about route
and leg importance scores in addition to that of a port. These importance scores, in turn,
allow us to understand why a port has become important, though it is neither the world’s
largest manufacturer nor consumer, such as the port of Singapore.
The computation of these scores is quite similar to that of the CPCI, except for different
matrix representations. In the link space mode, the overall port importance score and its
components are computed based on a flow-through matrix, while, in the route space model,
they are computed based on an incidence matrix, where hyperedges are used to represent
multidimensional relationship between ports, routes, legs, and container flow circulating
within the network.
Based on our illustration, it is evident that the crucial step for the derivation of impor-
tance scores lies on the construction of the flow matrix. Such relationship may vary from one
to another application, making the construction of the flow matrix more like an art rather
than a science. Nevertheless, we believe that the extension of the CPCI presented here gives
several insights into the construction of meaningful measures for ranking network’s entities
other than nodes or links.
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Table 23: Matrix A.
Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
(1,2) 1 1 1
(1,3) 1 1 1
(1,4) 1 1 1 1
(2,1) 1 1 1 1
(2,3) 1 1 1 1
(2,4) 1 1 1
(3,1) 1 1 1
(3,2) 1 1 1
(3,4) 1 1 1 1
(4,1) 1 1 1
(4,2) 1 1 1 1 1
(4,3) 1 1 1
Table 24: Importance scores derived from matrix A.
Legs Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores Ports and Routes Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores
(1,2) 0.2518 0.0737 1 0.4027 0.2345
(1,3) 0.2317 0.0679 2 0.4558 0.2655
(1,4) 0.3173 0.0929 3 0.4027 0.2345
(2,1) 0.3173 0.0929 4 0.4558 0.2655
(2,3) 0.3173 0.0929 R1 0.1431 0.1037
(2,4) 0.2718 0.0796 R2 0.1165 0.0844
(3,1) 0.2317 0.0679 R3 0.1431 0.1037
(3,2) 0.2518 0.0737 R4 0.1431 0.1037
(3,4) 0.3173 0.0929 R5 0.1696 0.1229
(4,1) 0.2518 0.0737 R6 0.1431 0.1037
(4,2) 0.4029 0.1180 R7 0.2609 0.1890
(4,3) 0.2518 0.0737 R8 0.2609 0.1890
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Table 25: Matrix A′.
Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
(1,2) 1 1 10
(1,3) 1 1 10
(1,4) 1 1 5
(2,1) 1 1 10 5
(2,3) 1 1 5
(2,4) 1 1 5
(3,1) 1 1 5
(3,2) 1 1
(3,4) 1 1
(4,1) 1 1 5
(4,2) 1 1 5 5
(4,3) 1 1
Table 26: Matrix A′F .
Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
(1,2) 0.5 0.5 10
(1,3) 0.5 0.5 10
(1,4) 0.5 0.5 5
(2,1) 0.5 0.5 5
(2,3) 0.5 0.5 5




(4,1) 0.5 0.5 5
(4,2) 0.5 0.5 5 5
(4,3) 0.5 0.5
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Table 27: Matrix A′E .




(2,1) 0.5 0.5 5 5
(2,3) 0.5 0.5
(2,4) 0.5 0.5






Table 28: Leg importance score derived from matrix A′, and its decomposition.
Legs Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores Full Container Empty Container
(1,2) 0.6352 0.3667 0.6282 0.0070
(1,3) 0.0181 0.0105 0.0146 0.0036
(1,4) 0.1218 0.0703 0.1176 0.0041
(2,1) 0.7487 0.4322 0.3176 0.4311
(2,3) 0.0082 0.0047 0.0045 0.0036
(2,4) 0.0272 0.0157 0.0230 0.0042
(3,1) 0.0127 0.0073 0.0036 0.0091
(3,2) 0.0073 0.0042 0.0036 0.0036
(3,4) 0.0016 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008
(4,1) 0.0093 0.0054 0.0052 0.0041
(4,2) 0.1407 0.0812 0.1365 0.0042
(4,3) 0.0016 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008
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Table 29: Port and route importance scores derived from matrix A′, and their decomposi-
tion.
Port and Routes Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores Full Container Empty Container
1 0.1036 0.4462 0.0518 0.0518
2 0.1050 0.4524 0.0525 0.0525
3 0.0033 0.0143 0.0017 0.0017
4 0.0202 0.0872 0.0101 0.0101
R1 0.9272 0.6896 0.6764 0.2508
R2 0.0164 0.0122 0.0122 0.0042
R3 0.0031 0.0023 0.0031 0
R4 0.0027 0.0020 0.0027 0
R5 0.0563 0.0419 0.0563 0
R6 0 0 0 0
R7 0.3387 0.2520 0.0879 0.2508
R8 0 0 0 0
Table 30: Matrix Ā.
Ports and Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
1 10 10 5 1 1 1 1
2 15 5 5 1 1 1 1 1
3 5 1 1 1 1
4 5 10 1 1 1 1 1
(1,2) 1 1 10
(1,3) 1 1 10
(1,4) 1 1 5
(2,1) 1 1 10 5
(2,3) 1 1 5
(2,4) 1 1 5
(3,1) 1 1 5
(3,2) 1 1
(3,4) 1 1
(4,1) 1 1 5
(4,2) 1 1 5 5
(4,3) 1 1
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Table 31: Matrix ĀF .
Ports and Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
1 10 10 5 0.5 05 0.5 0.5
2 5 5 5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
4 5 10 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(1,2) 0.5 0.5 10
(1,3) 0.5 0.5 10
(1,4) 0.5 0.5 5
(2,1) 0.5 0.5 5
(2,3) 0.5 0.5 5




(4,1) 0.5 0.5 5
(4,2) 0.5 0.5 5 5
(4,3) 0.5 0.5
Table 32: Matrix ĀE .
Ports and Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
1 0.5 05 0.5 0.5
2 10 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3 5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5




(2,1) 0.5 0.5 5 5
(2,3) 0.5 0.5
(2,4) 0.5 0.5







Table 33: Inbound score and route importance score derived from matrix Ā, and their
decomposition.
Ports and Routes Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores Full Container Empty Container
1 0.6359 0.3483 0.2672 0.3687
2 0.4678 0.2562 0.4530 0.0148
3 0.4228 0.2316 0.4147 0.0080
4 0.2993 0.1639 0.2905 0.0088
R1 0.2313 0.2978 0.1546 0.0767
R2 0.0965 0.1243 0.0626 0.0340
R3 0.0578 0.0744 0.0359 0.0219
R4 0.0523 0.0673 0.0327 0.0196
R5 0.0872 0.1122 0.0621 0.0251
R6 0.0266 0.0343 0.0133 0.0133
R7 0.1671 0.2152 0.0810 0.0861
R8 0.0580 0.0746 0.0290 0.0290
Table 34: Outbound score and leg importance score derived from matrix Ā, and their
decomposition.
Ports and Legs Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores Full Container Empty Container
1 0.5232 0.3012 0.5100 0.0132
2 0.6565 0.3780 0.3385 0.3180
3 0.1630 0.0938 0.0056 0.1574
4 0.3942 0.2270 0.3848 0.0095
(1,2) 0.1632 0.1630 0.1368 0.0264
(1,3) 0.0967 0.0966 0.0714 0.0253
(1,4) 0.0846 0.0845 0.0623 0.0223
(2,1) 0.2031 0.2029 0.0816 0.1215
(2,3) 0.0550 0.0550 0.0338 0.0213
(2,4) 0.0575 0.0574 0.0391 0.0183
(3,1) 0.0736 0.0735 0.0253 0.0483
(3,2) 0.0425 0.0425 0.0213 0.0213
(3,4) 0.0345 0.0345 0.0172 0.0172
(4,1) 0.0585 0.0584 0.0361 0.0223
(4,2) 0.0974 0.0973 0.0791 0.0183
(4,3) 0.0345 0.0345 0.0172 0.0172
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Table 35: Updated matrix Ā.
Ports and Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R7
1 10 10 5 1 1 1 1
2 15 5 5 1 1 1 1
3 5 1 1
4 5 10 1 1 1
(1,2) 1 1 10
(1,3) 1 1 10
(1,4) 1 1 5
(2,1) 1 1 10 5
(2,3) 1 1 5
(2,4) 1 1 5
(3,1) 1 1 5
(4,1) 1 1 5
(4,2) 1 1 5 5
Table 36: Updated matrix ĀF .
Ports and Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R7
1 10 10 5 0.5 05 0.5 0.5
2 5 5 5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3 0.5 0.5
4 5 10 0.5 0.5 0.5
(1,2) 0.5 0.5 10
(1,3) 0.5 0.5 10
(1,4) 0.5 0.5 5
(2,1) 0.5 0.5 5
(2,3) 0.5 0.5 5
(2,4) 0.5 0.5 5
(3,1) 0.5 0.5
(4,1) 0.5 0.5 5
(4,2) 0.5 0.5 5 5
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Table 37: Updated matrix ĀE .
Ports and Legs 1 2 3 4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R7
1 0.5 05 0.5 0.5
2 10 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3 5 0.5 0.5




(2,1) 0.5 0.5 5 5
(2,3) 0.5 0.5
(2,4) 0.5 0.5
(3,1) 0.5 0.5 5
(4,1) 0.5 0.5
(4,2) 0.5 0.5
Table 38: Inbound score and route importance score derived from the updated matrix Ā,
and their decomposition.
Ports and Routes Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores Full Container Empty Container
1 0.6392 0.3502 0.2685 0.3707
2 0.4678 0.2563 0.4538 0.0140
3 0.4201 0.2302 0.4147 0.0054
4 0.2979 0.1633 0.2907 0.0072
R1 0.2354 0.3361 0.1858 0.0495
R2 0.0974 0.1391 0.0796 0.0178
R3 0.0581 0.0829 0.0581 0.0000
R4 0.0525 0.0750 0.0525 0.0000
R5 0.0879 0.1254 0.0879 0.0000
R7 0.1692 0.2415 0.1196 0.0495
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Table 39: Outbound score and leg importance score derived from the updated matrix Ā,
and their decomposition.
Ports and Legs Unscaled Scores Scaled Scores Full Container Empty Container
1 0.5241 0.3020 0.5241 0.0000
2 0.6582 0.3792 0.3516 0.3066
3 0.1605 0.0925 0.0072 0.1533
4 0.3927 0.2263 0.3927 0.0000
(1,2) 0.1660 0.1844 0.1394 0.0265
(1,3) 0.0975 0.1084 0.0721 0.0254
(1,4) 0.0855 0.0950 0.0630 0.0225
(2,1) 0.2066 0.2295 0.0830 0.1236
(2,3) 0.0552 0.0613 0.0339 0.0213
(2,4) 0.0578 0.0642 0.0394 0.0184
(3,1) 0.0742 0.0824 0.0254 0.0488
(4,1) 0.0589 0.0654 0.0364 0.0225
(4,2) 0.0984 0.1093 0.0800 0.0184
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CHAPTER VI
MARKET STABILITY OF A LOGISTICS HUB
It might be true that a strategically located port with advanced and efficient infrastructure
may attract more liners and container flow, and consequently create opportunities for freight
consolidation or transshipment. Yet there are several threats that might affect the stability
of such a hub, for example, the competition among ports in the region, connectivity loss, and
hub relocation. In this chapter, we show that these risks are closely related and they should
all be recognized in a unified framework. In doing so, we establish an analytical framework
for assessing market stability of a logistics hub, which could also be used to predict the
behavior of shipping lines in a competitive/cooperative setting. With this analytical scheme,
it is possible for the port authority to comprehend and evaluate the expected loss from
shipping lines’ defection with respect to the actions executed by competitors. This piece
of information, in turn, allows the port authority to devise counter strategies protecting its
business from competing ports, such as strengthening its relationship with the customers
anticipated to leave.
6.1 Shipping Lines and Market Stability of a Logistics Hub
Among all members of the container-shipping industry, ports and shipping lines might be
considered as the most crucial players — since a port acts as a gateway for containerized
goods to be distributed, while a shipping line is the one that physically transports them from
the origins to the destinations via its service network. In practice, shipping lines usually
form an alliance to help enhance their vessel capacity. This also gives them opportunities
for serving more destinations by integrating their service networks with those in the same
alliance via transshipment at a logistics hub. Interestingly, it is shipping lines, not a hub,
that provide this connectivity. And, a popular hub with great connectivity usually induces
more liners, which consequently helps it remain popular.
From the port’s perspective, in order to become a logistics hub, a port must possess at
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least two important characteristics. The first is the infrastructure that allows shipping lines
to operate at lower cost but with higher speed. The latter is its geographical location, or
centrality. A hub possessing these two characteristics, such as ports of Singapore and Hong
Kong, usually attracts more liners, container flow, and so achieves connectivity for freight
consolidation or transshipment. Yet there are several threats that might affect the stability
of such a hub.
The first is the competition among ports in the vicinity. Obviously, ports in the vicinity
possess approximately the same importance in terms of centrality. Therefore, a port with
better infrastructure, as well as other external factors, such as lower port charges or lower
labor costs, generally attracts shipping lines to camp their operations at such a port. As
a consequence, a dramatic change in container-shipping patterns is evident. For example,
in 1991, Port of Hong Kong was the first and only container port in the Pearl River Delta
which served as the gateway to the southern region of China. The port of Hong Kong
became the world’s busiest container port several years before the emerging of the port of
Shenzhen, located in the same region. The port of Shenzhen began its container operation
with capacity of less than a million TEUs in 1991, which was far less than one tenth of Hong
Kong’s at the same period. However, with lower cost of operation and its location close to
the world manufacturer, China, the port of Shenzhen has become more and more important,
with a huge leap of both throughput and capacity. During 1991 – 2008, although ports of
Hong Kong and Shenzhen have increased both their throughput and capacity dramatically,
market share of the port of Hong Kong significantly dropped from 99% in 1991 to 53% in
2008, which is opposite to that of Shenzhen’s [56].
Another prominent example of port competition is the emerging of the port of Tanjung
Pelepas in Southeast Asia. It is well known that port of Singapore is one of the most
efficient container ports in the world, with designed capacity of over 24 million TEUs. The
port of Singapore, together with Port Klang and port of Tanjung Pelepas, is major port
accounting for 68.2% of container throughput in this region. Additionally, in terms of
transshipment, these three major ports account for almost 100% of transshipment traffic
[48]. However, based on the study of [48], they found that the annualized slot capacity
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called at the port of Tanjung Pelepas increased dramatically from 1999 to 2004, while the
exclusive market share of the port of Singapore decreased from 64.6% to 47.8% during the
same period. Apparently, a fierce competition among ports in the vicinity inevitably affects
market stability of logistics hubs.
Since ports themselves are static entities that cannot move freely, they are more vulnera-
ble to any decisions made by other players, especially the shipping lines. Without container
flow fed by the liners, a port is merely a gigantic monument located along the shore. Having
that in mind, port authorities have generally tried to bind shipping lines to operate at their
complexes by a wide range of strategies, such as providing dedicated terminals to their best
customers or contracting the minimum container amount to be handled to ensure lower
port fees charged. By having more operating lines at a port, it will become popular and
remain popular by help of its customers that provides port connectivity. Therefore, losing a
customer implies a reduction of both port connectivity and its attractiveness as a logistics
hub at the same time. In the worst case, this may trigger a series of defections by others
whose transshipment opportunities have been reduced. A transshipment hub is especially
vulnerable to this threat due to its smaller demand and supply, which might not otherwise
justify port calls made by the liners.
One prominent example demonstrating this risk is the competition between the ports of
Singapore and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia [10]. While Tanjung Pelepas and Singapore are
located on the opposite side of the Johor Strait, next to each other, labor cost at the port of
Tanjung Pelepas is much lower. In order to secure lower operational costs, in 2000, Maersk
Sealand, the largest operating line at port of Singapore, moved its operating hub from the
port of Singapore to the port of Tanjung Pelepas. Afterward, in 2002, Evergreen, the second
biggest line, also moved to the port of Tanjung Pelepas. Under economic pressure on small
shipping lines, some have to establish connection services to the port of Tanjung Pelepas
in order to transship their containers with those who moved, and the others have followed
them to the port of Tanjung Pelepas. By this succession of moves, the port of Singapore
has lost millions of TEUs of container flow to its competitor. Ironically, the most important
customer is also the greatest threat to the hub itself since it could abandon the current hub
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and easily move to a competing one, which increases economic pressure on the rest to follow
its move.
Based on the aforementioned, it might be true that, in order to maintain its status, as
well as its market share, a logistics hub must improve not only its operational performance
but also the relationship with its customers. Unfortunately, such a claim is not quite
complete since the container-shipping industry is more dynamic and such stability depends
not only on the hub’s decision itself but also on other players’.
In order to capture the whole picture of such a system, we establish a unified frame-
work for analyzing the effect of external forces on market stability of a logistics hub in a
competitive environment, taking account of both ports’ and shipping lines’ decisions. In
this setting, ports decide on their infrastructure which consequently defines shipping lines’
operational costs. With this cost function, shipping lines then decide on their operational
plans directing their container flow through these ports in a competitive/cooperative set-
ting. Once the system reaches stability, where no shipping line is better off moving its
business away to competing ports, each shipping line’s value of cooperation is determined
and used as base solution for the hub to devise counter strategies or policies preventing a
defection.
6.2 Literature Review
There are several research streams associated with port and shipping line operations ranging
from planning to operations in both non-cooperative and cooperative settings. Network op-
timization is regarded as one major research stream concerning shipping line’s best response
in a non-cooperative setting. The problems in this class mostly focus on shipping line’s op-
erational improvement, such as network design or ship scheduling. In [2], ship scheduling
and network design problems were modeled simultaneously by means of a time and space
network to help minimize liner shipping operational costs. In [94], the authors developed a
cost minimization model to help identify ship types and their associated numbers in each
shipping route to maintain the desired service level at minimal cost. In [93], liner shipping
schedule design and container routing problems were combined and solved for the optimal
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shipping plan that minimized total transshipment cost and penalty cost associated with
longer transit times at ports. Lastly, in [95], an interesting method of cost minimizing path
generation taking into account practical operational constraints, such as maritime cabotage
and maximum allowable transit time, was presented.
In order to make the model more realistic and practical, many researchers have incor-
porated an implicit cost, such as queuing or congestion, into their models. For example,
in [40], a multiserver queuing model was embedded within the optimization model to help
find the optimal number of open gate lanes that minimize total operating costs at marine
container terminals for trucking services.
In a large-scale optimization, the liner shipping network may be integrated with the
rail line or trucking network, reflecting intermodal transportation, such as those sea-land
networks studied in [27], [42], and [43]. In [43], they studied an integrated model of liner
shipping and rail line networks taking both transportation and inventory costs into account.
The objective of their research model was to identify the optimal channels of shipment from
the origin located somewhere in Asia to the Regional Distribution Centers (RDCs) in the
US. For modeling simplicity, several assumptions were imposed. For example, the demand
at each RDC was set to be proportional to the purchasing power in the region that such
a RDC served. In addition, each RDC was served only by one port using one channel of
transportation, where there was no capacity constraint at ports or rail line terminals, as
well as the minimum contractual volume. In [42], they revised their previous model by (i)
including the minimum contractual volume at each port and (ii) using the result from a
so-called short-run model presented by [52] to update the parameters of the revised model,
reflecting the fluctuation of transit times with seasonality.
Similarly, in [25] and [27], the studies of the North American container flow diversion in a
competitive environment were conducted. In their studies, congestion was considered as part
of shipping line’s operating costs modeled by means of a piecewise linear function. The result
from their model indicated the optimal routes, ship sizes, ports, and hinterland shipping
channels, that satisfied demand and capacity constraints at minimal cost. According to their
model, demand units were referred to as the Business Economic Areas (BEAs), which were
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defined as geographical groups that were relevant for economic analysis. They also used
such a model to evaluate the impacts of the Panama Canal Expansion and the change of
infrastructure at the port of Prince Rupert on the North American container flow diversion.
In [26], they extended their previous works to analyze the diversion of container flow in the
US ports caused by congestion. They concluded that congestion existed at most ports in the
US; and in some cases, flow diversion might be required to lower the cost of transportation.
Besides network optimization whose primary objective is to improve shipping line’s
operational performance, several researchers have instead focused more on the behavioral
study of players in the container-shipping industry. From the shipping line’s perspective
[88], an empirical study of port selection was conducted based on a survey of major lines
in Singapore and Malaysia. Their study concluded that, among seven factors, only port
charges and a wide range of services were the most influential factors in the selection
process. Similar studies were done by [69] and [87], but from different players’ perspective.
From freight forwarders’ perspective, [87] concluded that, among seven factors, efficiency,
shipping frequency, and infrastructure, were the top three influential factors in the selection
process, while cost and time related factors were the most significant ones from the shippers’
side [69]. In [84], the authors performed a detailed analysis of port selection incorporating
shipper size and other external factors under the control of port management. They found
that the most influential factors for different sizes of shippers were not the same. More
specifically, larger shippers focused more on the factors associated with delivery speed, while
the smaller ones focused more on costs. Although we can explain player’s behavior through
these sophisticated statistical methods, unfortunately they are too subjective and heavily
dependent on the design of the survey.
Observe that most of the literature discussed so far focuses on the performance of an
individual player, such as shipping lines or shippers, without considering the mechanism
between the player itself and others. In the case where the resulting outcome depends on the
decisions of several players, game theory might be used as a tool for explaining the behavior
of those involved players, where port competition is one of the active studies relying on such
a concept.
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The competition between Busan and Shanghai ports for transshipment container flow
was conducted by [3]. In their study, the payoff received by a port was assumed to depend
not only on the investment it made in its infrastructure but also on the investment made
by its competitor. In order to defend its market share, the key decision for a port was to
decide whether to invest, as well as the extent of such an investment, taking the strategies
of its competitor as factors for making a decision. In [56], the competition between the
ports of Hong Kong and Shenzhen was studied based on a two-stage game concerning price
and capacity of the competing ports as factors for decision making.
Recently, [57] investigated the duopolistic competition of transshipment ports using a
game-theoretic approach. This problem was motivated by a series of shipping line’s de-
fections from the port of Singapore to the port of Tanjung Pelepas mentioned earlier. In
their study, the relationship between shipping line’s operating costs and the number of
transshipped containers at ports was captured by a two-stage game solved by a traditional
backward induction. Though their study is interesting in several aspects, their model is
unrealistic since it heavily relies on speculative assumptions. For example, the demand
function used in their study assumes the same number of transshipment containers for all
shipping lines. In addition, transshipment volumes are assumed to depend on port connec-
tivity, or port efficiency, which is merely a conceptually undefined quantity. Objectively,
these assumptions are imposed solely for problem characterization and the derivation of
model’s solution.
Although both ports and shipping lines are each competing with their rivals within the
same business, interestingly, the cooperation among themselves has found to be useful and
it is widely used for enhancing their operational performance. From the shipping line’s
perspective, vessel capacity is time sensitive, and unfilled capacity is considered as loss.
Capacity sharing within a cooperative group of shipping lines, or the alliance, could help
improve member’s vessel utilization. Additionally, within an alliance, each member would
have more opportunities to serve more destinations by combining its network with others
via transshipment.
Since the contribution of each member to the formed alliance is not the same, the main
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issue that might arise in that setting is how to secure the stability of such an alliance.
Cooperative game theory then comes into sight. In the literature, we can model this kind of
problem by using the concept of cooperative game theory to find a condition that stabilizes
the formed coalition. Theoretically, such a condition is a fair sharing of cost or benefit
based on a specific set of allocation rules. There are three prominent solution strategies for
such an allocation in the literature, that is, the core solution, the Shapley value, and the
nucleolus.
The core solution is defined as an allocation such that no one is better off outside the
coalition. While the core solution is outstanding in terms of stability, unfortunately, in many
cases, it is not uniquely defined, or it might be empty. In order to alleviate this problem,
attention has been turned to another allocation concept called the Shapley Value. The
Shapley value is axiomatically characterized based on three properties, that is, (i) dummy,
(ii) symmetry, and (iii) additivity. Intuitively, one can interpret the Shapley value as the
marginal contribution of a player to the coalition. The Shapley value has several appealing
properties over the core, including that it is uniquely determined. Lastly, the nucleolus is
defined as the allocation rule such that player’s dissatisfaction is minimized.
In the container-shipping industry, cooperation between liners is common, but not for
the ports. Yet it is conceptually possible. For example, [77] studied a two-stage game involv-
ing cooperative structures among container terminals of the port of Karachi that directly
competed with another terminal of the port of Qasim. In the first stage, each terminal
decided whether to join the coalition non-cooperatively. Once the coalition was formed,
those who joined the coalition cooperatively determined the price in order to maximize the
coalition surplus in the second stage. In their model, market share of each terminal was
solely a function of price set by terminals. Such a function was derived from the multinomial
logit model and the equilibrium price was then determined by backward induction. As an
extension to their previous work, [78] used the same model to explain the effects of different
concession contracts on the coalition formation.
Lastly, [7] developed a game theoretic model to study the competition and cooperation
among three parties in the network of container shipping, that is, two major hub ports and
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the shipping companies. In that setting, market share of a hub port was a function of its
utility and such a utility function was solely based on its handling charge and that of its
competitors — and not the congestion. While their study, as well as their associated model,
is quite similar to ours in several aspects, our framework is more operational and, plausibly,
more beneficial for both ports and shipping lines. In particular, our framework properly
and better explains the mechanism between ports and shipping lines, in both competitive
and cooperative settings, without any further assumptions on port’s market share. It also
supports what-if analysis in such a way that their model, or the aforementioned models
discussed so far, could not.
Besides the applications of cooperative game theory in the container-shipping industry,
[36] showed that a significant decrease in the systemwide cost of the southern Sweden
forestry industry could be achieved by a cooperation within the forestry companies. Similar
to [36], but with different setting of cooperation, [8] proposed a methodology to answer one
interesting question: how should the collaborating group be formed? They answered such
a problem by modeling it as a transferable utility game in an extensive form, where a
subset of players in the leading companies (LC) was considered as the first and central
decision maker offering the proposition of bilateral agreement to the rest in the non-leading
companies (NLC), one at a time. Each players in the NLC decided whether to accept or
reject the proposal offered by the LC, whose proposition was offered only once. Once the
coalition formation ended, a set of potential solution paths would be revealed, together
with their associated payoff vectors. The optimal path was then determined based on the
concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) using backward induction.
Interested readers should refer to [79] and [30] for the comprehensive review of coopera-
tive game theory in coalition games, and a detailed discussion of the general framework for
cost allocation.
6.3 The Structure of Stability
Conceptually, a community of customers at a hub is stable if no customer is better off
moving his business to the competing ports. This means that the hub is resistant to the
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external forces from both its competitors and customers. In particular, we can analyze the
stability of a logistics hub by the following steps (see Figure 36).
• Step 1: Given infrastructure of ports in a competition and a set of actions to be
executed by competitors, we establish a model called the Liner Shipping Cooperative
Model to predict the diversion of container flow made by shipping lines in a cooperative
setting.
Conceptually, we use such a model to minimize total operating costs of a group of
shipping lines taking both port infrastructure and other cost factors into account.
Such a model is then sequentially solved from a singleton containing one particular
shipping line to the grand coalition constituting all lines. At each step, shipping lines
are assumed to work as a single entity planning for a centralized operational plan that
benefits them as a whole. As the coalition grows larger, shipping lines are expected to
perform better; and, the grand coalition is the most desirable state for all lines with
the largest surplus. In our study, market stability is reached when the grand coalition
has been formed.
• Step 2: At stability, we compute value of cooperation for each shipping line based
on the Shapley value. In this context, value of cooperation indicates incentive that a
shipping line expects to receive from cooperation.
• Step 3: From the logistics hub’s perspective, the grand coalition may be regarded
as the expected outcome caused by competitors, and the value of cooperation is the
condition that stabilizes it.
A hub can comprehend how container flow has been shifted from one to another
state during the formation in Step 1, as well as the condition sustaining the stable
community of shipping lines from Step 2. This information, in turn, allows the hub
to destabilize undesirable outcomes by devising and evaluating counter strategies or
















Figure 36: An analytical framework for investigating the stability of a logistics hub in a
competitive environment.
Our proposed methodology differs from the existing research in three ways. Firstly,
while most of the existing models may incorporate both explicit and implicit costs into
consideration, an implicit cost, such as waiting or congestion, is improperly captured. Par-
ticularly, such a function is modeled by means of G/G/m queuing model [41], where the
distribution of container processing time and interarrival time of the containers at ports are
assumed to be general with m operating cranes. As a consequence, given port infrastruc-
ture, we can compute the average waiting time that each container must wait in the steady
state.
In general, as container flow reaches port capacity, the average waiting time abruptly
increases. This means that shipping lines who operate at congested or highly utilized ports
will suffer more from this implicit cost. In the literature, we may model this cost by a
piecewise linear function, where such a cost is linearized into several connected segments as
an approximation of the original function. However, there is a pitfall with regard to this
particular technique; containers are assessed with different average waiting times, which is
improper to reflect the congestion at busy ports as they handle a great number of containers
at all times.
In our proposed cooperative model, we address this issue by using an alternate approach
called the piecewise-affine cost function introduced by [89], which assigns only one cost rate
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to all containers, modeled as a mixed integer program.
Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to tackle this problem by means
of an optimization-based cooperative game theoretic approach. More precisely, instead of
defining relationship between interested quantities, we take advantage of the optimization
model to explain such a mechanism, without need of any further assumptions for the char-
acterization of the model’s solution.
Lastly, the structure of our proposed methodology allows us opportunity not only to
investigate the behavior of shipping lines taking port information into account but also
to provide insights into the changes in container-flow patterns. This information, in turn,
allows a logistics hub to comprehend and quantify the threats posed by its competitors,
which is crucial for devising counter strategies or policies attaining its stability in the future.
It is worth noting that, depending on the structures of cooperation, we may use variants
of the Shapley value for the evaluation of shipping line’s value of cooperation in Step 2.
And since there exist several variants that might be useful for our study, we will next review
the concept of cooperative game theory and the Shapley value, together with its variants
and applications, in Chapter 7, while the detailed discussion of liner shipping cooperative
model and its results will be presented in Chapter 8.
Interestingly, as the concept of the Shapley value is gradually built, the connection
between the Shapely value and centrality measures will become more apparent. At the end
of Chapter 7, by using network expansion as a criterion, we show that the Shapley value
might be used as a centrality measure to identify key operational lines at ports.
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CHAPTER VII
THE SHAPLEY VALUE, CENTRALITY MEASURES, AND KEY
OPERATIONAL LINES
In complex systems, where the interaction among members affects their decisions and wel-
fare, Game Theory is regarded as a proper tool for the behavioral study of those rational
decision makers. In a non-cooperative game, each player independently chooses the strat-
egy that maximizes its own welfare assuming that other players would react to its action
rationally. On the contrary, if players are allowed to cooperate, we call such a game a coop-
erative game, where a group of cooperating players is usually referred to as a coalition, or an
alliance in the context of shipping liners. While cooperation could help increase systemwide
welfare, and so better payoff, one question needs to be answered: How would this surplus
be fairly allocated to each member of the coalition? In this chapter, we will discuss one
prominent solution strategy for such an allocation, called the Shapley Value. And, as the
concept of the Shapley value is gradually built, the connection between the Shapley value
and centrality measures will be more apparent. This suggests that the Shapley value may
be used as a centrality measure to identify key players in cooperative games. Based on this
observation, we show that the most influential shipping lines at a port, or Key Operational
Lines, could be revealed by such a value.
7.1 The Shapley Value
In cooperative game theory, we define N as a non empty set of players and any subset s ∈ N
is called a coalition, where the grand coalition is the one that constitutes all players. Given
a coalition s, the coalition value v(s) is defined as total worth gained from such a structure
— which is usually referred to as a characteristic function — and by definition v(φ) = 0. If
total worth could be divided and allocated to the coalition members freely, i.e. there is no
restriction on the distribution of total worth among members, such games are called games
with transferable utility (TU), else the games are nontransferable (NTU). Since our focus
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lies on the TU games, from here on, unless specified, all games are considered TU games.
The Shapley value is one of the solution strategies that allocates total worth v(s) to the
coalitional members based on three axioms: dummy, symmetry, and additivity, where the
allocation vector φi(v) denotes the worth each member i ∈ s receives.
Axiom 7.1.1 Dummy (Carrier): Define a coalition s as a carrier of game v if and only
if v(s ∩ t) = v(s) for all s ⊆ N . It follows that, for any game v and coalition s, if s is a
carrier of v, then
∑
i∈s φi(v) = v(s).
Intuitively, the first axiom states that dummy players, i.e. any players who are not the
carrier, contribute nothing to the coalition. Therefore, they should not get any worth from
the allocation.
Axiom 7.1.2 Symmetry: Let v be a game and π be a one-to-one permutation function
mapping N onto N , where π(i) = j. Moreover, for any game v and coalition s, let πv be
the game such that πv{π(i)|i ∈ s} = v(s) for all s ⊆ N , we have φπ(i)(πv) = φi(v).
This axiom states that the role of player i in v, and π(i) in πv, are essentially the same.
In other words, relabeling does not change total worth of the coalition.
Axiom 7.1.3 Additivity (Linearity): For any games v and w, φ(v + w) = φ(v) + φ(w).
Prominently, Shapley has shown that, given a game v, there exists a unique function φ,
or the Shapley value, satisfying those three axioms.
Theorem 7.1.1 The Shapley value: There exists a unique function φ mapping coalition
vector v to RN which satisfies all three axioms, i.e. dummy, symmetry, and additivity




(|s| − 1)!(|N | − |s|)!
|N |!
(v(s)− v(s− {i})) (86)
Interestingly, the Shapley value has a nice interpretation in terms of a probabilistic
model. Suppose that all players are going to form the grand coalition at a specific place.
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However, each player can enter the place one at a time. Clearly, there would be |N |!
combinations of queues possible. Further assume that the next player to enter the place is
player i and the resulting coalition to be formed is s. Without player i, the total worth would
be v(s−{i}) and the marginal contribution of player i to the coalition s is v(s)−v(s−{i}).
Since (|s|−1)!(|N |−|s|)!|N |! is the probability that player i would find itself in the coalition s once
it enters the place, the Shapley value is indeed the expected payoff that player i obtains
under this randomization scheme.
Besides the Shapley value, we will briefly discuss other prominent solution strategies
called the core and the nucleolus1. The core of a game is defined as the set of allocated
payoffs that no member is better off in any coalitions. Mathematically, if x ∈ RN is an
allocation vector, where
∑
i∈n xi = v(N), x is in the core if and only if
∑
i∈s xi ≥ v(s),
∀s ⊆ N . Although the core solution is appealing in terms of stability, researchers have
found that the core might be empty and finding the core solution is as hard as solving an
NP-complete problem (as cited in [79]). Additionally, the core is not uniquely defined and
the allocations that lie in the core might not be fair to all players.
The nucleolus of a game is defined as the allocation vector that minimizes player dissat-
isfaction. More formally, given a coalition s, the excess e(x, s) = v(s)−
∑
i∈s xi, is defined
as a measure of dissatisfaction of the allocation vector x in coalition s, and O(x) is the
excess vector of x arranged in a non-increasing order. The allocation vector x such that
O(x) is lexographically less than O(δ), for any allocation δ, is called the nucleolus. While
the nucleolus is quite an interesting solution concept, it has been rarely studied due to its
computational complexity.
7.2 Variants of the Shapley Value
7.2.1 Graph-Restricted Games
According to the calculation of the Shapley value, all coalitions are assumed to be equiprob-
able. Yet, in practice, some coalitions might not even exist. For example, let us consider
a three-player game, where (i) player 1 desires to cooperate with both players 2 and 3, (ii)
1Interested readers may find detailed discussion about the core and the nucleolus in [61] and [79].
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player 2 prefers to cooperate with only player 1, and (iii) player 3 wants to cooperate with
only player 1. This dilemma would make coalitions {123}, {12, 3}, and {13, 2} seem im-
plausible. However, if we consider the cooperation between members as cooperative links,
this puzzle is immediately solved, and the graph shown in Figure 37 properly reveals their
cooperation preferences. In the literature, we refer to this kind of games, where the coalition
is represented by a restricted cooperative graph as graph-restricted games.
1
2 3
Figure 37: A graph representing cooperative preference of a three-player game, where (i)
player 1 desires to cooperate with both players 2 and 3, (ii) player 2 prefers to cooperate
with only player 1, and (iii) player 3 wants to cooperate with only player 1 [59].
To establish a fair allocation, let N be a non empty set of players and CL be the set
of all coalitions formed by members of N , i.e. CL = {s|s ⊆ N, s 6= φ}. A graph-restricted
game is defined as vector v in RCL; and, for any game v ∈ RCL and coalition s ∈ CL, we
define v(s) as total transferable utility of coalition s.
In addition, let g be the network containing a list of unordered pairs, or links, connecting
nodes i and j, denoted as ij. If we let gN be the complete graph, i.e. graph containing all
links connecting all nodes, then G = {g|g ∈ gN} represents the set of all possible graphs
generated by N players.
For simplicity, from here on, we denote the symbol \ as the removal operation. For
example, given a coalition s and node j, s\j denotes the removal of node j from coalition
s, i.e. s\j = {i ∈ N |i ∈ s, i 6= j}. Similarly, g\nm = {ij|ij ∈ g, ij 6= nm}. Lastly, given
a graph g and coalition s, g|s denotes the resulting graph after removing all links except
those connecting nodes within s, i.e. g|s = {ij|ij ∈ g and i, j ∈ s}, while s|g denotes the
partition of s on g, or the collection of smaller coalitions of s induced by graph g. In other
words, the symbol | denotes the division of the first component based on the structure of
129
the second component.
Let Yi(g) be the expected payoff of player i under cooperative graph structure g, [59]
shown that the payoff vector Y (g) could be axiomatically derived the same way as that of
the Shapley value, but with two allocation rules, (i) component balanced condition and (ii)
equal bargaining power condition.
Definition 7.2.1 Component Balanced Condition: An allocation Y is component balanced
if for any graph g ∈ G and any coalition s ∈ g|N ,
∑
i∈s Yi(g) = v(s). In other words, for
any connected component of g, total worth of s, denoted as v(s), should be allocated only to
the members of s. In addition, this allocation rule is independent of connected structures.
Definition 7.2.2 Equal Bargaining Power Condition: An allocation Y is equal bargaining
power if for any graph g ∈ G and ij ∈ g, Yi(g) − Yi(g\ij) = Yj(g) − Yj(g\ij). In other
words, players i and j equally benefit or lose from the removal of cooperative link ij.
As proven by [59], there exists a unique fair allocation Y satisfying these two rules, as




(v(g|s ∪ {i})− v(g|s))
(




Moreover, if v ∈ RCL is supperadditive, i.e. for any game s and t in RCL, if s ∩ t 6= φ
and v(s ∪ t) ≥ v(s) + v(t), the allocation vector Y is also proven to be totally stable.
Example 7.2.1 Consider a three-player game with v ∈ RCL, where v({1}) = v({2}) =
v({3}) = 0, v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 1, and v({1, 2}) = v({1, 2, 3}) = 2. If the cooperative




(v(g|s ∪ {1})− v(g|s))
(
|s|!(|N | − |s|!− 1)!
|N |!
)





= 16(2− 0) =
1
3 .





= 16(1− 0) =
1
6 .









Here we have Y1(g) =
5
6 . Similarly, Y2(g) =
5
6 and Y3(g) =
2
6 , and the allocation vector





In this example, we find that both the core and the nucleolus lead to the same allocation
vector (1,1,0) as player 3 is considered as a dummy player. However, in terms of the
cooperative graph, if either player 1 or player 2 is about to break its relationship with player 3,
its allocated worth would decrease, i.e. Y ({12, 23}) = (12 ,
1











3) is indeed stable and fair for this game.
7.2.2 Games in Partition Function Form
Games in partition function form were firstly introduced by [86], and [60] has extended
the result of the Shapley value to such games. In that setting, we assume that the payoff
of any coalition depends not only on its members but also on the structure outside the
formed coalition. More specifically, given a coalition s, the coalitional structure set B is
defined as B = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sl} such that ∀i 6= j, si ∩ sj = φ, and ∪ii=1si = N , where the
total worth of coalition s depends on both s and B that s ∈ B, denoted as v(s,B). For
example, let us consider a four-player game, where s1 = {12}, s2 = {34}, s3 = {3}, and
s4 = {4}. In addition, let B1 = {s1, s2} and B2 = {s1, s3, s4}. In this game, although the
coalition s1 is a member of both partitions B1 and B2, as the partitions B1 and B2 differ,
v(s1, B1) 6= v(s1, B2).
In the literature, this type of effect is usually referred to as the externality. To model
externality [60], let B be the set of all partitions of N , we define the embedded coalitions,
denoted as ECL, as the set of coalitions that specifies the structure of the coalition formed
by both players inside and outside coalition s, that is, ECL = {(s, q)|s ∈ q ∈ B}.
With all of the aforementioned notations, games in partition function form are defined
as vectors in RECL, and, for any game w ∈ RECL and (s, q) ∈ ECL, w(s, q) is total
transferable utility of coalition s in partition q. Deriving from the same axioms as those of
the original Shapley value, it was shown by [60] that there exists a unique function mapping
games in partition function form to allocation vectors in RN , denoted as Φ(w), where the
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(|q| − 1)(|N | − |s̃|)
w(s, q) (88)
Example 7.2.2 Consider an arbitrary three-player game, by Expression (88), Φ1(w) could




w({1, 2, 3}, {{1, 2, 3}}) + 1
6
w({1, 2}, {{1, 2}, {3}})
−1
3
w({3}, {{1, 2}, {3}}) + 1
6
w({1, 3}, {{1, 3}, {2}})
−1
3
w({2}, {{1, 3}, {2}}) + 2
3
w({1}, {{1}, {2, 3}})
−1
3
w({2, 3}, {{1}, {2, 3}})− 1
3




w({2}, {{1}, {2}, {3}}) + 1
6
w({3}, {{1}, {2}, {3}})
Regarding the first term of this expression, we have |q| = 1 and |s̃| = 0. Thus, the





= 13 . Similarly, since both
the second and the third terms appear in partition q = {{1, 2}, {3}}, we have |q| = 2, and 16
and −13 are the coefficients of the second and the third terms, respectively.
7.2.3 Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
If we view a coalition formation as a sequential process, the worth each player gets might
depend not only on its members but also on the order of players forming such a coalition.
For example, consider a three-player game raised by [70], where player 1 has two machines
which are of value to him only if he could sell them. Players 2 and 3 could use these
machines to produce goods for sale. Assume that both players 2 and 3 have valued the
first inferior machine equally as 1 monetary unit, while players 2 and 3 have valued the
second superior machine differently as 2 and 3 monetary units. While both players 2 and 3
try to buy the second machine first, player 1 is going to sell it to anyone offering the best
price. In this setting, it is evident that total worth of any coalitions inevitably depends on
the order of the players forming the coalitions. For example, if player 2 offers to buy the
second machine and at that time player 3 has not shown up yet, S = {1, 2, 3}, the total
worth of this coalition would be 3, v(1, 2, 3) = 2 + 1. However, if player 3 shows up before
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player 2 does, the coalition formed would be S = {1, 3, 2} and its associated total worth is
4, v(1, 3, 2) = 3 + 1.
In conclusion, we have the following.
v(1, 3, 2) = v(3, 2, 1) = v(2, 3, 1) = v(3, 2, 1) = 4
v(1, 2, 3) = v(2, 1, 3) = 3
v(1, 2) = v(2, 1) = 2 and v(1, 3) = v(3, 1) = 3
The coalitions other than those stated above have a worth of zero. In such a case, we can
alternatively say that total worth of the coalitions depends on the information each player
perceived in order, and [70] defined this kind of game as games in generalized characteristic
function form.
More formally, a game in generalized characteristic function form is defined as a function
v that assigns a real value v(T ) to each of the ordered coalition T ∈ Π(s), where Π(s) is
the set of all ordered coalition, and s ⊆ N . [70] shown that such a function, as shown by
Equation (89), was uniquely determined based on the following three axioms, (i) efficiency,






(|N | − |T | − 1)!
|N |!
(v(T, i)− v(T )) (89)







i (v) specifies expected payoff that player i receives from this ran-
domized bidding scheme.
Based on similar concept, [80] introduced another variant of the Shapley value for games
in generalized characteristic function form by (i) modifying null player axiom introduced
in [70] and (ii) adding one more axiom called the symmetry axiom. Regarding null player
axiom, in [70], a player i is defined as a null player if v(T, i) = v(T ) for all ordered coalitions
T not containing i, while, in [80], a player i is a null player if v(T, ih) = v(T ) for all
ordered coalitions T not containing i and h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |T |+ 1}, where (T, ih) denotes the
ordered coalition (i1, i2, . . . , ih−1, i, ih, ih+1, . . . , i(|T |)) — this could be viewed as a stricter
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version, where a null player contributes nothing independently of his position in the ordered
coalitions of every game v.
For symmetry axiom, players i and j are symmetric in game v if for every ordered
coalition T such that, for i, j /∈ T , v(T, ik) = v(T, jk) for all k = 1, 2, . . . , |T | + 1. In other
words, if players i and j are symmetric, total worth under games v would be the same.
According to the aforementioned axioms, [80] axiomatically characterized a variant of







(|N | − |T | − 1)!




v(T, il)− v(T )
)
(90)
7.3 Applications of the Shapley Value in Cooperative Games
In the literature, cooperative game theory and the Shapley value have been intensively
studied and successfully applied in many applications. Examples include communication
networks, logistics and transportation systems, and bioinformatics. Due to their viability,
in this section, we will present two interesting applications of the Shapley value. Based on
the results of these applications, we are able to develop a game-based centrality measure
for the identification of key operating lines at ports discussed in the following section.
7.3.1 Maximum Flow Games
Let G = (V,E) be a network, where V represents a set of nodes and E represents a set
of (directed) links. Assume that each node has control over a specific set of links, which
consequently limits the flow passing each link. In logistics network, we may consider a node
as a shipper, where each link denotes either shipping capacity or contracted capacity between
shippers. Without cooperation, each shipper can use only its own controlled network for
fulfilling their shipment, which might leave some of its capacity unfulfilled.
To visualize this, let us consider an example network from [76], shown in Figure 38,
where s and t denote source and sink node. Additionally, node 1 has control over edge set
{s1,1t}, node 2 has control over edge set {s2,12,32,2t}, and node 3 has control over edge














Figure 38: An example for describing the use of the Shapley value in a maximum flow game
[76].
If we let v(s) be the maximum flow of coalition s, under the myopic strategy, each
shipper will have limited capacity of v(1) = 19, v(2) = 37, and v(3) = 26, or equivalently
the total capacity of 82. However, they could do better in a cooperative setting, which is
evident from the increase in maximum flow from source to sink as the coalition gets bigger,
v(12) = 64, v(13) = 45, v(23) = 73, and v(123) = 100.
Assume further that fulfilling a unit of flow from source to sink would leave a profit
of one monetary unit to a shipper, as the maximum flow is attained only from the grand
coalition, every player would be tempted to form the grand coalition in order to enjoy the
surplus of 18 more monetary units. [76] referred to this problem as the maximum flow game,
where the Shapley value was used as an allocation rule to sustain the grand coalition.




[v(1)− v(0)] + 1
6
[v(12)− v(2)] + 1
6
[v(13)− v(3)] + 1
3
[v(123)− v(23)] = 23.
Similarly, the payoffs of players 2 and 3 are φ2(v) = 46 and φ3(v) = 31. Since it is
well known that the core of flow games is non-empty and we can verify whether the point
(23, 46, 31) lies in the core by substituting it into the definition of the core, it is not difficult
to show that this allocation vector indeed lies in the core. Therefore, it is a stable solution.
7.3.2 Vertex Connectivity Rating
Another interesting application of the Shapley value in network analysis was presented by
[1], where the Shapley value was used as a centrality measure for assessing the influence of
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vertices in terms of their connectivity. In that setting, given a graph G = (V,E), we say
that G is strongly connected if for every pair of vertices u, v ∈ V there is a path defined
on E connecting u to v. In addition, for any coalition s ⊆ V , the characteristic function
v(s) is defined as total number of strongly connected components on graph G induced by a
set of vertices in s. Intuitively, the smaller the value of the Shapley value, the greater the
connectivity.
For later reference, let SCC(G) denote the set of all strongly connected components of
G and fG be the characteristic function mapping any subsets s of V to a real number in R,
that is fG(s) = |SCC(G|s)|, where G|s denotes the subgraph of G induced by s for every
subset s ⊆ V .
For example, consider a directed network G containing eight vertices as shown in Figure
39. Apparently, since G is strongly connected, we must have fG(V ) = 1. And, based on the
aforementioned characteristic function v, we can calculate the Shapley value of all nodes as























Figure 39: An application of the Shapley value for vertex connectivity rating on a directed
graph G containing eight vertices [1].
Although such an application is quite interesting in many aspects, it is quite costly for
both, counting the connecting subgraphs and calculating the Shapley value. Yet this appli-
cation suggests how cooperative game theory could be connected with centrality measures
in network analysis.
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7.4 Cooperative Game-Based Centrality Measures and Their Applica-
tions
The foundation of cooperative game-based centrality measures might have originated from
the study of power in the context of game theory, where the Banzhaf power index might be
considered as the very first measure of power.
Consider a weighted voting game, where N denotes a set of political parties, where each
political party i ∈ N has a weighted voting power wi, 0 < wi ≤ 1 and
∑
i∈N wi = 1. In
such a game, a coalition is defined as winning if the sum of its members’ weighted voting
power is equal to or greater than a threshold q. A political party i is called a decisive vote,
if its defection leads to losing. In the literature, the decisive vote is usually referred to as
swing mimicking its nature, and the Banzhaf power index of the political party i, denoted
as Bi, is defined as Equation (91).
Bi =
number of swings of party i
total number of swings for all parties
(91)
In general, the normalized version of such an index might be preferable since it allows
us to compare the players’ power across networks. In order to do so, if |N | = n, there are
2N−1 possible coalitions, and, hence, we have the following.
Bi =
number of swings of party i
2N−1
(92)
By using the Banzhaf power index as an alternative measure of node centrality, [39]
redefined the winning coalition as the existence of path connecting nodes, where node i was
a decisive vote if its deviation led to the failure of the winning coalition, i.e. the coalition
could not be formed when node i disappears.
Another interesting class of cooperative game-based centrality measures was introduced
by [38], where the centrality of a node was defined as the difference between the Shapley
values obtained from two different structures of graph games. In order to visualize this
concept, let us consider a three-party voting game discussed in [38], where each party has
different voting power: 40, 20, and 40 %. In addition, assume that each member of each
party has agreed to vote in block. Suppose that, for passing a bill, it requires at least 2/3 of
all votes, which is only possible when the first and the third parties have formed a coalition.
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Since party 2 is a dummy player, and by the symmetry axiom, parties 1 and 3 would have
equivalently the same bargaining power, which leads,
φ1(v) = φ3(v) =
1
2
, and φ2(v) = 0.
[38] pointed out that this allocation was reasonable only if all coalitions were equally
possible; however, in many cases, some coalitions might not even exist with regard to the
relationship among players. For example, if parties 1, 2, and 3 are aligned from the liberal
to the conservative one, it is less likely that parties 1 and 3 could reach an agreement to
form a coalition without party 2. Hence, the only coalition possible now has become the
grand coalition. With this information, we may model this game as graph-restricted game,
and, by Equation (87), we have,




where g = {12, 23}. It is evident that party 2 has increased its power with regard to its
position, while the power of both parties 1 and 3 have been decreased.
By exploiting the difference between these two values, [38] successfully defined a new
class of centrality measures based on cooperative game theory, where the greater the dif-
ference, the better the centrality of a player. As an extension to their previous work, [21]
introduced another family of centrality measures defined on directed networks by defining
centrality as the difference between the allocations with and without graph restriction.
Similar to [38], [97] explored and used a cooperative game-based centrality measure as
power index by defining players’ power as the difference between two reference values, called
the reference-point dependent measure.
Lastly, as motivated by [38], [58] have established a cooperative game-based centrality
measure for assessing gene centrality in a bioinformatics application, whose objective was
to investigate the most centrality, or powerful, genes causing genetic disorders. In their
setting, two different sets of genes have been firstly defined, (i) a set K of key genes and (ii)
a set N of interested genes supposedly affecting key genes, i.e. when genes in N interact
with genes in K, some genetic disorders might occur.
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If we let I be a set of interactions between genes in N and K, i.e. I ⊆ {{i, k}|i ∈ N, k ∈
K}, the triplet (N,K, I) represents the situation when genes in N and genes in K interact
with interactions in I.
Based on the assumption that, given a set of genes s ⊆ N , the more interactions between
genes in s and key genes K, the higher the possibility that genes in s evolves in the interested
biological process, [58] define a characteristic function v(s) as the number of key genes in
K that only interacts with genes in s by interaction I. The pair (N, v) is now defined as an
association game corresponding to the triplet (N,K, I). Since not all coalitions are possible,
they define a specific network structure of interactions among genes in N prohibiting some
coalitions from being formed, called the interaction network < N,Γ >, where Γ is a set of
edges connecting genes in N .
With all of the aforementioned notations, the centrality measure of genes in N , defined
as γi(v,Γ), could be calculated through Expression (93).
γi(v,Γ) = Yi(Γ)− φi(v) (93)
Based on their example, consider a set of key genes K = {a, b, c}, a set of genes
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, a set of interaction I = {1a, 1b, 3b, 3c, 4c}, and a set of interaction Γ =





Figure 40: An example of the association game, where the interaction set I is represented
by thin lines and the interaction set Γ is represented by thick lines [58].
By ignoring the interactions of genes in N , we have v(2) = v(3) = v(4) = v(2, 3) =
v(2, 4) = 0, v(1) = v(1, 2) = v(1, 4) = v(3, 4) = v(1, 2, 4) = v(2, 3, 4) = 1, v(1, 3) =
v(1, 2, 3) = 2, and v(1, 3, 4) = v(1, 2, 3, 4) = 3. After applying the Shapley value to such a
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graph, we have φ(v) = (32 , 0, 1,
1
2).
Similarly, in its graph-restricted version, where the interaction Γ has been imposed on








2), and the centrality of genes in N , which is the




6 , 0). This implies that, with the
existence of connecting edges within gene set N , gene 2 is the most influential gene, not
gene 1.
7.5 An Application to Liner Services at a Port
In the shipping industry, cooperation among shipping lines is not unusual since forming an
alliance with other lines helps enhance liner shipping operations in many ways [5]. Firstly,
since liner shipping is a capital intensive industry and ocean vessels are getting bigger in
order to take advantage of economies of scale by pooling vessels within the alliances, all lines
are better off in terms of capacity utilization. This directly helps decrease each member’s
operational cost. In addition, by forming an alliance, shipping lines would be able to explore
new markets by creating new service routes joining their core shipping networks with those
of other members via transshipment.
Observe that, it is also the shipping lines that provide port connectivity for transship-
ment. A port may lose its connectivity, and so its competitiveness, if these customers decide
to move their operations away to the competitors. In the worst case, this may trigger a
series of defections by other shipping lines whose transshipment opportunities have been
reduced. To survive in this situation, a port has to understand how important each of its
customers is, and use this information to estimate the damage from each defection. This
information would in turn allow the port authority to keep its customers, or, at least, lessen
the effect of container bleeding. In order to do so, the port authority may need to identify
the most influential shipping lines, or key operational lines, of the port and treat them with
different standards.
For example, let us consider an integrated service network provided by four shipping lines
at the port of Singapore, namely, Maersk Line, CMA CGM, APL, and Evergreen2. Each
2All information is provided on shipping lines’ websites as of October, 2010.
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shipping line has a different number of services, both from and to the port of Singapore, as
well as total number of reachable ports, which defines the size of its core shipping network.
Table 40: Information of service routes, from and to the port of Singapore, together with
total number of reachable ports of the four interested shipping lines.
Shipping Lines Incoming Routes Outgoing Routes Reachable Ports
Maersk 27 29 183
CMA CGM 17 17 287
APL 43 43 137
Evergreen 17 15 141
From Table 40, APL may be regarded as the most powerful shipping line at the port
of Singapore based on the number of routes; however, the size of its core shipping network
is the lowest. If there exist bigger shipping lines that provide service services covering all
ports that APL serves, losing APL will not seriously affect worldwide connectivity of the
port of Singapore.
By considering worldwide connectivity shrinkage as the most important factor, the most
powerful shipping line is the one whose existence increases total number of reachable ports
the most. Mathematically, if we define N as a set of shipping lines, A as a set of coalitions,
or liner shipping alliances, and R(i) is the set of line i’s reachable ports, a connectivity
game could be defined as v ∈ RA, where v(s) is the incremental number of reachable ports
from coalition s. For example, v(i) = 0, ∀ i ∈ N , and v(s) = {∪i∈s(∪i∈sR(i) − R(i))}. By
applying the Shapley value to this game, we have φ(v) = (80.75, 106.75, 65.42, 66.08).
According to the Shapley value, we can conclude that, with respect to worldwide con-
nectivity shrinkage, CMA CGM is the most powerful shipping line to the port of Singapore,
while both APL and Evergreen are relatively the least powerful.
Similarly, we can use another metric to identify key operational lines other than network
expansion, such as origin-destination pair expansion or container flow; however, it is worth
noting that the best metric should be the one that most reflects port interest.
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7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have provided fundamental concepts of the Shapley value and its variants,
which may be considered as an alternative form of centrality measure. We adapt this idea
to define key operational lines at the port of Singapore. We believe such a model can serve
as a guide for assessing shipping line’s incentives in a cooperative setting (see Chapter 8 for
more details). With this piece of information, it is possible for the port authority to devise
strategies to keep shipping lines from decamping to competing ports.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE LINER SHIPPING COOPERATIVE MODEL AND THE
EVALUATION OF MARKET STABILITY OF A LOGISTICS HUB
In order to evaluate market stability of a logistics hub, we develop an optimization model,
called the Liner Shipping Cooperative Model, to predict the diversion of container flow
made by the shipping lines in a cooperative setting — where the grand coalition defines
the stability of a logistics hub. This model is constructed based on the assumption that
shipping line’s operating costs are the main driver affecting the decision of shipping lines.
Once stability has been reached, we compute value of cooperation for each shipping line
indicating its expected incentive for joining such a coalition. This information, in turn,
allows a hub to devise and evaluate counter strategies for destabilizing undesirable outcomes,
and to regain its market share from competitors.
8.1 The Liner Shipping Cooperative Model
Fundamentally, shipping lines decide how to transport their containers based on their total
operating costs. While a portion of these costs may be observed from direct payment
associated with container-shipping operations such as handling cost, the remainder are
somewhat unintentional costs paid for non-value added processes, for example, the waiting
time — as longer waiting time implies more operating costs for the shipping line and more
in-transit inventory for the shipper.
As traffic at mega-hub ports is usually high, congestion and so longer waiting time is
expected. In such a case, waiting cost may affect both shipping line’s and shipper’s opera-
tional costs greatly. While important, waiting cost is usually omitted during planning due
to its complex nature. In particular, no individual shipping line has control over the costly
waiting time as it is a result from both liner shipping uncoordinated plan and port infras-
tructure. However, shipping lines could plausibly avoid congestion by centralized planning,
where they cooperatively re-route their container flow to nearby ports while maintaining
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the connectivity of liner services.
Based on the aforementioned, and the assumption that shipping lines decide solely on
their total operating costs — which include both implicit and explicit costs — we establish
an optimization model, called the Liner Shipping Cooperative Model, to help them decide
how to cooperatively re-route their container flow through ports optimally. Conceptually,
our proposed model takes port infrastructure as input for constructing a waiting cost func-
tion; and, once observed, shipping lines then centrally decide on the diversion of container
flow through ports such that total operating costs are minimized.
8.1.1 A Waiting Cost Function
In the literature, such as [25], [26], and [27], given port infrastructure, the average waiting
cost at a port could be computed by the G/G/m queuing model [41], where the distributions
of both container interarrival time and container processing time at the port are assumed to
be general with m operating cranes. Figure 41, for example, shows two congestion curves
reflecting the average waiting time at ports A and B computed by such a model, where the
infrastructure of both ports are given in Table 41. Observe that, as container flow reaches
the port’s designed capacity, the average waiting time abruptly rises. This implies that the
shipping lines operating at congested or highly utilized ports are expected to pay more for
waiting to be served.
Table 41: Infrastructure of fictitious ports A and B.
Ports Number of Cranes Crane Efficiency Implied Capacity
(TEUs/hr/crane) (kTEUs/month)
A 10 40 288.0
B 6 30 129.6
Though the waiting time is nonlinear in nature, we can linearlize and model it as a
piecewise linear function, where the function of waiting cost is represented by connected
linear segments. This modeling approach has been widely used in the literature for the
modeling of waiting cost. Unfortunately, it has one pitfall, which is its misinterpretation.
More specifically, by using a piecewise linear function, each container will be assessed with
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Figure 41: Congestion curves of ports A and B, up to 99% of port utilization.
different cost rates rather than one, as it should be in the steady state.
To make it clear, let us consider a port with traffic of d containers per month, where
the computed average waiting time is assumed to be td, i.e. each container would remain in
queue for td on average before getting served. Assume further that the average waiting time
is linearized into three segments having u1 and u2 as breakpoints (see Figure 42). With
this modeling approach, the average waiting time of the first u1 units, the next u2 − u1
units, and the last d− u2 units, will be differently calculated based on different rates, that
is, rates 1, 2, and 3. This is clearly an improper estimate of congestion at busy ports as
they generally handle a great number of containers at all times.
In order to address this issue, we instead use the piecewise-affine cost function proposed
by [89]. As waiting cost is part of shipping line’s operating costs, in the following sections,
we will show how to model such costs using these two different modeling approaches.
8.1.2 The Modeling of Shipping Line’s Operating Costs
Observe that the fundamental service of a logistics hub is to facilitate the transshipment
of freight, which, in turn, allows liners to open new markets by calling at such a hub. In
addition, since the majority of container traffic at major hubs, such as port of Singapore,










Figure 42: An illustration of the approximated piecewise linear function of the average
waiting time at a fictitious port with d containers.
ports, we therefore assume that shipping line’s operating costs are mainly constituted of
transshipment related and congestion costs. More specifically, in this work, shipping line’s
operating costs consist of (i) handling cost at ports, (ii) cost of unfilled demand due to
insufficient capacity, possibly caused by connectivity loss, and (iii) congestion cost reflected
by waiting at ports.
In order to describe these cost components properly, we need the following sets, param-
eters, and decision variables.
Sets
• L is a set of shipping lines, where |L| = l.
• K is a set of ports, where |K| = k.
Parameters
• F ij denotes the required number of containers to be transshipped from shipping line
i to j, where a pair (i, j) might be referred to as commodity.
• LCapi denotes total capacity of shipping line i.
• PCapk denotes total capacity of port k.
• cik denotes the handling cost per container that port k charges shipping line i.
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• CWk denotes the waiting cost per container per time unit at port k.
• TLij denotes loss per container of the commodity (i, j)’s unfilled demand.
Decision Variables
• xijk is the number of containers to be transshipped from shipping line i to j at port k
(see Figure 43, for example).





Figure 43: An illustration of decision variable xijk , which could be considered as freight-flow
allocation through k competing ports (k = 2 in this example).
• f ijk is free capacity of shipping line i allocated to commodity (i, j) through port k
• qij is the number of containers of the commodity (i, j)’s unfilled demand.
• yk is total container traffic at port k.
As the coalition’s objective is to minimize total operating costs for all shipping lines in


















< CWk · tk · yk >,
where tk is the average waiting time at port k. In particular, tk is a function of (i)
arrival rate (r), measured in number of containers per time unit, (ii) processing time (p),
measured in time unit per container, and (iii) number of berths or operating cranes (m).
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where ca and ce are the coefficients of variation in container arrival time and container




By modeling the waiting cost as a piecewise linear function [33], we simply replace the
waiting-cost term
∑





where rk is the number of linear segments representing the average waiting cost at port
k and sk,nk is the slope of the n
th




















Based on Equation (95), this modeling approach clearly assigns different cost rates to
the container flow as previously described. We may fix this problem by replacing the waiting
cost function with Equation (96).
Wk(yk) =

sk,1yk + bk,1 , if yk ∈ [0, uk,1]
sk,2yk + bk,2 , if yk ∈ [uk,1, uk,2]
· ·
· ·
sk,rkyk + bk,rk , if yk ∈ [uk,nrk−1 , uk,rk ],
(96)
where Wk(yk) is the congestion cost at port k with yk container traffic. Since Equation
(96) is not in a proper form for the modeling purpose, we therefore introduce binary variable
δk,nk and decision variable zk,nk to help transform such an equation into one single linear
equation.
More precisely, for each k, we have,




 sk,2yk + bk,2 , if δk,1 = 1sk,1yk + bk,1 , otherwise
zk,2 =
 (sk,3 − sk,2)yk + (bk,3 − bk,2) , if δk,2 = 10 , otherwise
zk,rk−1 =
 (sk,rk − sk,rk−1)yk + (bk,rk − bk,rk−1) , if δk,rk−1 = 10 , otherwise.
With logical variable δk,nk , it is obvious that z̄k is the same as Wk(yk) in Expression
(96).
In sum, the modified shipping line’s operating costs, modeled as a piecewise-affine cost

















where z̄k is defined as Equation (97).
While these two cost functions differ slightly, the second modeling approach requires
significantly more variables and sets of constraints to completely describe the problem —
particularly, the waiting cost.
8.1.3 The Constraint Sets of Piecewise-Linear Cost Model
For simplicity, we will focus on a simple model, where transshipment traffic and capacity
are key restrictions.




ij = F ij , ∀(i, j) (99)










f ijk ≤ LCap
i , ∀i (100)
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f ijk ,∀i, k (101)





xijk , ∀k (102)
Additionally, for each of yk,nk , let dk,nk and dk,nk−1 be the breakpoints of the n
th
k
segment of the waiting cost function at port k, where dk,0 is 0, we need,
0 ≤ yk,nk ≤ dk,nk − dk,nk−1, nk = 1, 2, . . . rk,∀k. (103)
5. Additional constraints, i.e. capacity constraints at ports.∑
nk
yk,nk ≤ PCap
k , ∀k (104)
6. Non-negativity constraint.
8.1.4 The Constraint Sets of Piecewise-Affine Cost Model
In this modeling approach, the first three constraint sets are the same as those of the previous
model, but the rest concerning the description of waiting cost are completely different.
1. Proportion of transshipped containers at each port k.
2. Boundary constraint for the capacity of each shipping line.
3. Transshipment traffic could not exceed the capacity of each shipping line at ports.





5. As previously described, δk,nk is used to capture the container traffic at port k. To
control such a variable set, we need 2 logical constraints for each δk,nk as follows.
Dk,nkδk,nk ≤ −(uk,nk − yk) +Dk,nk , ∀nk = 1, . . . , rk − 1 (106)
(dk,nk − ε)δk,nk ≤ (uk,nk − yk)− ε, ∀nk = 1, . . . , rk − 1, (107)
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where Dk,nk and dk,nk is the maximum and the minimum of (uk,nk − yk) defined by
Equations (108) and (109), given that yk ∈ [0, uk,nk ], and ε is a small value.
Dk,nk = maxnk
(uk,nk − yk) = maxnk
(uk,nk)−minnk
(yk) = uk,nk (108)
dk,nk = minnk
(uk,nk − yk) = minnk
(uk,nk)−maxnk
(yk) = uk,1 − uk,nk (109)
For example, let us consider the constraints that control δk,1 as follows.
Dk,1δk,1 ≤ −(uk,1 − yk) +Dk,1 (110)
(dk,1 − ε)δk,1 ≤ (uk,1 − yk)− ε, (111)
If δk,1 = 1 and δk,2 = 0, or equivalently yk ∈ [uk,1, uk,2], we have dk,1 ≤ (uk,1−yk) ≤ 0
and ε ≤ (uk,2 − yk) ≤ Dk,2, which properly describes the container traffic at port k.
Lastly, for i > j, we cannot have δk,i = 1 while δk,j = 0. Therefore, we need,
δk,nk ≤ δk,nk−1, nk = 2, . . . , rk. (112)
6. Decision variable zk,nk must be controlled as described by Equation (97). In doing
so, let Mk,nk and mk,nk be the maximum and the minimum values of sk,1yk + bk,1 for
nk = 1, sk,2yk + bk,2 for nk = 2, and zk,nk for nk ≥ 3, given that yk ∈ [0, uk,rk ]1.
To control the value of zk,1, we need,
(Mk,2 −mk,1)δk,1 − zk,1 ≤ −[sk,2yk + bk,2] + (Mk,2 −mk,1) (113)
(Mk,1 −mk,2)δk,1 + zk,1 ≤ [sk,2yk + bk,2] + (Mk,1 −mk,2) (114)
(mk,2 −Mk,1)δk,1 − zk,1 ≤ −[sk,1yk + bk,1] (115)
(mk,1 −Mk,2)δk,1 + zk,1 ≤ sk,1yk + bk,1. (116)
Based on Inequalities (113) and (114), if δk,1 = 1, we have zk,1 ≤ sk,2yk + bk,2 and
zk,1 ≥ sk,2yk + bk,2, which implies zk,1 = sk,2yk + bk,2. At the same time, from
Inequalities (115) and (116), we have zk,1 ≥ sk,1 + bk,1 + (mk,2 −Mk,1) and zk,1 ≤
1For example, Mk,3 and mk,3 are the maximum and the minimum values of (sk,3− sk,2)yk + (bk,3− bk,2).
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sk,1 +bk,1−(mk,1−Mk,2). Since Mk,nk and mk,nk are defined as the maximum and the
minimum of zk,nk , last two inequalities then provide us range that covers the resulting
equation implied by the first two inequalities. On the contrary, if δk,1 = 0, the last
two inequalities would imply zk,1 = sk,1yk + bk,1, which is covered by the range of the
first two inequalities.
In sum, we have 4 additional constraints for each decision variable zk,nk ; Expressions
(117) - (120) for nk = 3, . . . , rk, together with Expressions (113) - (116), for all k.
Mk,nkδk,nk−1 − zk,nk−1 ≤ −[(sk,nk − sk,nk−1)yk + (bk,nk − bk,nk−1)]
+Mk,nk (117)
−mk,nkδk,nk−1 + zk,nk−1 ≤ [(sk,nk − sk,nk−1)yk + (bk,nk − bk,nk−1)]
−mk,nk (118)
mk,nkδk,nk−1 − zk,nk−1 ≤ 0 (119)
−Mk,nkδk,nk−1 + zk,nk−1 ≤ 0 (120)
Lastly, we need equation (97) to complete this set of constraints.
7. Additional constraints, i.e. capacity at ports.
yk ≤ PCapk , ∀k (121)
8. Non-negativity constraints.
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8.1.5 Piecewise-Linear Cost and Piecewise-Affine Cost Models




















































All variables are positive













































Dkδk,nk ≤ −(uk,nk − yk) +Dk,∀k, nk = 1, . . . , rk − 1
(dk − ε)δk,nk ≤ (uk,nk − yk)− ε, ∀k, nk = 1, . . . , rk − 1
δk,nk ≤ δk,nk−1,∀k, nk = 2, . . . , rk
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(Mk −mk)δk,1 − zk1 ≤ −[sk,2yk + bk,2] + (Mk −mk),∀k
(Mk −mk)δk,1 + zk1 ≤ [sk,2yk + bk,2] + (Mk −mk),∀k
(mk −Mk)δk,1 − zk1 ≤ −[sk,1yk + bk,1], ∀k
(mk −Mk)δk,1 + zk1 ≤ sk,1yk + bk,1,∀k
Mkδk,nk−1 − zk,nk−1 ≤ −[(sk,nk − sk,nk−1)yk + (bk,nk − bk,nk−1)] +Mk, ∀k, nk = 3, . . . , rk
−mkδk,nk−1 + zk,nk−1 ≤ [(sk,nk − sk,nk−1)yk + (bk,nk − bk,nk−1)]−mk, ∀k, nk = 3, . . . , rk
mkδk,nk−1 − zk,nk−1 ≤ 0,∀k, nk = 3, . . . , rk
−Mkδk,nk−1 + zk,nk−1 ≤ 0,∀k, nk = 3, . . . , rk
z̄k = zk1 + zk2 + . . .+ zk,rk−1 , ∀k
yk ≤ PCapk , ∀k
All variables are positive and δk,nk are binary variables
In this model, we replace Dk,nk and dk,nk with Dk and dk, where Dk = uk,rk and
dk = uk,1 − uk,rk . Similarly, we replace Mk,nk and mk,nk with Mk and mk, where Mk =
maxnkMk,nk and mk = minnk mk,nk .
8.1.6 An Example of the Liner Shipping Cooperative Model
Consider a competition between two ports, A and B, with four container-shipping lines,
where the infrastructure of both ports is given in Table 41 (Section 8.4.1) . In addition, the
handling costs per container for all lines at ports A and B are 400 and 300, respectively.
Assume further that total capacities of these four shipping lines are 150, 120, 80, and
60 kTEUs, where the information about transshipment among lines and loss of unfilled
demand is provided in Tables 42 and 43. Lastly, the operating cost per day per container
is 80 for all shipping lines.
Table 42: Transshipment traffic among shipping lines (kTEUs).
Lines 1 2 3 4
1 100 20 10 5
2 20 75 10 10
3 15 5 55 5
4 15 0 0 35
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Table 43: Loss per unfilled container.
Lines 1 2 3 4
1 1,200 1,000 800 800
2 1,000 1,200 800 700
3 1,000 900 1,200 900
4 1,000 1,100 1,000 1,200
Based on the aforementioned information, we found that total operating costs from
the piecewise-linear cost model are much less than that of the piecewise-affine cost model
(140.387M versus 178.661M), where the difference is mainly from the underestimated wait-
ing cost (785.66K versus 20,613K) and loss from unfilled demand (0 versus 30,735k)2. Ev-
idently, by using an improper estimate of waiting cost, the shipping lines will instead pay
253.29M, or 80% more than what they expected. This clearly stresses how important con-
gestion is for the shipping lines.
With better waiting cost estimation, trade patterns also change, mainly at port B, where
the waiting cost is much higher compared to that of port A (Figures 44 and 45).
Port A Port B
Lines
L1(51.016, 20, 10, 5, 15)
L2(20, 0, 10, 10, 0)
L3(15, 5, 55, 5, 0)
L4(15, 0, 0, 35, 5)
L1(48.984, 0, 0, 0, 0)
L2(0, 75, 0, 0, 0)
L3(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
L4(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
Figure 44: Solution to the piecewise-linear cost model, where Li(x
i1, xi2, xi3, xi4, f) denotes
the operational plan of shipping line i in kTEUs.
2Interestingly, while shipping lines have enough capacity to handle all transshipment traffic, it may be
wiser for them to reject some shipment as it does not justify costly waiting time at ports.
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Port A Port B
Lines
L1(9.71, 20, 0, 0, 30)
L2(20, 75, 0, 0, 0.85)
L3(15, 0.85, 55, 5, 0)
L4(15, 0, 0, 35, 0)
L1(90.29, 0, 0, 0, 0)
L2(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
L3(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
L4(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
Figure 45: Solution to the affine-linear cost model, where Li(x
i1, xi2, xi3, xi4, f) denotes the
operational plan of shipping line i in kTEUs.
8.2 The Evaluation of Market Stability of a Logistics Hub
Conceptually, given infrastructure of ports in a competition and a set of actions to be
executed by competitors, we can use the liner shipping cooperative model to predict the
resulting container traffic at all ports. In doing so, we implicitly assume that all shipping
lines deliberately cooperate and simultaneously decide on their operational plans re-routing
their freight flow through ports in such a way that total operating costs are minimized —
which resembles the formation of the grand coalition in the context of cooperative game
theory.
In practice, it is less likely that all shipping lines could take action simultaneously, but
rather through a series of formations from a singleton to the grand coalition. As total
operating costs are less when the coalition grows larger, the grand coalition, or equivalently
the solution to the liner shipping cooperative model, is therefore the most desirable state
for all shipping lines defining stable community of liners at all ports.
If we consider the formation of the grand coalition as a sequential process, we could
observe a progression of reductions in total operating costs, from one to another state until
equilibrium. More specifically, let s1 and s2 be coalition sets such that s1 ⊂ s2 ⊂ N . In
addition, let Cs1 and Cs2 be the associated cost vectors of s1 and s2. Namely, Csi = TC(si),
where TC(Si) is the total cost accrued by shipping lines in coalition si. Since we expect
Cs1 ≥ Cs2 , and Csi ≥ CN , ∀si ⊂ N , by solving a series of liner shipping cooperative
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models, we can observe the effects of competitors’ actions, both cost and coalition changes,
as system gradually moves toward new equilibrium. With this piece of information, a
hub can comprehend how a stable community of liners might be formed. This, in turn,
allows the port authority to devise and evaluate counter strategies protecting its business
from competing ports — by repeating the formation process once again using the previous
equilibrium as the new initial state.
In summary, we can evaluate market stability of a logistics hub by the following steps.
1. Given infrastructure of ports in a competition and a set of actions to be executed,
solve a series of liner shipping cooperative models in a coalition formation setting.
2. Evaluate shipping line’s value of cooperation using the Shapley value, which may be
regarded as incentive each shipping line expects from the cooperation.
3. Utilize the information from Steps 1 and 2 to devise and evaluate counter strategies
protecting its business from competing ports by repeating these three steps.
In the context of cooperative game theory, we may regard the first two steps as the
problem of finding the Shapley value in a coalition formation game, where the characteristic
function of such a game is defined as total cost reduction caused by the coalition formed.
8.2.1 The Coalition Formation Game
In this setting, a set of shipping lines is divided in two groups, that is, a group of shipping
lines with cooperation s and those outside s, denoted as s̄. Given signals from competitors,
we solve a series of liner shipping cooperative models from a singleton, i.e. |s| = 1, reflecting
the decision of each shipping line in a non-cooperative setting, to the grand coalition, i.e.
|s| = N , where all shipping lines cooperate, as shown in Figure 46.
Given a coalition s, the coalition formation game is defined as vector v ∈ Rs, where v(s)
denotes total cost reduction from coalition s. More specifically, v(s) = Cs0 −Cs, where Cs0




1 2 . . . N
...





. . . . . . . . . . . .
1,2,. . . ,N
Figure 46: An illustration of the coalition formation game, where the numbers inside the
circle indicate cooperative group s.
It is worth noting that, in the computation of Cs, we assume that the decisions of
all shipping lines outside s, or s̄, remain the same. In other words, we update only the re-
routing of container traffic within coalition s, while treating all decision variables associated
with shipping lines in s̄ as parameters.
8.2.2 Experimental Results
Let us reconsider the example of liner shipping cooperative model previously discussed in
Section 8.1.6, where the solution to the piecewise-linear cost model is assumed to be base
situation s0. By implementing better approximation technique for the calculation of waiting
cost, trade flow is expected to gradually change and eventually reach new equilibrium, that
is, the solution to the piecewise-affine cost model — assuming that the grand coalition is
eventually formed. Figure 47 shows how trade flow at each port changes at each step of the
formation, together with the coalition and the systemwide cost reductions.
By using the Shapley value as the allocation rule for the total cost reduction of 73.68M,


















































Figure 47: The result of a four-shipping-line coalition formation game with two ports in
a competition. The numbers inside each circle indicate member(s) of cooperative group s,
total flow at ports A and B measured in kTEUs, and total cost reduction from the coalition
s followed by the systemwide cost reduction, except that of state φ, where total cost is
shown.
expected incentives for joining the grand coalition. While this allocation is stable3, it might
seem surprising that shipping line 1 has to pay 8.57M more compared to the solution to
3By substituting this solution into the definition of the core solution.
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the grand model. But this is because such a value is an expectation from all coalitions, not
just the stability state alone.
Regarding flow diversion, interestingly, we have found that trade-flow difference between
s0 and sN at port A is much less than that at port B (2.13% versus 27.18%), which could
be explained by the costly waiting time at port 2. This implies that port infrastructure, or,
equivalently, port efficiency, is the most influential factor for shipping lines in the selection
of their transshipment hubs, not port fees, which is consistent with the empirical studies of
[84] and [88].
8.3 Interesting Implications of the Liner Shipping Cooperative Model
8.3.1 The Order of Shipping Line Defection
In addition to the prediction of trade-flow diversion, we can also predict the order of shipping
line’s defections by defining the most likely coalition formation path based on the result of
the coalition formation game. In particular, such a path is constructed based on the removal
of all coalitions that are less likely to be formed, assuming that shipping lines could join
the coalition one at a time.
These coalitions are usually the ones whose member’s benefits are less than those of the
base solution — in some coalitions, some shipping lines might be worse off as they sacrifice
their own benefits for better coalition-wise results. For example, shipping line 4 in coalition
{1,2,4} in our example has to pay 2.91M more for achieving the coalition-wise cost reduction
of 69.27M. Unless there exists a fair allocation rule for this surplus, shipping line 4 would
be reluctant to join such a coalition making it seem implausible.
From Figure 47, since there is no cost improvement from the singleton coalitions {3} and
{4}, therefore, the most likely coalitions with one member are {1} and {2}. As we assume
that shipping lines could join the coalition one at a time and the coalitions whose member’s
benefits are worse off are unlikely to be formed, so the most likely coalition formation path
predicting the defection of shipping lines in order could be shown by Figure 48.
Based on Figures 47 and 48, it might be inferred that bigger shipping lines, such as
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Figure 48: An illustration of the most likely coalition formation path.
new equilibrium. In addition, small lines, such as line 3 or 4, are more dependent on the
decision made by bigger lines as they could not achieve any improvement, or may even be
worse off4, without joining a coalition.
While our model is only preliminary and not yet populated with actual data, nevertheless
it seems consistent with the observation of shipping line’s relocation at the port of Singapore,
previously discussed in Chapter 6, where Maersk, the biggest operating line, was the first
to move to the port of Tanjung Pelapas followed subsequently by Evergreen, the largest by
the remaining lines at the port of Singapore.
8.3.2 Regaining Market Share
Another implication of the liner shipping cooperative model is the evaluation of counter
strategies for a logistics hub to regain its market share from competitors. Based on our
example, it is evident that both ports suffer from high level of congestion which does not
make good economic sense for shipping lines to operate, especially at port B. With this piece
4For example, in the singleton coalition {2}, lines 3 and 4 outside the coalition are worse off as they have
to pay 1.38M and 8.64M more as a result of line 2’s decision. By realizing this threat, it might be better for
them to seek cooperation with other shipping lines to help reduce their operating costs.
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of information, it might be urgent for port B to improve its infrastructure to accommodate
more freight flow, rather than to focus on lowering port fees, or handling charges. In such
a case, depending on which players are interested, the liner shipping cooperative model,
as well as the coalition formation game, could be used to predict the consequences of the
strategies executed by ports, or shipping lines, in a what-if-analysis fashion.
8.4 Conclusions
The container-shipping industry is a dynamic system involving multiple players, of which
ports and shipping lines might be considered the most crucial. We have established a model
called the liner shipping cooperative model to evaluate market stability of a logistic hub in a
competitive environment. Unlike other models, the liner shipping cooperative model takes
decisions from both shipping lines and ports as input for evaluating the resulting freight-
flow diversion at all ports. As we assume that shipping lines decide based solely on their
operating costs and the grand coalition defines the stable community of liners at a hub, we
can use this model to study the behavior of shipping lines with regard to the changes of
policy or strategies made by ports. Consequently, expected trade-flow loss, as well as the
order of shipping line’s defections, could be predicted and avoided.
While the preliminary results from our model conform with the observation of shipping
line’s relocation at the port of Singapore, where the bigger lines are expected to be the first
movers inducing the smaller ones to new equilibrium, there are several observations worth
to be mentioned.
• Regarding the estimation of the average waiting cost, we have not specified the distri-
bution of either the interarrival or the processing time of container flow, as information
at this level is not generally accessible. However, by using a general distribution, our
estimation of the average waiting cost might be overestimated since the variations
in both interarrival and processing times, i.e. ca and ce, might not be that high in
modern hubs with exceptional port planning and management.
• By using the Shapley value as an allocation rule for the computation of shipping
line’s value of cooperation, we implicitly assume that all coalitions are plausible and
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equiprobable. Yet, if we pose some restrictions on the coalition formation process,
like the one we propose for the finding of the most likely coalition formation path,
coalitions {1,4} and {1,2,4} might not exist. In addition, we intentionally ignore the
effects of externality, as well as those of the order of the formations, on the value of
the game5.
If any of the aforementioned matters, the Shapley value might not be a proper alloca-
tion rule since it is no longer fair for the coalition members in some critical dimensions.
Rather, we might need to modify such an allocation rule, or use the existing variants
of the Shapley value6, that accounts for these kinds of special structures.
• While we use the Shapley value as guidelines for identifying the most likely coalition
formation path, it might be interesting for both ports and shipping lines to know
how the surplus would be allocated to the coalition members based on these specific
sequences rather than the randomization scheme assumed by the original Shapley
value.
According to the above observations, our model can be refined and improved, which
would be useful for answering some interesting upcoming issues in the container-shipping
industry — in particular, the effects of the Panama Canal Expansion on the patterns
of freight-flow diversion. By the completion of its expansion, the Panama canal would
be able to handle the so-called Post-Panamax ocean vessels whose capacity is more than
double that of its current capacity, or up to 13,000 TEUs. Clearly, this would significantly
decrease handling cost per container for the shipping lines deploying larger ocean vessels,
but, without justified infrastructure, this could also be an operational trap as congestion
might outweigh the reduction on operating costs. We also expect that the extension of our
proposed framework would be beneficial for the players concerned as it supports what-if
analysis in such a way that none of the existing models could.
5For example, if we consider coalition {1,2} in an arbitrary four-player game, such a routine will as-
sume that the structure outside the coalition has no effect on the coalition value v(12), or equivalently
v({12}|{12, 3, 4}) = v({12}|{12, 34}). In addition, v(12) = v(21).
6See Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of the Shapley value and its variants.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
In this dissertation, we establish a new measure, called the Container Port Connectivity
Index (CPCI), to more accurately reflect the relative importance of container ports within
the Global Container-Shipping Network (GCSN). Unlike any of the existing measures, the
CPCI is based on both economics and network topology, where it expresses more than
local connectivity to immediate neighbors but also neighbors-of-neighbors, and so on. In
particular, as measured by the CPCI, the most important ports are not necessarily those
with the most links, or those handling the most TEUs, but the ones with good connections
with other well-connected ports. This is a reflection of fact that the CPCI does not depend
only on the number of links but also on link quality and the connectivity of the ports to
which they connect.
The CPCI also allows us to better understand the critical roles of some major ports, as
well as the patterns of trade flow within the network of container shipping. For example, as
measured by the CPCI, Los Angeles and Long Beach are ranked relatively high in terms of
inbound which reflects the fact that these two ports are main entry ports for the products
manufactured in East Asia. Once calling at these two ports, services that have to traverse
the Pacific Ocean typically call at Oakland before returning to the large ports of Asia,
making Oakland relatively important in terms of outbound.
We also show that the CPCI is so flexible that it could take alternative input other
than the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) as link weights. We also show that,
with proper modification, the CPCI could be decomposed into components. This helps us
understand why a particular port has become important — and by which factors.
While the CPCI has many useful properties, it also has some weaknesses. Particu-
larly, in the computation of the CPCI, link weights are represented by the LSCI reflecting
164
shipping capacity and not the actual number of TEUs transported or transshipped — as
information at this level is generally unavailable. Nevertheless, as the LSCI has been vetted
by economists as capturing intensities of trade, our index inherits that descriptive power
and exercises it at a more granular level.
We expect the CPCI to be useful in some of the same ways as those used by the
economists. This may include explaining how the container-shipping network changes over
time or using the link weights and port scores as explanatory variables for economic phe-
nomena. We believe these finer-grained statistics will be easier to understand and to explain
because they directly reflect immediate decisions of primary actors such as shipping com-
panies.
While powerful, the CPCI is only a descriptive index summarizing how well-connected
a port is within the global structure of container-shipping network. It could not provide us
insights into the behavior of shipping lines or ports with respect to major changes within
the container-shipping industry. To better explain the dynamic between those key players,
we establish an analytical framework for evaluating market stability of a logistics hub in
a competitive environment. In particular, we build a model, called the Liner Shipping
Cooperative Model, to help predict how the stable community of liners at a hub might be
formed as the result of actions by competitors.
Although the liner shipping cooperative model is initially developed to explain the be-
havior of shipping line’s defections at the port of Singapore in 2000 [10], nevertheless, it
has been found to be useful for the behavioral study of both shipping lines and ports with
respect to the environmental changes within the container-shipping industry. In particular,
it allows us to alter critical parameters and evaluate the effects of such changes on the
system from one to another stage until new equilibrium has been reached.
While our preliminary results conform with the empirical studies of [84] and [88], where
efficiency is the most influential factor for shipping lines in the selection of their transship-
ment hubs, and the observation of shipping line’s relocation at the port of Singapore, there
are several observations about our model and framework to be mentioned.
• We assume that (i) shipping lines decide based solely on their operating costs and
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(ii) the grand coalition which defines market stability of a logistics hub is eventu-
ally formed. While the first assumption is generally true, shipping lines rarely share
information about their business, even with their partners in the same alliance. In
addition, it is less likely that all shipping lines could cooperatively work as one single
entity, but rather as a collective of alliances. Yet our model is still applicable by
treating each alliance as if it were a single line.
• We consider only the allocation of freight flow through ports in a competition without
considering other constraints, such as minimum contractual volume at ports or route
restriction. Nevertheless, these could be integrated into the model without affecting
our broad framework.
• While we use the Shapley value as guidelines for identifying the most likely coalition
formation path, which indicates the order of shipping line’s defections, it might be
interesting for both ports and shipping lines to know how the surplus would be al-
located to the coalition members based on these specific sequences rather than the
randomization scheme assumed by the original Shapley value.
According to the above observations, our model can be refined and improved, which
would be useful for answering some interesting upcoming issues in the container-shipping
industry — in particular, the effects of the Panama Canal Expansion and the construction
of a canal on Kra Isthmus, the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula separating the Gulf
of Thailand from the Indian Ocean with the distance of only 50 Km, on the patterns of
freight-flow diversion. We expect that the extension of our proposed framework and model
would be beneficial for the players concerned as it supports what-if analysis in such a way
that none of the existing models could.
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